Soon after East Timor voted for independence, the Indonesian news magazine Gatra ran a provocative cover article on the threat posed by Australia, illustrated by a graphic showing arrows arcing up from the Northern Territory into Indonesian Papua.
It played on a popular mood at the time: that Australia, having secured East Timorese independence, next had designs on Papua.
A low-level insurgency in support of independence had persisted in Papua since Indonesia won sovereignty in a controversial and flawed act of “self-determination” in 1969.
While observers in Australia might regard such suspicions as fanciful, they are more widespread, and deeply held, even among those in positions of high authority, than might be imagined.
Indonesia has a long and historically justified anxiety about foreign interference, sometimes verging on neurosis.
The old suspicions flared when Australia agreed to host a rotational US Marine attachment in Darwin in 2011; they arose again on October 6 when Australia signed a defence treaty with Papua New Guinea that committed the two sides to come to each other’s aid in the event of an armed attack “in accordance with (their) constitutional processes”.
The strategic purpose of the “Pukpuk Treaty” unmistakably is to secure Australian interests in the Pacific in the face of growing worries about Chinese activity in the region. Most Indonesian foreign policy and defence planners understand that – they share the concerns.
So far, the public statements from Jakarta have been diplomatic and relatively muted. The Foreign Ministry said Australia and PNG should respect Indonesia’s sovereignty, while noting the rights of other countries to enhance their defence.
But Indonesia is nervous about Papua. Its efforts to turn indigenous Papuans away from aspirations for independence have largely failed. Its reliance on a combination of economic inducements, the subdivision of Papua into new provinces (there are six), and periodic crackdowns on armed insurgents and their civilian supporters have done little to change the preferences of the indigenous Melanesian population.
Figures issued in March by the Central Statistics Agency showed poverty actually has increased in the Papua region, one of only two regions of Indonesia where this occurred. Parts of the highlands have the highest poverty rate in the country at 30 per cent, based on a complex province-by-province formula that determines the minimum amount of money required to meet both food and non-food basic needs.
One retired senior army officer, who has worked on strategic planning for the armed forces (TNI), said realists in the government accepted that only 10 to 20 per cent of the indigenous population supported integration with Indonesia.
Still, after decades of internal migration, it is generally accepted the non-indigenous population is more than 50 per cent, meaning there is little likelihood of the Papuan provinces following the example of East Timor. Moreover, the officer said the TNI estimated the number of insurgents under arms at no more than 200.
Indonesia’s perception of vulnerability in Papua often prevails over this reality. In 2017, the then TNI commander, General Gatot Nurmantyo, briefly suspended military co-operation with Australia after he received complaints from an Indonesian officer over certain “offensive” materials he saw at the Special Air Service Regiment in Western Australia, which reportedly included some on Papua.
The reaction of many senior officers to the signing of the Pukpuk Treaty reflects this historic sensitivity. One well-connected political observer reported several conversations with senior officers from all branches of the TNI in which the treaty was depicted as further evidence of Australian strategic assertiveness, conflating with earlier efforts to deepen the alliance with the US, such as the Darwin deployment. These officers spoke of the need to bolster the army presence along the PNG-Indonesia border.
The political observer said a team was being set up within the Ministry of Defence to assess the implications of the Pukpuk Treaty for Indonesia.
The status of Papua, and Indonesia’s conduct there, will persist as one of the biggest potential flashpoints in bilateral relations.
Every Indonesian government has its Papua strategy; President Prabowo Subianto’s is taking shape. So far, there is little to suggest it will be very different from that of his predecessor, Joko Widodo, or that it will be any more successful in improving the lot of Papuans.
According to a prominent Papuan observer, who has discussed the President’s plans with various officials in the government, Prabowo wants to spread metals industry development to the Papuan provinces to take advantage of its immense natural resource wealth.
He has spoken of establishing several Special Economic Zones in eastern Indonesia. In Papua, the new industrial zones would be powered by green energy by tapping the Mamberamo and Urumuka rivers – a plan Widodo mooted but failed to deliver. The government has been pressing US copper and gold giant Freeport, operator of the Grasberg mine in Central Papua Province, to build another copper smelter in the region, despite the extremely tough global market conditions for these smelters.
To support his Papua strategy, Prabowo recently set up the Executive Committee for the Acceleration of Papua Development, which will report to Vice-President Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Widodo’s son.
The development ambitions might be laudable, but there are valid doubts about who benefits. Powerful Jakarta political-business-military elites have long coveted and prospered from Papuan wealth. For example, Prabowo, as defence minister, launched a plan to develop one million hectares as a food estate in Merauke regency of South Papua. He appointed the South Kalimantan businessman Andi Syamsudin Arsyad, widely known as Haji Isam, to run the project. Critics say it has damaged the environment and done little to improve the welfare of local people.
Prabowo advisers say the President understands the limitations of investment in industry and infrastructure in improving people’s welfare. Consistent with his school programs, Prabowo reportedly wants to place more emphasis on access to services and human development in Papua than in the past. They say he also intends to crack down on misuse of special autonomy funds by corrupt local officials.
The other dimension of Prabowo’s Papua strategy will be an increased security presence. Alongside an increase in the number of provinces is a planned increase in regional military commands and troops.
This likely places the Prabowo strategy squarely in the tradition of his predecessors. He is set to rely on economic incentives and security deterrence to quell separatist sentiment. Such a strategy ignores the reality that many of the Papuan grievances are political and are unlikely to be solved by simply avoiding them.
It stretches credulity that in the current geopolitical environment, the issue of Papuan sovereignty might be reopened or that an independence campaign could be successfully pursued given the “facts on the ground”. But a more enlightened approach to how the region is ruled would benefit Indonesia’s global standing and remove a potential irritant in relations with Australia.
Donald Greenlees is a senior adviser to Asialink, the University of Melbourne.
Authorities need a helicopter to get to the location, or face an eight-hour trek from the nearest town, he said.
The rescue is also being complicated by the fact the area is categorised as a "red zone" in security terms, he added. Papuan separatists have fought for independence since Papua came under Indonesian control following Dutch rule in a vote overseen by the United Nations in 1969. The police said the location of the landslide was in the same area where a separatist group killed dozens of workers who built a bridge back in 2018.
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