1) Unidentified Men Shoot Brimob Plane at Papua Airport

2) Aircraft carrying election material fired on in Papua

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1) Unidentified Men Shoot Brimob Plane at Papua Airport

TEMPO.CO, Jakarta - The Papua police said that that a group of unidentified men shot at a Twin Otter Trigana aircraft chartered by the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) when landing at Keneyam Airport, Nduga, Papua.

The Papua Regional Police spokesman Sr. Comr. AM Kamal said the pilot, Capt. Ahmad Abdillah, suffered gunshot wounds on his back.

"The police and the TNI Army are still chasing after the shooter," Kamal said as ANTARA reported on Monday, June 25.

The Brimob aircraft departed from Wamena Airport, Jayawijaya and landed at Keneyam Airport at around 09:40 East Indonesia Time. As the plane taxied, about 15 people began firing the left side of the fuselage.

In addition to Ahmad, Kamal said that other passengers were also shot by bullets, including coopilot Irene Nur Farida.

Head of the Trigana Jayapura, Toro, confirmed the incident. He said the aircraft crew suffered injuries. Toro said that the crew was flying 18 Brimob officers who will be on duty for the Regional Head Election in Papua, which is on June 27.

"We also received reports that a shoot-out is taking place, and so we cannot rescue the crew and the passengers yet," he added.

ANTARA

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http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/25/aircraft-carrying-election-material-fired-on-in-papua.html

2) Aircraft carrying election material fired on in Papua

Nethy Dharma Somba

Jayapura, Papua | Mon, June 25, 2018 | 12:46 pm

A Twin Otter aircraft carrying election material and the National Police’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob) personnel, which will secure the upcoming regional elections in Papua, was fired on by unidentified assailants shortly after it landed at Kenyam Airport in Nduga at 9:45 a.m. local time on Monday.

Pilot Ahmad Abdillah Kamil, 27, suffered gunshot wounds to his left back during the incident. The perpetrators allegedly carried out the attack from the left side of the aircraft.

The aircraft departed for Kenyam, Nduga, from Wamena Airport in Jayawijaya with 15 passsengers on board. They were all Brimob members assigned to oversee the distribution of election material and secure the Papua gubernatorial election, which will be held on Wednesday.

Papua Police spokesperson Sr. Comr. AM Kamal confirmed the incident. “The pilot has received medical treatment at Kenyam health clinic. He is conscious. Plans have been made for the aircraft to fly the pilot back to Wamena, Jayawijaya,” said Kamal.

Kamal said the police and Indonesian Military personnel were searching for those responsible for the armed attack.

Responding to concerns over security in the election process in Nduga regency, Papua General Elections Commission (KPU Papua) commissioner Tarwinto said the election might be delayed due to the alleged attack, depending on recommendations from security authorities.

Within one week, two aircraft shooting incidents have occurred at Kenyam Airport. On June 22, a Twin Otter Dimonim Air PK-HVU was fired on when it landed at 1:05 p.m. (ebf)

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Timor-Leste – War Memorials or Truth-Telling?

Timor-Leste – War Memorials or Truth-Telling?

Original Politics in the Pub

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Timor-Leste – War Memorials or Truth-Telling?

An Evening with Sr Susan Connelly, a Sister of St Joseph

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1) Indonesia's slow and circuitous road to democracy

2) Indonesian Perspectives: Economic and Security Relations with Australia

3) Gold prospectors demand reopening of gold stores in Timika

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http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-24/indonesias-slow-road-to-democracy/9830834

1) Indonesia's slow and circuitous road to democracy

By Olivia Nicole Tasevski Posted about an hour ago

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the resignation of Indonesia's authoritarian president, Suharto, who led Indonesia from 1966 until 1998. Suharto's resignation, which was motivated by a faltering Indonesian economy and widespread anti-Suharto demonstrations, marked the beginning of Indonesia's transition to democracy. 

Significant progress has been made in relation to Indonesia's democratisation over the past 20 years. 

Nonetheless, a culture of impunity regarding historical human rights abuses persists in Indonesia and human rights violations continue to be perpetrated by the Indonesian government and security forces.

Positive developments in post-Suharto Indonesia

During Suharto's New Order regime, some political parties were banned by the government, in part to prevent them from participating in elections and during elections.

Voter intimidation was used by the Indonesian army (the TNI) to pressure Indonesians to vote for Golkar (Suharto's political vehicle).

During this period, the Indonesian parliament, which was responsible for electing the Indonesian president, was largely stacked with Suharto's supporters and unsurprisingly re-elected Suharto six times.

Post-Suharto era Indonesia has had regular, competitive, free and fair elections, including direct presidential and vice-presidential elections, the first of which occurred in 2004.

During the Suharto regime, the government closed down media outlets that were critical of it. In contrast, post-1998, Indonesian media reports that are critical of the Indonesian government are regularly published.

Moreover, in 2017, Freedom House, an American non-government organisation which monitors human rights globally rated the press in Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste as "partly free" and rated the media in all other Southeast Asian states as unfree in 2017.

Challenges remain on the human rights front

Despite these positive developments in relation to press freedom, foreign journalists' access to the Indonesian province of West Papua, where a pro-independence movement exists, remains restricted by Indonesian authorities.

Furthermore, a BBC journalist was expelled from West Papua this year for criticising the Indonesian government's response to the current malnutrition crisis in the province on Twitter.

Indonesian and Papuan journalists are also at times harassed, intimidated and assaulted by Indonesian security forces.

Since West Papua's annexation by Indonesia in 1963, the TNI and Indonesian police have repeatedly used force against Papuans at protests, resulting in the killings of Papuans, and detainedand imprisoned pro-independence Papuans who participate in protests.

Notably, in 2013, Papuan Oktovianus Warnares was arrested for raising the Morning Star flag (the banned flag of the Papuan independence movement) and remains imprisoned.

The Indonesian army has also not been prosecuted over an alleged massacre in Biak in 1998, when the TNI, led by General Wiranto, were accused of raping, torturing and killing Papuan civilians who raised and guarded the Morning Star flag in West Papua. Given that General Wiranto currently serves as Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs it is highly unlikely that the Indonesian government will seek to combat this culture of impunity in relation to the Biak massacre in the foreseeable future.

Similarly, the TNI, religious organisations and vigilante groups have not been held to account for their involvement in the 1965-66 mass killings, imprisonments and sexual violence in Indonesia

The pretext for these human rights violations was the killing of seven army officers by the 30th September Movement, which the TNI incorrectly blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI).

During 1965-66, at the orders of the anti-communist TNI, led by Suharto, members of religious organisations and vigilante groups armed by the TNI killed approximately 500,000 members of the PKI, individuals formally and informally associated with the PKI and alleged communists.

The military also directly participated in these killings.

During this period, the army imprisoned many individuals without trial and perpetrated sexual violence, including rape, predominantly against female prisoners.

In 2015, Indonesian president Joko Widodo asserted that he had "no thoughts about apologising" about the 1965-66 events.

Bans on Marxism-Leninism, PKI remain

The bans on Marxism-Leninism and the PKI introduced by the anti-communist Suharto regime remain in place in Indonesia. 

In post-Suharto Indonesia, atheism continues to be associated with communism and public expressions of atheism are illegal. 

The ongoing persecution of atheists is illustrated by the fact that in 2012, Alexander An received a two-and-a-half-year jail sentence for posting on Facebook the statement, "God does not exist."

Indonesia's ethnic Chinese population is also subjected to ongoing discrimination as a Suharto-era ban on Chinese Indonesians participating in the armed forces remains in place.

The death penalty, introduced during Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, also continues to be used against locals and foreigners, particularly drug offenders, despite condemnation from local anti-death penalty campaigners and multiple states and the fact that the death penalty violates the right to life enshrined in international human rights law.

At a time of rising authoritarianism in south-east Asia, Indonesia must continue to democratise by addressing historical and contemporary human rights abuses, rather than retaining vestiges of authoritarianism.

Olivia Tasevski is an international relations and political science tutor at the University of Melbourne, where she completed her Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and Master of International Relations. Her honours thesis examined US human rights policy towards Indonesia during Gerald Ford's tenure.

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http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/indonesian-perspectives-economic-security-relations-australia/

2) Indonesian Perspectives: Economic and Security Relations with Australia

31 MAY 2018 Jarryd de Haan, Research Analyst, Indian Ocean Research Programme  Download PDF

• Over the next decade, Australia may become increasingly less relevant to Indonesian economic interests.
• The current trade relationship is skewed in Australia’s favour and Indonesia is likely to look towards other, larger, markets to counter that deficit.
• Australia has gradually reduced the amount of foreign aid to Indonesia while, at the same time, Australian investors are deterred by the generally poor Indonesian business environment.
• There may be an opportunity for Australia to adapt its defence exports to Indonesia’s minimum essential force needs.
• The strongest ties lie in police-to-police links, aimed at combatting terrorism. That relationship could be used as a model for other bilateral linkages.

Summary

As Indonesia’s economy continues to grow and its population swells, the relationship with Australia is becoming more and more asymmetric. From the Australian perspective, it presents some opportunities but, as a counterbalance, Indonesia may be seeking to engage more closely with other, larger, powers in the region. This paper will look at the current economic and security ties in that context and explore some of the possible future prospects for the bilateral relationship.

Analysis

Economic Relations

Australia as an Export Market

As noted in a previous FDI Strategic Analysis Paper, Australia’s economic relationship with Indonesia has begun to falter. Looking at 2017 trade figures from Bank Indonesia, Australia makes up 5.1% of Indonesia’s goods market. In comparison, Indonesia’s largest trading partners in 2016 included China (which imported 13 per cent of Indonesia’s exported goods), Japan (13%) and Singapore (11%). While Australia’s position in the Indonesian market is sizeable, increasing deficits have marred trade relations from Indonesia’s perspective. As seen in Figure 1, between 2000 and 2011 the value of imports closely matched the value of exports; bilateral trade never resulted in a deficit of much more than $500 million for either country. Since then, Indonesian exports to Australia have fallen in value, resulting in a trade deficit for Indonesia of $2.6 billion in 2016, the largest shortfall in the trading relationship to date.

The saving grace of Jakarta’s economic relationship with Canberra lies in Australia’s contribution to the Indonesian tourism industry. Defined as “travel exports” in services trade statistics, tourism is a vital part of the Australian-Indonesian economic relationship and is the single largest source of income for Indonesia in that relationship. When services exports are taken into account, the $2.6 billion trade deficit that Indonesia experienced in 2016 is reduced to $593 million.

Looking to the longer-term, however, Australia does not appear to be the primary market for Indonesian plans to expand its tourism industry. As a previous FDI Strategic Analysis Paper has discussed, Indonesia is expected to focus on increasing the inflow of Chinese and Muslim tourists. Arrivals from China have rapidly overtaken those from Australia and now make up the bulk of international tourists visiting Indonesia. At the same time, the Indonesian Government is working to promote Halal tourism, an approach that holds promising potential, given that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world.

From Indonesia’s perspective, the declining level of its goods exports to Australia is a weak point in the bilateral economic relationship. That may not improve for some time. With Australia’s relatively small population of 24 million, Indonesia is potentially better off seeking to expand trade in other, larger, markets. Historically, China, India and the United States have been the largest and fastest-growing export markets for Indonesia. In the past five years, however, growth in the Chinese and Indian markets has begun to stagnate and, at times, fall. Based on the last five years of Indonesian exports, the Philippines and Vietnam have replaced China and India as the fastest growing markets for Indonesia. Compared to Australia, the Philippine and Vietnamese markets for Indonesian exports are larger, faster-growing and also in close proximity to Indonesia.

It is unlikely that the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) will lead to Australia becoming a primary market for Jakarta. Negotiations surrounding the agreement have been difficult and failed to conclude by the revised December 2017 deadline. That said, when implemented, the IA-CEPA will play an important role in boosting bilateral trade and investment, just not at a level comparable to Indonesia’s larger economic relationships. According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the IA-CEPA aims to address impediments to bilateral trade, including both tariff and non-tariff barriers, to improve access to each other’s services markets and to cut the red tape preventing Australian investment in Indonesia.

Investment

Canberra’s investment relationship with Jakarta has room for improvement from Indonesia’s perspective. According to statistics from Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), Australia ranked as the tenth-largest investor in Indonesia during first quarter of 2018, investing $172.52 million through 176 different projects. That has seen Australia move up in the ranks of the top investors in Indonesia compared to the first quarter of 2017, even though total investment slightly decreased from 2017. In the first quarter of 2017, Australian investment realisation reached $185.65 million through 158 projects, ranking twelfth.

While Australia is placed among the top ten overall investors in Indonesia, that position is more due to the fact that comparatively few countries invest significant sums in Indonesia. Additionally, as seen in Figure 2, investment realisation from Australia sits at almost half that of Malaysia and approximately twenty times less than that of Singapore.

Investment in Indonesia also accounts for a very small portion of Australia’s total overseas investment. Of the $2.3 trillion overseas investment by Australia in 2017, Indonesia received only $10.7 billion, approximately 0.46% of outbound Australian investment. In comparison, Singapore received $59.4 billion as the largest destination for Australian investment in South-East Asia. Additionally, Australian investment in the Indonesian economy is similar to that of its investment in the Malaysian and Philippine economies, which are arguably less attractive for investors when comparing the raw size of the three economies.

As Future Directions International has previously assessed, one of the primary factors behind the low level of Australian investment is a poor business environment within Indonesia. There is a strong correlation between the countries that Australian firms choose to invest in and the ease of doing business in those countries. According to the rankings used by the World Bank, Indonesia is placed ninety-first of 190 economies in the “Ease of Doing Business Ranking” (EDBR). That is primarily due to factors such as: limitations and caps on foreign investment, excessive permit requirements and costs, a shortage of skilled labourers and low productivity. In the longer-term, business reforms will hopefully address some of those issues and attract greater numbers of Australian investors.

Faltering trade and a lack of confidence on the part of investors is a disappointing transition from the previous donor-recipient relationship with Indonesia. With Official Developmental Aid (ODA) to Indonesia falling each year (from $888 million in 2012 to $316 million expected this year), Australia does not seem to have achieved its stated goal of moving ‘from a donor-recipient model to an economic partnership of equals’. Instead, from Indonesia’s perspective, Australia has gradually cut off its ODA while importing less and investing little.

Defence and Security

Importing Australian Military Equipment

Indonesia is currently working to upgrade its defence force through the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme, under which it seeks to upgrade its naval, air and land capabilities. Current efforts so far have included: importing a range of military equipment, including fighter jets; the joint development of new military technology with South Korea; and the revitalisation of its indigenous defence industry. To date, Australia has played a very minor role in the MEF programme with Indonesia, preferring to collaborate with countries such as Russia, South Korea and the United States. That could potentially change, however, as Australia has signalled its intention to revitalise its defence exports industry, in the hope of becoming one of the top ten global defence exporters within the next decade.

In the Australian Government’s Defence Export Strategy, South-East Asia has been identified as a priority market, along with the wider Indo-Pacific. While Indonesia is not specifically mentioned, it has since 2013 become a major importer of Australian arms, receiving 28 per cent of Australian arms exports since then.^[1] As a market for defence exports, Indonesia is not without its challenges, however, with the Department of Defence listing the following obstacles: ‘protracted procurement processes, indigenous industry development and offset policies, transparency and integrity risks, and improving levels of regulation of exports.’ In the case of Indonesia, the first two obstacles are especially relevant. Jakarta has a history of using difficult and unclear bidding processesfor projects and is committed to building up its domestic defence industry at the expense of defence imports.

Despite those challenges, looking at the longer-term, there is an opportunity for Australia to become an attractive source of defence materiel for Indonesia. Jakarta has prioritised increasing its naval capabilities through the MEF programme, to secure its territorial waters and combat both terrorism and piracy in the region. Indonesia is an archipelagic country and borders some of the most important global shipping routes. Consequently, maintaining and then growing its naval capacity will continue to be a priority for Jakarta well past the 2024 deadline of the MEF programme. That makes it a suitable market for Australia; especially given that 66 per cent of Australian defence exports over the past five years have been naval-related. It will be difficult, however, for Australia to compete with other countries that already have a foothold in the Indonesian defence industry, such as South Korea. A number of obstacles facing the Australian shipbuilding industry could exacerbate these concerns.

Maritime Security

According to Peter Chalk, in The Maritime Dimension of International Security, Indonesia would need 300 vessels operating around the clock to adequately protect and monitor its three million square kilometres of archipelagic waters.^[2] The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL), however, only has approximately 178 naval vessels in active service. While it is aiming to have up to 274 vessels in service by 2024 under the MEF programme, it is highly unlikely that that target will be achieved given the many challenges surrounding the MEF programme. Due to the imbalance between Indonesia’s vast archipelagic geography and its underequipped navy, Jakarta has put a strong focus on maritime co-operation in its bilateral relationships. That has primarily consisted of joint maritime patrols and intelligence sharing, with a particular focus on countering illegal fishing, smuggling and counter terrorism.

Given that Australia does not yet have a defence export market targeted at Indonesian needs, maritime co-operation should perhaps be the focal point of the defence relationship. Both governments have shown commitment to closer maritime co-operation, having signed on 16 March 2018 a Maritime Co-operation Plan of Action (MCPA), which implemented the Joint Declaration on Maritime Co-operation signed in February 2017. Under the agreement, both countries will work to combat illegal fishing and transnational crime, improve search and rescue co-ordination and strengthen navy-to-navy links, in addition to a range of other commitments. In a press release following the signing of the MCPA, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop also announced a four-year bilateral Maritime Capacity Building Initiative in Indonesia, which will see Australia allocate increased resources to help strengthen that country’s maritime capabilities.

From Indonesia’s perspective, however, it could be argued that ties with Australia are too unpredictable and that it is better off focusing on improving defence ties with its closer South-East Asian neighbours. January 2017, for instance, saw the sudden suspension of Australia-Indonesia defence ties, following the showing of what was deemed offensive material at a joint-training session between Indonesian Special Forces group Kopassusand the Australian Special Air Service. This incident cast doubt over the prospects for long term co-operation.

While the ties with Canberra can be fragile at times, the Royal Australian Navy outstrips the naval capabilities of Indonesia’s South-East Asian neighbours. Despite its comparatively small fleet size, Australian vessels are stronger, more modern and boast superior technology, in part due to having the twelfth-largest defence budget in the world and a close defence partnership with the United States. Australia also has the highest number of submarines in the region, on par with Singapore. Maintaining strong defence ties with Australia through maritime co-operation is an immensely valuable resource in securing Indonesian waters from non-state threats.

Counterterrorism

Indonesia has also sought co-operation in countering terrorism. While Indonesia suffers from fewer terrorism incidents than the Philippines, it does contain the largest jihadist community in South-East Asia. Monitoring that community is a monumental task and virtually impossible to manage completely. To lighten the load, the Indonesian Government has sought co-operation from a variety of governments, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States, in addition to its ASEAN neighbours. Historically, those efforts have been criticised as weak and token in nature due to a prevailing emphasis on sovereignty above all else, especially among the ASEAN states. In recent years, however, notable advances in both intelligence sharing and joint operational procedures have been achieved, especially in its co-operation with Australia.^[3]

Following the 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian and Australian Governments signed a series of Memoranda of Understanding, to expand co-operation in combatting terrorism within Indonesia. Those MoUs included steps such as: information sharing; building up the capacity of Indonesian counter-terrorism forces; and combatting terrorist financing. The aligned interests between Australia and Indonesia following the Bali bombings also highlighted counterterrorism co-operation as a focal point from which the broader strategic relationship could potentially flourish. In the months following the signing of the MoUs, both governments continued to work closely and, along with the US, formed Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) on 30 June 2003. This is a specialist anti-terrorist branch of the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, or POLRI). Since then, the Australian Government has continued to fund and train the special unit, which has been widely praised for its successes in arresting terrorists and foiling attacks.

Today, counterterrorism continues to be a focal point of Indonesia’s security relationship with Australia and it has led to close collaboration between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and POLRI. Speaking at Edith Cowan University on 10 April 2018, Tito Karnavian, Police Chief of the Indonesian National Police, praised the relationship between his organisation and the AFP, adding that it is POLRI’s strongest relationship in the region that is committed to combatting terrorism. According to a paper released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the closeness of the AFP-POLRI relationship is a rare achievement among security forces and can be seen as a success story in the wider bilateral relationship.

The partnership has clear benefits for both countries, allowing the police forces to better disrupt and prevent transnational crime and terrorism. Although the police-to-police relationship can be vulnerable to the ups-and-downs of the bilateral relationship, it has made a positive contribution to the broader relationship through fostering a ‘habit of co-operation’. In the longer-term, it can be expected that both governments will continue to invest in this essential component of the bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

From an economic standpoint, it appears that Australia will become less relevant to Indonesia as the Indonesian economy grows. Australia’s small population in comparison to the countries of South-East Asia means that bilateral trade will reflect that decline as Indonesia looks elsewhere to expand its export markets. While IA-CEPA will help to boost bilateral trade, it is unlikely to shift Indonesian priorities away from larger, faster growing, markets.

The defence relationship, on the other hand, is a different story. With Australia operating one of the most capable navies in the Asia-Pacific, maritime co-operation with Canberra is a valuable resource for Jakarta in its struggle to maintain the security of its vast expanse of archipelagic waters. While there are opportunities for closer ties through defence exports, the strongest linkages lie in police-to-police co-operation aimed at tackling terrorism in the region. Over time, those linkages will hopefully become even stronger and set a precedent for closer ties in other aspects of the bilateral relationship.

*****

[1] Data taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

[2] Chalk, P., ‘The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United States’, Rand Corporation, 2008, p. 12.

[3] Chow, J.T., ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Co-operation Since 9/11’, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, № 2, p. 304.

Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. 

Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd.

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https://en.antaranews.com/news/116244/gold-prospectors-demand-reopening-of-gold-stores-in-timika

3) Gold prospectors demand reopening of gold stores in Timika

Reporter: Evarianus Supar  17 hours ago

Timika, Papua  (ANTARA News) - Thousands of traditional gold prospectors in the Kali Kabur river of Timika, Papua, demanded the reopening of gold shops, which had been the buyers of their gold dust in that area.

The people, members of what they called Forum of Community of Gold Prospectors issued their demand in a rally in front of the office of the Mimika legislative body (DPRD) on Friday.

"We asked the government to immediately find a solution and allow gold shops to operate again here," Simon Rahajaan, chairman of the forum said in Mimika, the municipal town on Friday.

Simon said the traditional gold miners have been in difficulty to find buyers for their gold dust after gold shops were forced to stop operation in that area.

Police closed down small gold shops in that area following the arrest of the owner of Toko Emas Rezki Utama, H Basri, at the Makassar airport recently.

H Basri was arrested for taking a lot of gold bars from Timika, Simon said, adding after the incident other shop owners felt not safe in taking gold they bought from the gold prospectors to be resold outside Timika.

The government has to consider the fate of around 15,000 people of Timika make a living from panning for gold in the Kali Kabur river.

The Kali Kabur river has been a disposal place for mining tailing by PT Freeport Indonesia, a U.S. gold and copper mining company operating in Papua.

"We could not continue this life and feed our children and send them to school unless we could sell our gold dust. We have no other jobs other than panning for gold," Rony Leisubun , a depuity chairman of the Forum.

The people said they are ready to cooperate with the district administration and PT Freeport to uncover who were responsible for the damage caused to the mining pipe of Freeport.

"We gold prospectors panning for gold in the Kali Kabur river are not responsible for damaging the Freeport mining pipe as we have no access to the Freeport area,"Anis Werbetu, anothyer leader of the forum.

Mimika DPRD speaker Elminus Mom said the gold prospectors are free to continue their activities at Kali Kabur river.

"No regulation banning them from continuing their activities. Thousands of people make a living from panning for gold in the river," Elminus said

He also asked the old gold shops to resume their business buying the gold dusts from the traditional gold miners. ***2**

  

Editor: Otniel Tamindael

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Eliezer Awom passed away, West Papuans drawn in sorrow

http://tabloidjubi.com/eng/eliezer-awom-passed-away-west-papuans-drawn-in-sorrow/

Eliezer Awom passed away, West Papuans drawn in sorrow

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 49 mins ago 

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 22 June 2018

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                                                         Eliezer Awom. – Jubi/Doc

Jayapura, Jubi – The passing of Eliezer Awom when on the way from Bintuni to Kaimana on Friday (15/6/2018) has left deep sorrow to the land and people of West Papua, in particular, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

ULMPWP Spokesperson Jacob Rumbiak said the ULMWP express their condolences to the family and the people of West Papua. “His body arrived at his house in Manokwari on 16 June 2018. Most of his children and grandchildren departed from Papua New Guinea and already arrived in Jayapura, except his two children who are still on the way from PNG,” Rumbiak told Jubi on Sunday (17/6/2018).

Eliezer Awom was born on 4 July 1948 in Inasi Village of Numfor Island. His late education was the junior high school before he went to Mobile Brigade training at Deplat Lido Cigombong Bogor, West Java on 29 November 1965.

“His career in Indonesian Military began from 1965 – 1971 to serve at Mobile Brigade Headquarter in Kelapa 2 Jakarta. In 1971, he assigned to Regiment 12 West Irian (Papua), Vocational School of Battalion M Jayapura,” added Rumbiak.

Based on Decree No.17 IRJA Sprint/36/II/1982 issued by Papua Police Chief, continued Rumbiak, he was appointed as the sniper course instructor for Brimobdak Irja from 1981 to 1983. In 1984, he resigned from the Indonesian Army to join the West Papua National Liberation Army/Free Papua Movement (TPN-PN/OPM).

“He served as the Commander of the West Papua National Liberation Army from 1984 to 1988. In 1989, he was shot and arrested by the Indonesian Army and underwent his life sentence in Indonesian Military Detention in Wamena before transferred to Kalisosok Detention Class I in Surabaya, East Java,” said Rumbiak.

Rumbiak further explained that in 2000, the Indonesian Government released him along with other West Papuan political prisoners. From 2002-2018, he served as the Chairman of West Papuan Ex-political Prisoners. “In 2002, he and the late John Simon Mambor represented the West Papuan Ex-political Prisoners as a member of the Papua Presidium Council in the Congress of Papuan People II. Further, in 2011, KRP III declared the Federal State of West Papua Republic (NFRPB) which he was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces cum the Minister of Defense until the end of his life.

“On 27 November – 6 December 2014, the name Eliezer Awom was noticed in the list of other greatest West Papuans to declare Saralana Declaration that born the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). For his tireless dedication, Mr Awom deserves the Best Guerrilla Star Award along with other heroes who have fought for the independence of West Papua,” he said.

Meanwhile, ULMWP Domestic Affair Working Team Markus Haluk said on Sunday, 17 June 2018, Awom’s brother and oldest son departed to Manokwari to decide whether the funeral would conduct in Manokwari or Jayapura.

“As we all know that the late Mr Awom has devoted his entire life for the independence and political sovereignty of the West Papuans. He became a role model and central figure to all of us. He was a true nationalist and great warrior of the Papuan people. Therefore let us pay him a tribute to conduct three days of national grief upon his funeral,” said Haluk. (*)

Reporter: Abeth You

Editor: Pipit Maizier

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1) Indonesia: New Counterterrorism Law Imperils Rights

2) Letter on Indonesia’s New Counterterrorism Law

3) Prabowo accuses Jokowi govt of weakening TNI

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https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/indonesia-new-counterterrorism-law-imperils-rights

1) Indonesia: New Counterterrorism Law Imperils Rights

Revise Act to Uphold Protections While Meeting Security Concerns

June 20, 2018 7:45PM EDT

(New York) – The Indonesian government should seek to amend provisions in the newly enacted counterterrorism law (“CT Law”) that threaten human rights protections, Human Rights Watch said in a letter sent on June 11, 2018, to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and other officials.

After suicide bombings by attackers aligned with the Islamic State in the city of Surabaya in May, Indonesia’s parliament on May 25 approved long-pending revisions to the CT Law. While the new law contains some improvements, it risks undermining human rights and could weaken efforts to counter extremist threats.

“The Indonesian government’s counterterrorism measures should not come at the expense of fundamental rights,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “The new counterterrorism law has provisions that will facilitate rights violations by authorities and ultimately undermine public safety.”

The new law relies on an overbroad and ambiguous definition of terrorism. The definition could be used to target peaceful political activities of indigenous groups, environmental advocates, and religious or political organizations.

The CT Law also allows for prolonged pre-charge and pre-trial detention that increases the likelihood of torture and other ill-treatment in custody. It extends the period that police can detain terrorism suspects without charge from three days in the 2003 law to a maximum of 21 days. And it permits prosecutors to unilaterally extend pre-trial detention for terrorism suspects from 180 days to 240 days.

The new law has provisions that will facilitate rights violations and ultimately undermine public safety.  

Brad Adams

Asia Director

The law empowers authorities to “open, examine, and confiscate mail and packages by post or other means of delivery … and intercept any conversation by telephone or other means of communication” suspected of being used for planning or committing terrorist acts. These provisions could be used to authorize massive, disproportionate surveillance that violates privacy rights.

The new law also expands counterterrorism enforcement activities to the Indonesian armed forces. While the deployment of armed forces in response to domestic security threats may be justified in certain cases, extended military deployment in a civilian policing context carries serious risks, in part because military personnel typically do not receive law enforcement training. In addition, the Indonesian military justice system has an egregious track record investigating and prosecuting human rights violations by military personnel.

“The Indonesian government should recognize that violating human rights in the name of counterterrorism merely benefits armed extremists over the long term,” Adams said. “The government should act to revise the counterterrorism law so that it meets international standards.”

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https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/letter-indonesias-new-counterterrorism-law

2) Letter on Indonesia’s New Counterterrorism Law

To President Joko Widodo and Speaker Bambang Soesatyo

June 20, 2018 7:45PM EDT

Your Excellencies,

I am writing on behalf of Human Rights Watch to express our concerns regarding the amended Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Law (the “CT Law”) that the Indonesian parliament passed on May 25, 2018, which amends the 2003 law. The amended law was enacted following the horrific Surabaya suicide bombings on May 13-14, 2018.

We wish to express our condolences to the victims of those attacks and their family members. We recognize that those incidents underscore that the Indonesian government has a responsibility to keep those under its jurisdiction safe, and that the new statute includes some improvements from the previous law. However, certain aspects of the new CT Law risk undermining key human rights protections and ultimately weaken efforts to counter armed threats from extremists.

Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about the following elements of the CT Law:

1. Overbroad Definition of Terrorism
The new CT Law relies on an overbroad and ambiguous definition of terrorism. Article 1(2) defines terrorism as any act that uses “violence or threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear, resulting in mass casualties and/or causing destruction or damage to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or an international facility.” Article 1(4) defines “the threat of violence” as including any “speech, writing, picture, symbol or physical, with or without the use of electronic or non-electronic form which may incite fear in a person.”

While there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, the definition in the new CT Law goes far beyond the definition endorsed by the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, which defines terrorism as “an act committed with the intent to kill, cause serious bodily injury, or take hostages with the aim of intimidating or terrorizing a population or compelling a government or international organization.”

Human Rights Watch’s research has shown that prosecutors in dozens of countries have used similarly broad counterterrorism laws to prosecute acts of political dissent that result in property damage, such as demonstrations. In Indonesia, we are concerned that the broad definition of terrorism could be used to target peaceful political activities of indigenous groups, environmental advocates, and religious or political organizations.

We urge you to do the following to avoid human rights violations linked to overbroad definitions of terrorism under the CT law:

• Ensure that the CT Law’s implementing regulations provide a much narrower and specific definition of terrorism and terrorist activities that mitigate the dangerously ambiguous definition in the law.
• Ensure that police and prosecutors apply the law in a way that does not infringe on protected rights and freedoms by only prosecuting acts that qualify as “genuinely of a terrorist nature,” as set out by the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism.

2. Lengthy Pre-Charge and Pre-Trial Detention Periods
Article 28 of the CT Law extends the period that police can detain terrorism suspects without charge from three days in the 2003 law to a maximum of 21 days. That compares to a 24-hour period that police can detain suspects for non-terrorism-related crimes.

Article 25 of the CT Law permits the prosecutor to extend pre-trial detention for terrorism suspects from a maximum of 180 days under the 2003 law to 240 days, or up to 290 days with approval of the chief magistrate of the district court.

Prolonged detention without charge, particularly when coupled with restrictions on detainees’ ability to challenge that detention in court, creates conditions conducive to torture and other ill-treatment that will go unnoticed by the courts and unsanctioned by law. The insertion in article 28(3) that the arrests and detention of the suspect during the pre-charge phase will be done in accordance with the “principles of human rights” is welcome, but will do little in guaranteeing the rights of suspects.

Prolonged pre-charge detention, particularly when not authorized by a judge, may also violate the right to liberty under international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is party, states that anyone arrested or detained for a criminal offense “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.” Furthermore, anyone deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention has the right to “take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, an international expert body that monitors state compliance with the ICCPR, has explicitly interpreted this provision to apply to “all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention,” including persons held in pre-charge detention. The committee has increasingly interpreted prompt appearance before a judge to be within 48 hours.

We urge you to take the following step to address these lengthy pre-charge and pre-trial detention periods:

• Urge parliament to promptly amend the CT Law so that all those taken into custody are brought before a judge within 48 hours to be formally charged and able to contest the basis for their detention.

3. Anonymous Witnesses in Terrorism Prosecutions
Article 34A of the CT Law states that “witnesses, experts, and rapporteurs” in terrorism prosecutions will be provided protection including “confidentiality of identity.” While the authorities may take measures to protect witnesses, international law requires that prosecutors allow suspects to adequately defend themselves, including by calling and examining witnesses.

We urge you to seek amendments to article 34A that would:

• Ensure that any measures taken to protect the security of witnesses do not infringe upon the right of defendants to have a proper opportunity to question and challenge witnesses against them at some stage of the proceedings.
• Ensure that any concealment of witnesses’ identities is limited to cases where the measure is shown to be necessary and justified by serious and objective reasons.

4. Overbroad Surveillance Powers
Article 31 of the CT Law allows Indonesian authorities to “open, examine, and confiscate mail and packages by post or other means of delivery … and intercept any conversation by telephone or other means of communication suspected of being used to prepare, plan, and commit a Criminal Act of Terrorism.” These provisions could potentially be used to authorize massive, disproportionate surveillance that violates privacy rights.

To prevent possible massive, disproportionate surveillance, we urge you to:

• Ensure that all surveillance powers are fully set out in clear, publicly accessible laws. Those laws should include safeguards for ensuring the surveillance is strictly necessary and proportionate, and should specify, for example, the nature and scope of the surveillance, the standards and procedures for surveillance requests and approvals, the circumstances under which a government agency may share surveillance data with others, how and for how long the surveillance data will be stored, at what point individuals will be notified that they were monitored, and a system of effective remedies for any abuses. Vaguely worded, potentially broad provisions are not sufficient.
• Ensure that this law cannot serve as a basis for mass surveillance. Surveillance should be limited to what is strictly necessary for achieving a legitimate aim, such as preventing or investigating serious crimes. Any interceptions should be as targeted as possible and should use the least intrusive means available.
• Ensure that the monitoring is proportionate. The government should reconsider the yearlong duration of these orders and impose much more limited periods of surveillance; a year of surveillance may capture very large amounts of data and be extremely revealing of sensitive aspects of personal life.

5. Deployment of Indonesian Armed Forces in Counterterrorism Operations
Article 43 of the CT Law specifies that the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) may be deployed in “combating acts of terrorism.” The passage of the new law coincides with the establishment of the military Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab), which involves the army special forces, the marine corps, and the air force’s special corps.

The deployment of armed forces in response to domestic security threats may be justified in certain cases. However, extended military deployment in a civilian policing context is undesirable and carries serious risks.

Military personnel are trained and traditionally deployed to neutralize an enemy force through lethal force during times of armed conflict in which the international laws of war apply. Their training typically does not significantly involve law enforcement operations. Policing operations, in contrast, are bound by international human rights law, which restricts use of force to the minimal amount necessary to keep order, and to use lethal force only when there is an imminent threat to human life.

In addition, accountability for abuses by the military in Indonesia remain the sole jurisdiction of Indonesia’s military courts. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly expressed concerns that the Indonesian military justice system lacks transparency, independence, and impartiality, and has failed to properly investigate and prosecute alleged serious human rights abuses by military personnel.

The CT Law specifies that the details regarding the involvement of the military in counterterrorism operations will be stipulated in a Presidential Regulation. We urge you to take the following steps to prevent and appropriately respond to abuses by the military during counterterrorism operations:

• Ensure the Presidential Regulation restricts participation of military forces in counterterrorism operations where involvement of the military is strictly necessary and proportionate. It should include specific provisions that limit the scope, levels, and duration of the military deployment.
• Ensure that military troops deployed in counterterrorism operations have appropriate training in law enforcement and abide by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which apply to all security forces outside of armed conflict situations.
• Coordinate with parliament to establish a body within the Indonesian House of Representatives tasked to monitor the application of the CT Law in line with respect for international human rights standards, and to monitor military actions as well as those of the police in accordance with international human rights law.
• Ensure the House of Representatives monitoring team can investigate any alleged abuses committed by military forces.
• Seek legislation that would allow for the prosecution of military personnel who commit serious human rights violations in the civilian courts.

6. Expanded Application of the Death Penalty 
The 2003 CT Law permitted imposition of the death penalty against “anyone who commits violence or threatens violence that takes ‘massive casualties’ or destroying strategically vital objects, using chemical or biological weapons, transferring illegally any firearms or explosives into Indonesia to be used for ‘terrorism acts’ and for any person who masterminds those actions.” The amended CT Law also allows the death penalty for anyone “who intentionally incites others to commit a criminal act of terrorism.”

International human rights law discourages the use of the death penalty and mandates that it only be applied to the most serious crimes, such as those resulting in death or serious bodily harm. The new CT Law would allow the death penalty to be carried out for crimes that did not reach this level of grievousness.

In 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Moratorium on the use of the death penalty,” which 104 states voted in favor of. Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as cruel and inhuman punishment, one that is plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error wherever it is applied.

We urge you to take the following steps to address the human rights implications of the expanded application of the death penalty:

• Impose a general moratorium on the death penalty until such time that capital punishment can be banned in Indonesia.
• Encourage parliament to remove the death penalty from the 2018 CT Law.

7. Problematic Aspects of Measures to Protect Victims of Terrorism
Articles 35 and 36 of the new CT Law provide expanded measures to protect and assist victims of criminal acts of terrorism, including through the provision of medical, psychosocial, and psychological rehabilitation; restitution to the family in the event of death; and compensation. The law also formalizes the involvement of Indonesia’s Witness and Victim Protection Agency (Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, LPSK)—an independent body established in 2006 that has been providing financial compensation and rehabilitation programs to victims of crimes.

Support for victims of terrorism is included as a key component of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It is evoked in section I, which encourages national systems of assistance, and section IV, which urges governments to promote and protect the rights of victims. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime report on good practices emphasizes that “the enactment of legislation on the rights of victims contributes to empowering victims of terrorism and is in itself an effective message against violent extremism and terrorism,” and creates goodwill among the general population.

8. Ensuring Preventive Measures Do Not Violate Human Rights
The new CT Law stipulates that the government should adopt measures to prevent “criminal acts of terrorism,” and appoints Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency as the lead agency in such efforts.

The law also provides for the establishment of a national terrorism alert system, counter-radicalization projects for individuals and groups vulnerable to radicalization, and a deradicalization program for prisoners accused of “criminal acts of terrorism.”

The details of such measures are left for future government regulations.

Coordinated national efforts to stem extremist attacks need to comport with international human rights standards. They should not infringe on the rights of individuals to freedom of religion, belief, opinion, or expression that is nonviolent. Participation in so-called deradicalization programs may only be required as part of a sentence upon conviction for a recognizable criminal offense.

We urge you to ensure that international human rights standards are upheld in drafting relevant implementing regulations on preventing criminal acts of terrorism, and that you:

• Consult with nongovernmental organizations who represent members of affected groups to minimize possible discriminatory regulations.
• Seek to ensure that the regulations do not exacerbate existing grievances and thus increase the likelihood of violent extremism.

We would be happy to meet with you as well as officials involved in these issues to discuss these matters further.

Sincerely,

Brad Adams
Asia Director
Human Rights Watch

CC:
Dr. Hatta Ali, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Dr. Anwar Usman, Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court
Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto, Commander of the National Armed Forces
Gen. Tito Karnavian, Chief of the National Police
Muhammad Prasetyo, Attorney General

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http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/21/prabowo-accuses-jokowi-govt-of-weakening-tni.html

3) Prabowo accuses Jokowi govt of weakening TNI

Nurul Fitri Ramadhani

Jakarta | Thu, June 21, 2018 | 11:56 am

Gerindra Party chairman Prabowo has accused the government of trying to weaken the Indonesian Military (TNI) and putting the country at political risk.

The retired military general made the remarks on Tuesday in a 40-minute live streaming video that addressed Gerindra cadres on his official Facebook fan page.

“The TNI is weak, our Navy and Air Force are weak, our resources have been seized. As a result, our economic condition grows worse and burdens the people,” Prabowo said in the video.

Gerindra deputy chairman Ferry Juliantono said that Prabowo meant to criticize the government for favoring the National Police instead of the TNI. For example, he added, the government did not give the TNI a greater counterterrorism role in the new terrorism law,.

He also pointed to the recent inauguration of Comr. Gen. Iriawan, a high-ranking officer in the National Police, as acting West Java governor.

“The government seems to treat the police as its ‘golden boy’,” Ferry said on Wednesday.

In his video, Prabowo also said that these days, money could buy power, and pointed to massive corruption in the current administration.

“There is a power that sees itself controlling and determining who can be regents, mayors, governors – even the next president,” said Prabowo.

“Our [state] institutions are weak. As a result, our political power is at stake,” he added.

Prabowo also satirized President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for frequently distributing aid packages of staple foods to the people to increase his popularity. “But that does nothing to improve our economic sovereignty,” he said.

The ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) criticized Prabowo’s remarks, saying that he had no solid data behind his arguments.

“Prabowo’s opinions about the TNI and our economic condition are inaccurate. He did not refer to any data or analysis. [It is] more a subjective judgement,” said Andreas Pareira of the PDI-P central executive board.

Andreas, who is also a member of House of Representatives Commission I overseeing defense, also rebutted Prabowo's criticism, pointing to the professionalism of the modern-day TNI.

“The military is now more professional than during Prabowo's era. It is now more focused on the defense sector. We provide them with the best facilities and best weaponry,” he said. (evi)