Thursday, September 17, 2026

1) Impunity update September 2026: Stalled investigations and internal proceedings leave victims of security force violence in West Papua without justice

2) The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) Kodap Ndugama claims responsibility for fatal shooting on Wamena-Nduga road

3) Governor urges South Papua residents to protect Payum coastal mangroves
4) TPNPB Expands West Papuan Insurgency to Foreign Targets
5)  TNI orders air evacuation for OPM victim's widow in Papua  

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1) Impunity update September 2026: Stalled investigations and internal proceedings leave victims of security force violence in West Papua without justice

The past weeks have been characterised by a re-occuring pattern of impunity across the Papuan provinces. Civilians died or were seriously injured during security operations, families and lawyers file reports, legislative bodies form special committees, and the police pledge transparent investigations. Months later, no suspect have been named, no case file has reached a prosecutor and the officers involved remain on duty. From Merauke in the south to Sorong in the west and the central highlands, recent cases documented by Papuan legal aid organisations and human rights groups show that internal disciplinary mechanisms and administrative delays continue to obstruct criminal accountability in West Papua.
Human Rights Monitor has documented for years that impunity continues to be a structural driver of human rights violations in West Papua rather than an incidental failure. While police or military personnel have occasionally faced sanctions, these instances were often disproportionate to the severity of reported torture, killings and disappearances. Courts seldom held perpetrators accountable in public trials, police investigations lacked transparency, and neither military courts nor internal police procedures provided victims with adequate reparations. Recent cases of human rights violations which have been brought to the attention of authorities remain in legal limbo due to delayed investigations, limited transparency and an absence of meaningful criminal prosecutions, even where public protests, formal complaints and engagement with other governmental institutions generated pressure.

Maybrat: No suspects named in shooting of three civilians

On 13 August 2026 three residents, Mrs Anike Fatie, Mr Silvester Assem and Mrs Selviana Sory, were shot near the Aifam River in Aifat Timur Tengah district, Maybrat Regency, Southwest Papua. A month later, at a public discussion in Sorong on 13 September organised by the Maybrat Community Solidarity for Democracy and Human Rights together with LBH Pos Sorong, participants demanded legal action following promises made by the Maybrat District Police Chief and the Southwest Papua Provincial Police Chief to solve the case. Neither the shooter nor the motive has been made public.
Investigators accompanied by Komnas HAM representatives recovered 26 bullet casings and collected witness testimonies during the crime scene examination on 22 August. Police investigators stated that the casings would be forensically analysed to establish the type and likely origin of the ammunition. As of mid-September 2026, neither the public nor the relatives have been informed about the stage the investigation has reached. Civil society groups welcomed the local parliament’s decision to form a special committee and monitor the law enforcement process.

Sorong: torture complaint stalled for sixteen months

The case of Mr Ortizan F. Tarage, 34, continues to face legal stagnation. Members of the Sorong City Police reportedly tortured Mr Tarage with bamboo, wood beams, a hose, and a metal object, during his arrest in May 2025. His wife lodged a police report on 22 May 2025 (LP/B/341/V/2025). As of September 2026, according to LBH Papua Pos Sorong, no suspect has been named and no adequate legal proceedings have begun against the officers involved, who continue to work at the police station.
The Papua Regional Office of Komnas HAM examined the complaint and found acts of torture and cruel treatment, arbitrary use of coercive measures and unreasonably protracted handling of the case. The stagnation in the investigation amounted to an attempt to grant the officers impunity. LBH has demanded that investigators must identify suspects and that the internal affairs section should take firm action against anyone proven to be involved in the alleged torture.

Central Papua: six months of silence on four bloody incidents

The Papua Action Group of Amnesty International Indonesia (GA-Papua AII) marked six months of unanswered demands for justice in a statement from Nabire on 1 September 2026. The cases at issue span the central highlands: alleged extrajudicial killings and other abuses in Dogiyai between 31 March and 2 April 2026; the Kembru and Pogoma incidents in Puncak Regency on 14 April; the Tembagapura (Kali Kabur Mile 69) incident in Mimika on 7 May; and the killing of Mrs Melkiana Duwitau in Intan Jaya on 2 July. According to GA-Papua AII, the resolution process appeared to be deliberately slowed, ignored or silenced by the authorities responsible, and warned that delay effectively encourages repetition of such abuses.
The Dogiyai case is exemplary of internal proceedings displacing criminal justice. After a coalition of Dogiyai community leaders met the Central Papua Police Chief on 2 April, only one of their three demands, the removal of the Dogiyai District Police Chief, was met. In May, around twelve officers from the Kamu and Dogiyai police were dismissed or demoted following a disciplinary hearing. All appealed against sanctions. Following the appeals, nothing further has been reported. Data submitted to Komnas HAM on 21 May has produced no visible follow-up.
In the Kembru case, a Puncak Regency investigation team and students have asked Komnas HAM to classify the incident as a gross human rights violation under Law No. 26 of 2000 and are still awaiting a decision. The killing of Mrs Duwitau in Intan Jaya was formally reported to Komnas HAM on 29 July with no reported progress. An earlier Intan Jaya case from Soanggama in October 2025 remains equally stalled.
Komnas HAM has acknowledged receiving material on the Tembagapura incident but has said nothing since. GA-Papua AII noted that all of these complaints have now exceeded the 30- to 40-day timeframe that Komnas HAM’s own procedures envisage, and called on the Central Papua Police Chief, the regional military commander and Kogabwilhan III to account for security operations in the area, including their command structures.

Lanny Jaya: Authorities have launched investigations into the Melagi Case

The killing of Pendite Weya, a 18-year-old girl killed by an explosion in Melagi District, Lanny Jaya Regency, on 6 June 2026, stands out because the legal process has begun to move, largely as a result of sustained pressure from a local legislative committee and civil society. The Lanny Jaya DPRK Special Committee on Humanitarian Affairs visited the scene within two days, held a public hearing on 26 June and handed its evidence and report to the local police. On 7 August it met the Deputy Papua Police Chief, the Director of General Criminal Investigations and the Director of Intelligence and Security in Jayapura to push for ballistic testing of the explosive remnants. The police committed to a reconstruction, and on 11 August a Papua Police team returned to Melagi with the committee, the Papua Foundation for Justice and Human Integrity (YKKMP), the Humanitarian Investigation Team and PAHAM Papua.
A police report has been filed at Lanny Jaya District Police. Investigators have questioned five witnesses, issued a formal case progress notification (SP2HP) and requested statements from 16 additional witnesses. The monitoring groups have welcomed this but demanded that witnesses be able to testify without intimidation, that any minors be questioned in line with child protection rules, and that debris from the scene be scientifically examined to determine the type of the explosive and how it was delivered.

Conclusion

The described cases show the same mechanisms at work. Complaints are lodged and the police promise transparency. Even if Komnas HAM or committees from local parliaments are involved in the advocacy process, suspects are rarely identified, and case files are not being forwarded to prosecutors to establish civilian court trials. The Melagi investigation demonstrates that persistent, coordinated pressure from a legislative body, lawyers and community groups can keep a case alive. The case also shows how much effort is required simply to obtain witness interviews and forensic testing that should be routine.
Measured against the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), which sets out the standards states must meet under the right to life, the cases fall short on almost every core element. The Protocol requires that any investigation into a death that may have been caused by state agents be prompt, effective and thorough, independent and impartial, and transparent.
The Konorop and Maybrat cases fail the promptness and transparency tests. One month after a triple shooting no stage of the investigation has been communicated to the public, and in Merauke the family is still petitioning a cultural assembly to secure a criminal process. Complains stalled for up to sixteen months breach the requirement that investigations not be unduly delayed and that findings be acted upon.
The Protocol’s provisions on securing physical evidence, ballistic and forensic analysis and protecting witnesses and families from intimidation have been honoured only in the Melagi case. Human Rights Monitor attributes this as an outcome of the legislative committee and civil society groups that pressed for crime scene reconstruction and forensic testing. Even where the Protocol’s procedural elements are partly met, the absence of published findings and civilian judicial oversight means that none of the cases currently satisfies the state’s duty to provide an effective remedy.



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2) The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) Kodap Ndugama claims responsibility for fatal shooting on Wamena-Nduga road

News Desk September 17, 2026

Jayapura, Jubi – The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) has claimed responsibility for the shooting that killed a driver, Aris Sanda, on the Wamena-Nduga road in Papua Highlands province.

The incident occurred near Lake Habema in Jayawijaya Regency on Tuesday (15/9/2026). The victim was found dead inside his burnt vehicle on Wednesday (16/9/2026).

TPNPB-OPM spokesperson Sebby Sambom said the TPNPB Central Headquarters had received an official report from TPNPB Defence Command Area (Kodap) III Ndugama Darakma commander Brigadier General Egianus Kogeya, who claimed responsibility for the shooting.

TPNPB claimed the victim was a military intelligence agent posing as a driver. The group also warned non-Papuan residents against carrying out activities in what it described as a war zone.

“We therefore urge Indonesian migrants working as motorcycle taxi drivers, taxi drivers and civil servants to stop their activities,” Sebby Sambom said in a written statement on Wednesday (16/9/2026).

Sambom said those who ignored the warning could face being shot dead because TPNPB considered them part of Indonesian military intelligence operating in the armed conflict zone.

He said the ultimatum was an important warning that TPNPB claimed was consistent with international humanitarian law.

TPNPB also called on non-Papuan drivers not to use the Trans Wamena Road in future, saying the route should only be used by Indigenous Papuans and their passengers.

“We do not allow migrants to enter the war zone in Papua, so we do not want to see Indonesian migrants on the road again,” Sambom said.

According to an official statement from the Indonesian military’s Habema Operations Command, the victim was a Toraja-born route driver who had operated between Wamena and Mbua since 2013.

The incident reportedly began at about 6am Papua time near the Lake Habema intersection at Mount Boy, Trikora District, Jayawijaya Regency, on the Wamena-Mbua route.

A group of armed men stopped the vehicle carrying the victim and his passengers and checked the driver and everyone inside the vehicle.

The passengers were then ordered to return towards Wamena, while the victim was taken towards the Lake Habema area.

After receiving the report, the Habema Operations Command launched a search and sweep of the surrounding area.

The team found a burnt vehicle with the driver’s body inside on Wednesday (16/9/2026).

The body was evacuated according to established procedures, while authorities continued to investigate the circumstances of the incident and gather witness statements.

Habema Operations Command spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel M. Wirya Arthadiguna said the victim had died as a result of violence allegedly committed by TPNPB.

“During the incident, a driver named Aris Sanda, also known as Bapak Tasya, from Toraja, was reported to have been the victim of violence by the armed OPM Kodap III Ndugama group, resulting in his death,” Wirya Arthadiguna said in a written statement on Wednesday (16/9/2026).

The Habema Operations Command said it would pursue the armed group involved and support law enforcement efforts.

Meanwhile, Damai Cartenz Operations public relations task force commander Senior Commissioner Yusuf Sutejo said security personnel were still heading to the area to investigate the incident.

“Yes, the incident happened yesterday. Our personnel are still at the location and have not yet returned,” Yusuf Sutejo said in a statement on Wednesday (16/9/2026). (*)

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3) Governor urges South Papua residents to protect Payum coastal mangroves

News Desk September 17, 2026

Merauke, Jubi – South Papua Governor Apolo Safanpo has urged residents to protect and preserve mangrove forests along the coast of Payum Beach in Merauke Regency.

Safanpo made the call while attending a mangrove planting event organised by the 11th Merauke Naval Regional Command (Kodaeral XI) at Payum Beach on Wednesday (16/9/2026).

He said mangrove ecosystems along the South Papua coast needed to be protected because few areas in Indonesia had mangrove forests as extensive as those found in Papua.

“Wise people say that the natural environment is not something we inherit from those before us, but something entrusted to us by our children and grandchildren in the future,” Apolo Safanpo said.

He said mangroves played an important role in protecting biodiversity and supporting coastal ecosystems.

“Therefore, we must protect and preserve them properly to ensure the continued survival of biodiversity and coastal ecosystems,” he said.

Safanpo said the mangrove planting was part of a series of events marking the 81st anniversary of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

He welcomed the initiative, saying mangroves played an important role in protecting coastal areas from erosion and other environmental impacts.

Meanwhile, Kodaeral XI Merauke commander Rear Admiral Joko Andriyanto said around 1,000 mangrove trees had been planted at Payum Beach.

“Yesterday, Tuesday (15/9/2026), we planted on the left side of the beach. Today, we are planting on the right side,” he said.

Joko said that if the newly planted mangroves grew well, they could provide habitat for a range of coastal species, including crabs.

He said the presence of these species could also provide an additional source of income for people living around Payum Beach. (*)


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https://jamestown.org/tpnpb-expands-west-papuan-insurgency-to-foreign-targets/

4) TPNPB Expands West Papuan Insurgency to Foreign Targets

09.17.2026 Uday Bakhshi

 

Executive Summary:

The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and Indonesian security forces remain embroiled in a conflict with no clear solution.

The TPNPB insurgency is escalating by targeting civilian aircraft, foreigners, and the Grasberg mine—all targets the group views as complicit in Jakarta’s exploitation of West Papua.

In response to the insurgency, Indonesia has deployed over 100,000 security personnel to Papua against roughly 1,400 TPNPB insurgents. This extreme militarization has only fueled human rights violations, corruption, and local resentment without resolving the conflict

These dynamics will perpetuate the conflict and increase the risk of further violence against Papuans, Indonesians, foreigners, and economic interests.


The trajectory of violence in West Papua points to a deepening insurgency with no clear solution. On July 2, fighters of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)—an insurgent group active in Indonesia’s eastern Papuan provinces—killed a U.S. pilot, Nicholas F. Goselin, after he landed in Highland Papua province (Antara, July 3). The fighters also set the small aircraft on fire after allowing seven local passengers to leave. The killing of Goselin generated international headlines, but it was not an aberration in the decades-long conflict. 

In recent years, the TPNPB has killed or kidnapped multiple pilots, including foreigners, working for local Indonesian civilian carriers. It has also targeted U.S. and Western interests, in addition to Indonesian targets. Jakarta’s posture and conduct in the Papuan provinces are helping drive this dynamic. 

 

The Militarization of Papua

Jakarta currently has nearly 75,000 soldiers deployed across the Papuan provinces (Project Multatuli, July 3). Some of these forces operate within civilian structures to provide Papuans with basic services, including food, education, construction, and healthcare. They also secure areas for commercial projects that benefit local and international companies, including some linked to Indonesia’s oligarchs. For instance, the military has been accused of harassment and forcing the eviction of indigenous tribes in Merauke in Southeast Papua for agricultural and energy projects, which could potentially be one of the world’s largest deforestation projects (Greenpeace Indonesia, December 19, 2025). 

Nearly 29,000 police officers are also deployed in the Papuan provinces, bringing the total number of security personnel to well over 100,000. More than ten percent of Indonesia’s military and police forces are therefore deployed in the Papuan provinces, despite them accounting for only two percent of Indonesia’s population. Police estimates, meanwhile, put the number of TPNPB members at slightly more than 1,400, underscoring the highly disproportionate balance between security forces and suspected insurgents (Project Multatuli, July 3).

The militarization of West Papua has not produced the desired effect, particularly in terms of winning local “hearts and minds.” Indonesian security forces have been implicated in human rights violations for decades (see Terrorism Monitor, April 12, 2023). In April, rights groups claimed that military personnel killed 15 civilians, including women and children, following a clash with the TPNPB (Kompas, April 20). The incident triggered protests in the Papuan capital, Jayapura, where security personnel clashed with demonstrators criticizing the military presence (Reuters, April 27).

Security personnel deployed to Papua have also been implicated in corruption at various levels and have even sold weapons to the TPNPB. At other times, they have been responsible for outbreaks of violence. In 2011, it was revealed that U.S. mining company Freeport-McMoRan, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua, had paid tens of millions of dollars to Indonesian security forces as “protection fees.” Police securing the national project—one of the world’s largest gold and copper mines—then killed and injured workers demanding higher wages (The Conversation, November 18, 2011).

 

TPNPB Operations and Threats to Foreign Interests

The TPNPB has grown stronger and more capable since 2018, despite its relatively small size. It has taken advantage of terrain largely unique to the island of New Guinea, and its familiarity with this difficult environment allows its fighters to move more freely than Indonesian troops and launch ambushes. Conversely, Indonesian forces face significant logistical challenges operating in the Papuan highlands.

Air transport is the region’s primary mode of travel. Following Goselin’s killing, the TPNPB reiterated that it would continue attacking all aircraft operating in Papua, whether civilian or military. [1][1]TPNPB Press Release from July 2, 2026. The group argues that the military uses civilian aircraft to transport personnel and logistics, making such aircraft justified targets. This rationale also extends to non-Papuans working in Papua, whom the TPNPB claims are part of Jakarta’s security complex and Indonesia’s “colonization” of West Papua. Papuans alleged to be working with security forces have also been killed. On July 21, the TPNPB killed three Papuans, including a former TPNPB member, for apparent collusion with the Indonesian state and security forces (Kompas, July 23). 

In January, the TPNPB surrounded a post in the Grasberg mining area, trapping Indonesian Freeport workers for three days (The Jakarta Post, January 17). The following month, the TPNPB killed one soldier and one Freeport worker traveling in a convoy in the mining area. In a separate attack, the group killed a pilot and co-pilot after their aircraft landed in Korowai (Reuters, February 11).

The Grasberg site remains a key target because it is the main symbol of perceived resource extraction and exploitation of Papuan lands from which many locals believe they have not benefited. Although Indonesia took majority ownership of the mine in 2018, the site is still closely associated with the United States. Former U.S. National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once served on Freeport’s board, and the company’s conduct has been heavily criticized locally and internationally for supporting Indonesia’s perceived transgressions in West Papua (Corporate Accountability Lab, February 28, 2022). The TPNPB therefore framed Goselin’s killing as a message to the United States.

 

Conclusion

In 2024, a New Zealand pilot was released by the TPNPB after being held hostage for more than 18 months, the longest such hostage crisis in the conflict. His release, however, drew criticism from the organization’s central leadership. This suggests that the group is hardening its stance in pursuit of an independent West Papua (Tempo, September 24, 2024). 

Jakarta’s increasing militarization of the provinces is further feeding the conflict, which is producing a growing number of casualties each year. Jakarta also shows little tolerance for expressions of Papuan freedom; the Papuan Morning Star flag remains banned, and possessing it is considered treason. Indonesian authorities recently attempted to block a documentary highlighting land grabbing and rights violations by Indonesian interests (Human Rights Watch, June 11). 

A political solution is becoming increasingly unlikely. The TPNPB has only become more violent, and Jakarta maintains controversial security deployments in Papua. These dynamics will perpetuate the conflict and increase the risk of further violence against Papuans, Indonesians, and foreigners alike. 

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https://en.antaranews.com/news/431749/tni-orders-air-evacuation-for-opm-victims-widow-in-papua

5)  TNI orders air evacuation for OPM victim's widow in Papua  

September 17, 2026 19:04 GMT+700


Wamena, Papua Highlands (ANTARA) - Chief of the TNI Habema Joint Operations Command Brig. Gen. Riyanto ordered an air evacuation on Thursday for Sinta Bilolo, widow of Aris Sanda, who was killed by an armed OPM group, from Mbua to Wamena in Papua Highlands Province.

“We ordered the evacuation by air because ground transportation along the Mbua-Wamena route was disrupted,” Riyanto said in a written statement issued in Wamena on Thursday.

He said the evacuation was conducted to ensure Sinta could travel safely while ground access remained unavailable.

“From Mbua, Sinta and her two companions, Haryati and Murni, were evacuated by Bell and Fennec helicopters to Kenyam. They then continued to Wamena aboard a Caravan aircraft. The entire evacuation proceeded safely,” he said.

Riyanto said the assistance was provided on humanitarian and safety grounds to support the family’s journey.

“Sinta is grieving and needs a safe journey. With ground access unavailable, I ordered air evacuation assistance so she and her companions could reach Wamena safely. In such circumstances, safety and humanity must come first,” he said.

The commander stressed that geographical conditions and limited access should not prevent authorities from assisting people in need, saying the state must be present when communities need help most.



Related news: Separatists behind murder of driver in Highland Papua, military says

Related news: TNI troops seize weapons belonging to Papua rebels in Intan Jaya

Related news: TNI seizes 21,400 cannabis plants in Papua Highlands

Translator: Yudhi E, Rahmad Nasution
Editor: M Razi Rahman

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Wednesday, September 16, 2026

1) Paving the Insurgency: Infrastructure in Papua and the War Jakarta Isn’t Ready to Fight


2) Police detain and ill-treat student protesters while obstructing legal aid during anti-MBG protests in Jayapura

3) Separatists behind murder of driver in Highland Papua, military says 
4) Jayapura Police: 78 students detained during protest released
5) West Papua palm oil companies accused of dumping waste and clearing endemic forest



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Small Wars Journal

1) Paving the Insurgency: Infrastructure in Papua and the War Jakarta Isn’t Ready to Fight

By Ahmad Syarif   |   09.16.2026 at 06:00am





                 Fighters of the West Papua National Liberation Army (Photo: @War_Noir via X)


In 2018, the West Papua Liberation Army declared open war on the Indonesian military. Since then, at least 100 Indonesian military and security personnel have died, alongside hundreds of civilian casualties, and hundreds more on the rebel side. The most recent victim was an American pilot flying logistics for a Catholic mission in a remote area, executed on the morning of July 2, 2026.

The Papua rebellion is now the oldest active insurgency in Indonesia, ongoing since the 1970s. But what suddenly transformed this low-level insurgency into a declaration of open war? And why in 2018?

In a vast tropical region like Papua, guerrilla fighters must operate in hard terrain: mountains and rainforest. Control of such terrain gives them three advantages:

Firstly, this control allows the rebellion forces to govern the flow of food, medicine, and other supplies to the wider population, including civilians, thereby binding local communities’ fortunes to those of the insurgency, and incentivizing recruitment.

Secondly, it gives them control over crucial illegal mining activity, a key source of funds.

Thirdly—and most importantly—rebel mastery of roadless terrain allowed hit-and-run attacks, with dense forestation shielding the insurgents from retaliation by the Indonesian military.

As James Scott describes in The Art of Not Being Governed, this highland terrain of Southeast Asia functions as a zone of deliberate statelessness, wherein nonstate armed actors can operate beyond the reach of government control. A massive effort by the administration of President Joko Widodo (2014-2024) saw the construction of roads and small airports for bush planes and commuter aircraft. This far-reaching infrastructural development opened that terrain, throwing all three guerilla advantages into jeopardy.

The 2018 escalation is best understood as a response to that contest. This article traces how Widodo’s roads and airports eroded the terrain advantage the insurgency was built on. It illustrates how—since 2018—the rebels’ new strategy—targeting logistical networks, illegal miners, and suspected collaborators—maps directly onto the three things the new infrastructure threatens. It closes by explaining why Indonesian military doctrine inadvertently favors the rebels, even as the geographic space between them and the military narrows.

To American readers, who may have experience firsthand the mixed outcomes of infrastructure development in Afghanistan, the insurgency in the highlands of Indonesian Papua may seem all too familiar. Papua is another live test of the same assumption: that roads, airstrips, and development extend the state’s reach, pacify contested ground, and win control over the population. But in that contested territory, the opposite happened. The roads and airports the Indonesian government cut through tropical forest and muddy produced two enormous problems. Firstly, the rebels were not pacified, but galvanized. Secondly, those projects went ahead without adapting the military doctrine to the subsequent conflict. Such dysfunction benefited the rebels over the state forces, as this article will show.

The Rebellion Dynamics 

The West Papua National Liberation Army, formed on March 26, 1973, is the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement. The rebellion drew global attention in 1996, when fighters kidnapped 26 members of a World Wildlife Fund research mission in Mapenduma, Papua. This incident later became known as the Mapenduma hostage crisis. The hostages included four Brits and two Dutch nationals, with the rest Indonesian.

Papua is about the size of California. Half of the island is mountainous, and nearly 81 percent is rainforest. This terrain isolates many indigenous people from the reach of the state, gives cover to the rebels for attack-and-hide operations, with ample space to run illegal mining enterprises.

The militarization of the area has been constant, but different presidents have taken different approaches to the conflict. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), the Indonesian government leaned on a policy of special autonomy. This program channeled money to local governments in Papua, letting local leaders decide which projects to fund. This quickly worsened corruption—the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center reporting that money was quietly wired to the rebels and the independence movement.

When Joko Widodo took office in 2014, he judged that special autonomy was not working. Widodo launched an ambitious infrastructure program centered on roads, small airports, and other public works. By 2023, his administration had built 3,462 km of road, including 1,098 km along the border with Papua New Guinea. It also constructed at least 10 new small airports and three seaports. Many of these reached remote areas in Papua’s mountainous interior.

Papua is also home to the American firm Freeport-McMoRan, which operates the Grasberg mine, the world’s largest gold mine and one of its largest copper reserves. Given the scale of the operation and the minerals’ importance to both Indonesia and the United States, Grasberg has been a frequent rebel target. The mine lies in the mountains, heavily guarded by the military, yet it remains one of the most attacked assets in the region. Rebels first tried to sabotage it in 1977. Since then, open sources record hundreds of casualties linked to Grasberg. Just this year, the Indonesian military rescued 18 Freeport-McMoRan workers from a rebel siege.

Papua’s natural wealth has sharpened the stakes. Gold in particular is easy to mine illegally and then sell on the black market. The rebels thus fear that any road-building push will open the land to rivals: state-sponsored legitimate mining, or other illegal, unaffiliated miners. Both would move in on the same assets and squeeze out the rebels’ own illicit operations, threatening their primary revenue stream.

The Battle Over Contested Territory

The 2018 declaration of open war was no coincidence. It followed the first roadbuilding in Papua’s interior and mountains, which opened logistics lanes, made it easier for the Indonesian military to operate, and let the state reach remote communities directly with daily necessities like food and medicine. That access threatened the rebels’ survival, pushing them toward more aggressive tactics.



Figure 1 shows West Papua Liberation Army attacks since 2018. On the map, the orange line marks the new roads built under the Widodo administration. Most attacks cluster in the same districts as or within 50 to 100 kilometers of that line. Several major incidents have signaled insurgent frustration with the infrastructure program. The government continued the projects despite rebel attempts to thwart them, and escalation followed. Since the declaration of war, the rebels have aimed for three main targets.

Logistics and Infrastructure

In December 2018 a rebel leader, Egianus Kogoya, led an attack on contractors paving roads in Nduga, killing 31 workers. Kogoya was 19 at the time. He has led 65 attacks that killed 42 people, making him the key figure in the rebellion. Strikes on the logistics chain itself followed: the 2023 abduction of a New Zealand pilotthe killing of a New Zealand helicopter pilot in 2024, and most recently the killing of Nicholas Goselin, an American logistics pilot, in July 2026. Aircraft are the only supply line into much of the highlands and are thus the extent of state reach.

Unaffiliated Illegal Miners

In July 2022, ten miners were killed on the orders of Kogoya. In the same month, a miner was beheadedIn October 2023, another seven were killed, and the latest attack—ten more illegal miners were executed in May 2026. The rebels have conducted these killings to reassert control over the illegal mining economy.

Alleged Indonesian Government Informants and Collaborators

In July 2026, a husband and wife were executed beside a newly-built road on suspicion of working for the government. In March 2025, a schoolteacher was killed under the same pretense. The aforementioned Nicholas Goselin, who flew for a Catholic mission, was likewise accused of aiding the military.

Contested Territory

This heightened frequency of attacks is the product of contested territory. Before the declaration of war in 2018 the movement carried out fewer, smaller-scale attacks: the 1996 Mapenduma hostage crisis, an ambush near the Freeport mine that killed three teachers (two American, one Indonesian) in 2002, and a series of shootings around the mine in 2009 and 2010 that wounded several workers, among other low-casualty incidents.

However, even with their control contested by the new infrastructure, the insurgents’ capacity to strike back at the Indonesian military and state assets has proven surprisingly broad. The most shocking blow for Jakarta came in April 2021 with the assassination of Papua’s chief of regional intelligence, a one-star army general. This raised a crucial question: if the roads and airports are a government project, why do state forces still seem unprepared for the attacks that follow?

The answer is doctrinal. The Indonesian military remains oriented toward territorial control and a counterterrorism template. It has failed to adapt to a mobile counterinsurgency model that roadless highland terrain demands.

A Doctrine Built for the Wrong War 

The West Papua Liberation Army fields no advanced weaponry. Its typical arsenal is modest: AX sniper rifles, SS1-V1, M4s, FN pistols, M16s, revolvers, and homemade firearms. The rebels rarely use rocket launchers or mount the kind of complex, coordinated operations seen among their Southeast Asian peers, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines or the Karen National Liberation Army in Myanmar. Their tactics are traditional guerilla practice: ambush, then run and hide.

The Indonesian military’s posture is territorial and inward-looking. It rests on a four-tier chain of area commands: the Military Regional Command (Kodam) covers one or more provinces, and beneath it sit the Military Area Command (Korem) over several regencies, the Military District Command (Kodim) at the regency level, and the Military Sub-district Command (Koramil) at the local level. Together these form a net of static territorial presence, where the chain of command and control are designed based on domestic territory.

This system hardened after independence in 1945 into an instrument of internal security against a series of rebellions and conflicts, most consequentially around the alleged communist-led coup of 1965. Under the New Order it fused with the military’s dual-function role in politics and society, extending the command net down to the village level, where it also served as a tool of intelligence, monitoring citizens for dissent, mutiny, or criticism of the regime. The result is a force organized to blanket territory and hold ground, not to outmaneuver and weed out an armed enemy in areas beyond the reach of the Koramil.

This doctrine also shapes procurement and technology adoption. Surveillance and air strikes are the capabilities most essential when dealing with roadless terrain. No official figures for the military’s drone inventory or its other air and surveillance assets in Papua can be readily found. While Indonesia has acquired 12 ANKA drones from Turkey and has since ordered 60 Bayraktar TB3 and 9 AKINCI drones, these are strike platforms. Their effectiveness depends on the surveillance and intelligence systems that enable them, and on the munitions they carry. In Papua, information still primarily flows from ground-level HUMINT sources. Though valuable, intelligence processing is slow. Reports must be escalated from the Military Sub-district Command up to the Military Regional Command, which holds the authority to deploy heavier weapons or special units. Furthermore, human sources are vulnerable to rebel intimidation.

The deeper cost of this territorial doctrine is inertia. This inertia slows military adoption of the air surveillance, intelligence fusion, and rapid-strike capabilities that a roadless guerrilla war requires.

Lessons Learned

Reminiscent of Afghanistan, the southern Philippines, or Colombia, two lessons stand out from the Indonesian government’s struggle against the West Papua Liberation Army’s insurgency.

Firstly, development in a conflict zone is not the same as development in peacetime. Building roads and air strips for the good of the population is essential and the right thing to do, but where it runs into an insurgency whose power rests on terrain and logistics, infrastructure should be seen as contested asset, not a merely development tool. The project cannot be planned in isolation from the security doctrine that has to hold the ground it opens.

The second lesson is the cost of building faster than you adapt. The Indonesian government opened the interior of Papua, but kept a military built for static territorial defense. That discrepancy between doctrine and practice, not the mileage paved, is what gave the rebels ample opportunity for continued strikes.

Neither lesson should stay in Papua. They can be applied to any theater where a state, or its allied security partners, tries to develop its way out of an insurgency without first matching the doctrine to the terrain.