4) Govt launches 250 more internet service points in Papua's 3T regions
5) School in Papua becomes a stronghold for mother tongue preservation
1) Alarming setback: Indonesia’s Human Rights Law revision threatens independent oversight
Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) expressed deep concerns regarding a proposed revision to Indonesia’s foundational human rights legislation that threatens to fundamentally undermine independent human rights protection mechanisms.
The draft revision of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, currently being prepared by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, represents what many experts describe as a systematic weakening of Indonesia’s primary independent human rights institution. According to Komnas HAM Chair Anis Hidayah, the proposed changes would effectively paralyze the commission’s ability to fulfill its mandate.
21 problematic articles
Komnas HAM has identified at least 21 crucial articles in the draft revision that pose significant concerns for both normative standards and institutional integrity. These include Articles 1, 10, 79, 80, 83-85, 87, 100, 102-104, 109, and 127.
The most alarming provision is Article 109, which would strip Komnas HAM of four core functions that have defined its work since its establishment: Receiving and handling complaints of alleged human rights violations, conducting mediation in human rights cases, providing human rights education and outreach to the public, conducting assessments and research, except in cases involving international regulations.
The four main functions of Komnas HAM, assessment, education, monitoring, and mediation, are the heart of this institution. If these are removed, Komnas HAM’s role will be paralyzed,” Hidayah emphasized.
Compromising independence: Presidential control over selection
Perhaps equally troubling is Article 100, paragraph (2)b, which stipulates that the selection committee for Komnas HAM members would be appointed by the President. This represents a dramatic departure from current practice, where the selection committee is appointed by the Komnas HAM plenary session itself.
This change directly contradicts the Paris Principles, internationally recognized standards for national human rights institutions that emphasize independence from government control. If the selection committee were appointed by the President, the institutional independence of the Komnas HAM would no longer be guaranteed.
Conflict of interest
The draft revision would transfer many of Komnas HAM’s authorities to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The ministry is part of the government apparatus, in contrast to Komnas HAM, which is a semi-independent state institution, similar to the Ombudsman. This structural flaw violates the basic principle that duty bearers (those responsible for upholding rights) should not simultaneously serve as the arbiters of whether violations have occurred. Independent oversight is essential for credible human rights protection.
Beyond reducing Komnas HAM’s investigative powers, the revision would eliminate its crucial preventive functions. By removing the commission’s authority to review laws and regulations and conduct public outreach, the draft would severely hamper efforts to prevent human rights violations before they occur.
What’s at stake
The implications of this revision extend far beyond bureaucratic restructuring. Komnas HAM has served as the last line of defense for victims of human rights violations in Indonesia. While Komnas HAM is often criticised for being a toothless tiger, the institution provides critical independent voices in a system where government accountability mechanisms are often inadequate.
The commission’s objective, as established in the original 1999 law, is “to develop conditions conducive to the implementation of human rights.” This mission becomes impossible if the institution is stripped of the tools needed to fulfill it. Komnas HAM has called on the government to fundamentally reconsider the direction of this revision. The commission has prepared its own academic paper and detailed recommendations (List of Issues) that would strengthen, rather than weaken, human rights protections.
Key recommendations include:
- Maintaining and strengthening Komnas HAM’s core functions in assessment, education, monitoring, and mediation
- Preserving the independence of the member selection process
- Enhancing protections for vulnerable groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and the elderly
- Clarifying the distinct roles of independent institutions versus government ministries in human rights protection
International implications
This revision comes at a time when human rights spaces are shrinking globally. International observers will be watching closely to see whether Indonesia, as the world’s third-largest democracy, will strengthen or weaken its human rights legislation.
The Paris Principles, established by the United Nations, provide clear guidance that national human rights institutions must operate independently from government, with broad mandates and adequate powers. The proposed Indonesian revision moves in precisely the opposite direction.
For Indonesia’s civil society, human rights defenders, and vulnerable populations, the stakes could not be higher. The question now is whether the Prabowo government will heed calls for genuine consultation and reform, or proceed with changes that could set back human rights protection in Indonesia by decades.
In late August 2025, Indonesia was shaken by a wave of protests following the death of Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle taxi (“ojek”) driver who was struck and killed by a police tactical vehicle during demonstrations. His death became the spark for mass mobilisations across several cities.
The state responded with repressive measures like police violence, mass arrests of activists and military intimidation. Eleven people have died, hundreds have been injured and many activists, such as Lokataru’s director Delpedro Marhaen, remain detained on vague charges. These events raise a critical question about what Indonesia’s escalating protests mean for Indonesia’s democratic trajectory amid autocratisation.
The August protests can be traced back to Pati, a regency in Central Java. Thousands of Pati’s citizens demanded the resignation of regent Sudewo after a staggering 250% rise in property taxes. The increase followed deep budget cuts imposed by President Prabowo Subianto’s administration, which reduced fiscal transfers to local governments.
Amid the budget cuts, the elites showed insensitivity and inequity, which fed widespread discontent. Public anger deepened when parliament raised its own salaries to 44 times the Jakarta minimum wage. Instead of dialogue, the state opted for coercion – producing a chain reaction of anger, violence and repression.
This trajectory highlights concerns raised by scholars who argue that Indonesia is experiencing not only democratic backsliding but a serious democratic erosion. In 2019, Warburton and Aspinall detected democratic regression rooted in the failure to exclude anti-democratic figures and in citizens’ superficial support for democracy. After the 2024 elections, Jaffrey and Warburton suggest Indonesia is edging towards “competitive authoritarianism”, borrowing Levitsky and Way’s typology. The latest 2025 V-Dem democracy report places Indonesia in the “grey zone”, indicating it no longer meets the minimum standards of electoral democracy.
The democratic decline can be traced back to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, when sectarian mobilisation by illiberal-leaning Islamists against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) reshaped the political landscape. President Joko Widodo responded to Islamist mobilisation with repression – what Marcus Mietzner calls “ fighting illiberalism with illiberalism”. The approach extended beyond Islamist groups to other arenas of civil society.
Key democratic institutions were weakened. The Corruption Eradication Commission was gutted and the 2020 Job Creation Law reinforced oligarchic entrenchment. The 2024 election was tainted by constitutional manipulation that enabled Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming, to run as Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate. Misuse of state resources and police intervention sealed the outcome. The result, as many feared, was a government with weak governance capacity and limited democratic commitment, deepening democratic erosion.
Research by Shadmehr and Boleslavsky suggests repression can backfire when legitimacy is uncertain, fuelling broader mobilisation. This dynamic is visible when peaceful dissent is met with police repression. In Indonesia, Kurniawan’s death turned coercion into a catalyst for mobilisation rather than a deterrent, further delegitimising the regime’s repression.
Whether these protests can shift Indonesia’s democratic trajectory depends on organisation. As Kurt Weyland argues, structured and organised democratic movements typically produce slower but more durable transitions. In contrast, unorganised protests risk providing a pretext for greater authoritarian entrenchment, even the imposition of martial law – a possibility floated in media reports after the riots and looting that accompanied Indonesia’s wave of protests.
Indonesia’s own history offers lessons. The Reformasi movement of 1998, though marred by violence and minority persecution, achieved a stable and more enduring democratic transition. This transition occurred largely because it involved organised networks of students, civil society and mass organisations.
The August protests of 2025 show early signs of expanding beyond spontaneous anger towards more organised and durable action. Indonesian diaspora groups worldwide have mobilised in solidarity, while initiatives such as the “ 17+8 People’s Demands” attempt to consolidate grievances from different civil society actors. If this momentum can be sustained and organised, the protests could become a vehicle for improving Indonesia’s democratic trajectory. But risks of fragmentation, repression and authoritarian retrenchment remain stark.
Indonesia’s current wave of protests reflects more than anger over local taxation or elite privilege. It embodies accumulated frustrations with elites’ insensitivity, oligarchic capture and democratic erosion. The protests highlight two dynamics – exposing the declining legitimacy of state coercion and the emerging possibility of democratic renewal in Indonesia. If civil society consolidates demands into an organised and broad-based movement, Indonesia may yet rediscover the spirit of Reformasi and push back against backsliding. But if the protests remain fragmented, the state’s coercive apparatus could instead entrench a more militarised authoritarian order.
Republished from East Asia Forum, 20 October 2025
The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.
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4) Govt launches 250 more internet service points in Papua's 3T regions
October 31, 2025 21:39 GMT+700
Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA) - Papua has activated 250 satellite-based internet service points across its disadvantaged, frontier, and outermost (3T) regions to boost digital access and accelerate regional development, Governor Mathius Fakhiri said on Friday.
“This satellite-based service aims to ensure equal access to digital connectivity across all areas,” Fakhiri said, describing it as a strategic step to increase internet penetration and support the province’s goal of a “progressive and harmonious New Papua.”
He added that expanded internet access would enable people in remote areas to obtain faster and more efficient education, health, and government services.
Papua’s Head of Communications and Informatics Jerry Yudianto said the 250 new service points mark the second phase of the program, following 50 points established in 2024, bringing the total to 300.
“This program helps accelerate digital transformation in Papua. All points were installed in areas with limited connectivity—such as schools, health centers, district offices, and places of worship. The service is free to the public,” Yudianto said.
He expressed hope that the network would be fully utilized to support inclusive growth.
“With equitable connectivity, Papua’s development can advance faster and more inclusively,” he added.
The Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi) Ministry has also promoted the use of solar energy as an alternative, eco-friendly power source for operating base transceiver stations (BTS) in Indonesia’s remote regions.
Although solar panels produce less energy than conventional generators, they have successfully powered BTS to connect essential public institutions to the internet, Komdigi said.
“Digital transformation cannot happen without reliable connectivity,” said Komdigi Minister Meutya Hafid.
“President Prabowo Subianto’s vision emphasizes digital public services, and we must ensure connectivity reaches even the most remote and border areas," she added.
Related news: RI Govt has built 397 BTS for internet network in Papua within a year
Related news: Papua calls for quick mitigation of telecommunications disruptions
Translator: Resinta Sulistiyandari
Editor: Rahmad Nasution
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5) School in Papua becomes a stronghold for mother tongue preservation
October 31, 2025 21:14 GMT+700
Sentani (ANTARA) - The Papua Language Office has recognized the Papua State Indigenous School in Jayapura District as a key model for preserving regional languages through education.
Senior linguist Antonius Maturbongs said the school’s integration of local language learning—such as Sentani—into primary and secondary curricula offers a concrete example for other regions seeking to protect their native tongues.
“The initiative shows how local education policies can sustain linguistic heritage,” Maturbongs said Friday in Sentani.
He explained that the Merauke District Education Office in South Papua is preparing a regulation to safeguard mother tongues, following a comparative study at schools in Sentani that teach the Sentani language as a local content subject.
“We held a three-day workshop with Merauke officials and visited schools to observe how local language education is implemented. This allows them to replicate the experience in their regions," he said.
According to Maturbongs, Papua has 428 regional languages, based on 2019 data, most of which are endangered due to a declining number of speakers — with some languages surviving with only one remaining speaker.
Related news: Striving to preserve Papua's Namblong language
He stressed the need for collaboration among local governments, schools, and communities to keep these languages alive.
Origenes Monim, director of the Papua State Indigenous School, said the institution functions not only as an academic center but also as a hub for cultural preservation.
“We have integrated the Sentani language into the school curriculum so it continues to be taught formally,” he said.
The local effort aligns with the Ministry of Education’s Regional Language Revitalization Program (RBD), launched in 2022 under the Merdeka Belajar (Freedom to Learn) initiative. The program promotes language use within families and schools through festivals, storytelling, and digital media.
The government also encourages early education in regional languages, particularly in remote and disadvantaged areas, to improve literacy. These efforts are supported by Government Regulation No. 57 of 2014 on the protection and development of local languages.
Related news: Ministry urges Papua regions to preserve endangered local languages
Translator: Primayanti
Editor: Rahmad Nasution
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