2) Non-Papuans Rally, Demand Security
TEMPO.CO, Jayapura - Thousands of non-Papuans residents living in the Jayapura district marched in the district's street on Wednesday, July 3. The non-locals rallied to protest against the murder of a man from Sulawesi in Sentani, last week.
"We demand security guarantees and the closing of all liquor stores," said Burhan, one of the protest leaders.
Burhan said that the immigrants had never done any harm to the native Papuans. "Everyone her are traders and shop owners and we have been nice. But somehow [Papuans] think we've taken their rights, whereas we are helping them by providing jobs," he said.
The protest caused a number of shops to close as most shop owners joined the protest. Hundreds of merchants marched on the streets, asking the government to work harder in creating harmony between native Papuans and non-Papuans.
JERRY OMONA
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http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-indonesia-relations-approach-with-caution/
3) Australia–Indonesia relations: approach with caution
With all the talk in the past few days about the possibility of Australia and Indonesia coming into conflict—be it diplomatic or otherwise—it’s worth understanding some of the pressure points in the relationship. At the top of the list, at least from Jakarta’s perspective, would be the events of late 1999. Following a self-determination ballot in August 1999, the security situation in East Timor worsened and—after a period of active diplomacy and coercive efforts supported by the US—Indonesia consented to the deployment of an Australian-led, UN-authorised peacekeeping force (known as INTERFET).
Aside from the obvious reasons, this case study deserves close scrutiny because a certain mythology (and oversimplification) has crept into the narrative over the years. In the latest issue of the Security Challenges journal, I present a new take on the events of 1999. As part of my research for this article, I interviewed the six Ministers then serving in the National Security Committee of Cabinet, as well as nine others who were intimately involved in Australian policy-making. One key lesson from the events of 1999 is that Australia will—in all but the most extenuating circumstances—prioritise the Jakarta–Canberra relationship above almost all other concerns.
While some see the violence of September 1999 as a catastrophe Australia could—and should—have prevented, I instead suggest that Australia’s ability to influence this outcome was limited. The events of 1999 should be considered, to some degree, independently of events in 1998. In January 1999 the Indonesian President, B.J. Habibie, announced that East Timor’s status would be resolved through an act of self-determination. Though Australia had advocated Indonesian policy action on the issue of East Timor, this decision was completely unanticipated and generated acute policy challenges for Australia. As such, Habibie’s announcement caught Australia by surprise and precipitated a period of reactive policy-making.
As 1999 progressed, it became clear than the Indonesian military (TNI) were unable or unwilling to provide adequate security for the ballot. This was the primary policy challenge for Australia—having advocated a new Indonesian approach, Australia was politically tied to the outcome. The best method for ensuring the security of the ballot was widely acknowledged to be a pre-ballot peacekeeping force (PKF) deployed under Indonesian consent. Given the abhorrent violence of September 1999, it’s no surprise that much of the historical debate centres on this issue.
Clinton Fernandes uses leaked documents to argue that Australia ‘worked assiduously’ to prevent a pre-ballot PKF. However, this account overlooks a number of factors that point to a more balanced Australian approach. Australia’s plan, in early 1999, was to maximise pressure on Indonesia—specifically the TNI—in the hope that they would improve security. Though Fernandes suggests a rift in Australia–US relations on this point, public testimony from the American Assistant Secretary of State, Stan Roth, supported the Australian approach. Fernandes’ account also overlooks Australia’s subsequent efforts to secure a pre-ballot PKF.
In April 1999, TNI forces failed to intervene during a churchyard massacre in Liquica, in which approximately sixty civilians were killed. This prompted Howard to call Habibie to suggest a high-level meeting in order to discuss the violence and possible solutions.
The ‘Bali Summit’ of 27 April 1999 started with a private meeting between Howard and Habibie. Howard asked Habibie to accept a pre-ballot PKF, but Habibie judged the situation in East Timor to be a secondary concern. While the TNI had accepted his decision for a self-determination ballot, Habibie felt they would not accept foreign troops on (what was still) Indonesian soil. Howard pressed Habibie, but he was rebuffed—Habibie insisted that his ‘position would be absolutely untenable in Jakarta if he were to agree to this’.
Hugh White, then a Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence, has since described the Bali Summit as the ‘last best chance to avoid the disasters of September’. I argue that while Australia could have pursued a pre-ballot PKF more forcefully, this would’ve entailed serious strategic risk. Had Habibie accepted Howard’s request, it could’ve precipitated a TNI coup or more determined efforts to subvert the ballot. These would have been catastrophic outcomes for Australia.
My research suggests that Australia’s primary policy challenge throughout 1999 was that of balancing competing strategic objectives. Pursuing one objective—such as reduced violence in Timor—could imperil more important objectives, such as supporting Indonesia’s continued democratic reform. Though Australia didn’t prevent the violence of September 1999, this wasn’t due to apathy, neglect or incompetence. Rather, this outcome reflects Australia’s invidious circumstances, where avoiding worst-case scenarios was a significant achievement. It also suggests that in all but the most-dire circumstances, Australia will likely prioritise good relations with Jakarta above other concerns. Given a bipartisan desire to address the ‘boatpeople’ issue, this notion could be of great relevance over the next year or so. A new Indonesian President, depending on their disposition towards Australia, could be another cause for cautious diplomacy.
After considering the events of 1998–1999, it would be foolish to conclude that Australia’s relationship with Indonesia should be paralysed by the fear of worst-case scenarios. However, it would be equally foolish to assume that the same priorities that motivated Australian behaviour in 1999 are less relevant today. Indonesia continues to be of immense and enduring importance to Australia. While this idea mightn’t resonate with a domestic audience, it’s a strategic reality unlikely to change, and should sensibly inform the consideration of any new policy which might pose a risk to the bilateral relationship.
Iain Henry is a Fulbright Scholar and PhD candidate at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. These are his personal views only. He tweets at@IainDHenry. Image courtesy of Flickr user jenny louise johnson.
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One wonders whose opinions the reportedly more consultative Kevin Rudd sought in advance of his press conference last week, when he speculated about confrontation with Indonesia under a Coalition government. ‘I am very concerned about whether if Mr Abbott became prime minister and continues that rhetoric and that posture and actually tries to translate it into reality I really wonder whether he is trying to risk some sort of conflict with Indonesia’, Mr Rudd said. ‘It’s not a good thing, it’s a really bad thing’.
Confrontation with Indonesia would be an unspeakably bad thing for any Australian government, but it’s difficult to see how that outcome would emerge from a difference of view over asylum seekers. The Australian Navy will always operate with the safety of individuals at sea as their prime concern, and no political direction can alter that. It’s simply misleading to imply that the unhappy and complicated asylum seeker issue could degenerate into war between Australia and Indonesia. The constant influx of boats carrying asylum-seekers makes the bilateral relationship difficult, but so too do differences over live cattle exports, the attitudes of some Australian NGOs on Papua, drug-mules and a range of other issues. The fact is that relations between the two countries remain on a positive track notwithstanding specific points of tension.
Here’s some good news: there’s largely bipartisan support for building closer and more effective relations with Indonesia. The 2013 Defence White Paper put a premium on closer relations with Jakarta, describing it as ‘our most important relationship in the region’:
Australia benefits from having a strong and cohesive Indonesia as a partner to our north, as Indonesia does from a secure Australia to its south. Geographic proximity means that Indonesia’s and Australia’s security interests are intertwined. We have a shared aspiration for the stability and economic prosperity of our region that underpins our partnership and is driving increased breadth and depth in our defence cooperation. (DWP 2013 (PDF), paragraph 3.17)
At the Shangri-La Dialogue last June, Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo indicated the bilateral defence relationship was progressing well. He praised Australia for closely consulting with Jakarta on the white paper and offered to do the same as Indonesia updates its policy.
For its part, the Opposition has indicated strong support for the bilateral relationship. A Coalition policy statement released in January 2013 notes the opportunities Indonesian economic growth offers for Australia, commits to fast-track a free trade agreement with Jakarta, promises to avoid ‘damaging backflips’ like the suspension of the live cattle trade, and says that if Prime Minister Mr Abbott will make his first overseas visit to Indonesia. This positive approach has been summed up as ‘more Jakarta and less Geneva‘ in Coalition statements.
Both sides of politics claim to appreciate the importance of the bilateral relationship, and say that it’s a priority to deepen engagement. If the government and opposition really mean what they say, they should work harder to ensure that domestic wrangles don’t damage their bigger aspirations for the relationship. The reality is that both sides have an interest in making sure that relations with Jakarta are kept on an even keel through the election period so that whichever party wins power, a government with a new mandate can make Indonesia a priority.
What would be the right way to approach Indonesia in the lead up to our own domestic poll? Mr Rudd will visit next week, and it’s likely the Coalition will continue to make their own contacts in the weeks before the election. I suggest four key approaches. First, it’s important to not leave the Indonesians with an impression that either side of Australian politics is trying to enlist their support in a domestic spat. Jakarta, sensibly, will want to be able to deal with whoever wins office in Canberra. Domestic politics shouldn’t be exported.
Second, we must take the time to set out the bigger goals for the bilateral relationship. As I’ve written here, Indonesia doesn’t necessarily think its relationship with Australia is as critical to them as we’d like. We need to sell the positive case for close relations with Canberra, which will be built around economic links, trade and people to people ties. It’s pointless just hectoring Indonesians about why they should jump to address our interests.
Third, if the relationship is really critical to Australia, we should be prepared to put our money where our mouth is—by offering substantial incentives to change behavior around people smuggling. This could involve helping to equip and train the TNI Navy and Air Force with the wherewithal to patrol their waters. Large scale development assistance to build capacity in customs, policing, judicial and related areas would also assist. It’s worth remembering here the breakthrough moment in the bilateral relationship that took place when John Howard announced abillion dollar aid package in January 2005 after the tsunami devastated the Aceh Province. This was a defining moment which helped to overcome resentments from the East Timor experience. Big gestures can yield big rewards.
Finally, our Government and Opposition should approach their contacts with Indonesian leaders in a suitably low-key way. Megaphone diplomacy of the type associated with Prime Ministerial visits won’t help to deliver the types of cooperative and long-term outcomes Australia wants. The right approach would be for both sides of Australian politics to signal their willingness to be involved in a deep, sustained and closed door-dialogue after our election is over. If ever there was a need for some bipartisan consensus on an international issue, good relations with Indonesia is the critical one. References to Konfrontasi should be shelved and promises of continuity offered instead.
Peter Jennings is executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Image courtesy ofAustralian Foreign Minister archive.
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