The Indonesian government’s proposal to grant amnesty to pro-independence rebels in Papua has stirred skepticism as the administration of new President Prabowo Subianto seeks to deal with the country’s most protracted armed conflict.
Without broader dialogue and accountability, critics argue, the initiative could fail to resolve the decades-long unrest in the resource-rich region.
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, coordinating minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections, announced the amnesty proposal last week. On Jan. 21, he met with a British government delegation and discussed human rights issues and the Papua conflict.
“Essentially, President Prabowo has agreed to grant amnesty … to those involved in the Papua conflict,” Yusril told reporters last week.
On Thursday, he told BenarNews that the proposal was being studied and reviewed.
“It should be viewed within a broader perspective as part of efforts to resolve the conflict in Papua by prioritizing law and human rights,” Yusril said.
Sebby Sambom, a spokesman for the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) rebels, dismissed the proposal as insufficient.
“The issue isn’t about granting amnesty and expecting the conflict to end,” Sambom told BenarNews. “Those fighting in the forests have chosen to abandon normal lives to fight for Papua’s independence. They are willing to die for this cause.”
Despite the government offer, those still engaged in guerrilla warfare won’t stop, Sambon said.
Papua, Indonesia’s easternmost region that makes up the western half of New Guinea island, has been a flashpoint of tension since its controversial incorporation into the archipelago nation in 1969. Papua, home to a distinct Melanesian culture and vast natural resources, has seen a low-level separatist insurgency in the years since.
The Indonesian government has consistently rejected calls for Papua’s independence. The region is home to the Grasberg mine, one of the world’s largest gold and copper reserves, and its forests are a critical part of Indonesia’s climate commitments.
Even with its abundant resources, Papua remains one of Indonesia’s poorest regions with high rates of poverty, illiteracy and infant mortality. Critics argue that Jakarta’s heavy-handed approach, including the deployment of thousands of troops, has only deepened resentment.
Yusril, the minister, said the new proposal was separate from a plan announced in November 2024 to grant amnesty to 44,000 convicts, and noted that the amnesty would be granted only to those who pledged loyalty to the Indonesian state.
He added that the government was finalizing the details of the amnesty scheme, which would require approval from the House of Representatives (DPR).
Prabowo’s amnesty proposal follows a similar, albeit smaller, move by his predecessor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who granted clemency to several Papuan political prisoners in 2015.
While Jokowi’s gesture was initially seen as a step toward reconciliation, it did little to quell violence. Armed clashes between Indonesian security forces and pro-independence fighters have intensified in recent years, with civilians often caught in the crossfire.
Cahyo Pamungkas, a Papua researcher at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), argued that amnesty, without prior dialogue and mutual agreements, would be ineffective.
“In almost every country, amnesty is given to resistance groups or government opposition groups only after a peace agreement is reached to end armed conflict,” he told BenarNews.
Yan Warinussy, a human rights lawyer in Papua, agreed.
“Amnesty, abolition or clemency should not be declared unilaterally by one side without a multi-party understanding from the start,” he told BenarNews.
Warinussy warned that without such an approach, the prospect of a Papua peace dialogue could remain an unfulfilled promise and the conflict could escalate.
Usman Hamid, director of Amnesty International Indonesia, said that while amnesty was a constitutional legal instrument, it should not apply to those who have committed serious human rights violations.
“The government must ensure that perpetrators of gross human rights violations in Papua and elsewhere are prosecuted through fair and transparent legal mechanisms,” he said.
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Papuans Behind Bars, a website tracking political prisoners in Papua, reported 531 political arrests in 2023, with 96 political prisoners still detained by the end of the year.
Most were affiliated with non-armed groups such as the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) and the Papua People’s Petition (PRP), while only 11 were linked to the armed West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).
The website did not list 2024 figures.
Anum Siregar, a lawyer who has represented Papuan political prisoners, said that the amnesty proposal has sparked interest.
“Some of those detained outside Papua are requesting to be transferred to prisons in Papua,” she said.
Meanwhile, Agus Kossay, leader of the National Committee for West Papua, which campaigns for a referendum on self-determination, said Papuans would not compromise on “their God-given right to determine their own destiny.”
In September 2019, Kossay was arrested for orchestrating a riot and was sentenced to 11 months in jail. More recently, in 2023, he was arrested in connection with an internal dispute within the KNPB and was released in September 2024 after serving a sentence for incitement.
“The right to self-determination is non-negotiable and cannot be challenged by anyone. As long as it remains unfulfilled, we will continue to speak out,” Kossay told BenarNews.
A West Papuan advocacy group is calling for an urgent international inquiry into allegations that Indonesian security forces have used the chemical weapon white phosphorus against West Papuans for a second time.
The allegations were made in the new documentary, Frontier War, by Paradise Broadcasting.
In the film, West Papuan civilians give testimony about a number of children dying from sickness in the months folllowing the 2021 Kiwirok attack.
- READ MORE: Frontier War, a documentary about Indonesia’s drone warfare in West Papua
- Other West Papua reports
They say that “poisoning . . . occurred due to the bombings”, that “they throw the bomb and . . . chemicals come through the mouth”, said United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) interim president Benny Wenda.
They add that this was “the first time they’re throwing people up are not dying, but between one month later or two months later”, he said in a statement.
Bombings produced big “clouds of dust” and infants suffering the effects could not stop coughing up blood.
“White phosphorus is an evil weapon, even when used against combatants. It burns through skin and flesh and causes heart and liver failure,” said Wenda.
‘Crimes against defenceless civilians’
“But Indonesia is committing these crimes against humanity against defenceless civilians, elders, women and children.
“Thousands of Papuans in the border region were forced from their villages by these attacks, adding to the over 85,000 who are still internally displaced by militarisation.”
Indonesia previously used white phosphorus in Nduga in December 2018.
Journalists uncovered that victims were suffering deep burns down to the bone, typical with that weapon, as well as photographing yellow tipped bombs which military sources confirmed “appear to be incendiary or white phosphorus”.
The same yellow-tipped explosives were discovered in Kiwirok, and the fins from the recovered munitions are consistent with white phosphorus.
“As usual, Indonesia lied about using white phosphorus in Nduga,” said Wenda.
“They have also lied about even the existence of the Kiwirok attack — an operation that led to the deaths of over 300 men, women, and children.
“They lie, lie, lie.”
Frontier War/ Inside the West Papua Liberation Army Video: Paradise Broadcasting
Proof needed after ‘opening up’
Wenda said the movement would not be able to obtain proof of these attacks — “of the atrocities being perpetrated daily against my people” — until Indonesia opened West Papua to the “eyes of the world”.
“West Papua is a prison island: no journalists, NGOs, or aid organisations are allowed to operate there. Even the UN is totally banned,” Wenda said.
Indonesia’s entire strategy in West Papua is secrecy. Their crimes have been hidden from the world for decades, through a combination of internet blackouts, repression of domestic journalists, and refusal of access to international media.”
Wenda said Indonesia must urgently facilitate the long-delayed UN Human Rights visit to West Papua, and allow journalists and NGOs to operate there without fear of imprisonment or repression.
“The MSG [Melanesian Spearhead Group], PIF [Pacific Islands Forum] and the OACPS [Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States] must again increase the pressure on Indonesia to allow a UN visit,” he said.
“The fake amnesty proposed by [President] Prabowo Subianto is contradictory as it does not also include a UN visit. Even if 10, 20 activists are released, our right to political expression is totally banned.”
Wenda said that Indonesia must ultimately “open their eyes” to the only long-term solution in West Papua — self-determination through an independence referendum.
In his first 100 days of office, President Prabowo Subianto has appointed several military figures to his Cabinet, including serving officers. Senior figures have proposed reforming the military law, allowing the military to hold business interests and more serving officers to work in civilian government posts. Military businesses are already a driver of conflict in resource-rich areas, above all in West Papua.
Prabowo has also promised to pursue food self-sufficiency through ‘Food Estates’. But in West Papua, many Food Estates have already been earmarked for growing export crops.
Thirdly, Prabowo’s much vaunted prisoner amnesty can be seen as aimed at reducing the costs of imprisonment, improving the image of Prabowo and his notoriously poor human rights record, and supplying labour to Food Estates which may well lead to more abuses in Papua.
Deepening ‘Dwifungsi’
Since Prabowo’s inauguration in October 2024, he has appointed several ministers with military backgrounds. His new Minister of Defence, Sjafrie Sjamsuddin,1 has pushed for reforms of the military law (34/2004).2 Prabowo has also promoted loyalists into senior military roles.3
Proposed reforms include abolishing fixed term limits on the TNI Commander (Panglima). This carries a risk of deeper collaboration between the military and civilian politicians, including the President himself. Another proposed reform is to allow military personnel the ability to work in any civilian government post (currently such personnel may work in just 10 government agencies). Civil society organisations argue that these appointments should be based on a candidate’s qualifications, not designed to find jobs for active duty officers.4
Proposed reforms also include removing a ban on military personnel having business interests. Military personnel were supposed to divest from businesses by 2009 but this was not followed through by politicians. Under such a move, the military could now be allowed to develop above-board business interests in resource-rich areas of Indonesia (where many military businesses already operate illegally). West Papua, where the military justifies its presence by fighting a low-level war against pro-independence armed groups, is the most problematic of these resource-rich areas. There are no effective checks on security force operations there. Recent operations have made indigenous people chronically displaced; local people have been convicted in flawed trials of involvement in attacks on the security forces. Local government attempts to return people to their land have failed because they are always guided by ‘the security approach’, which has allowed the security forces to occupy land from which they extract resources.5
Food self-sufficiency and Food Estates
Much of what Prabowo has done since entering office has focused on food or agriculture. Above all, his administration has implemented a policy of providing free school meals (makan siang gratis).6 There has also been a reported pivot away from infrastructure towards achieving national food self-sufficiency.7 The Prabowo administration has supported controversial plantation projects to help realise this goal. After being inaugurated, Prabowo promised three million hectares of ‘Food Estates’ - massive agro-industrial plantations - across Indonesia, in four years. At least one million hectares of these would be in Merauke, South Papua province.8 In 2020, plans were drawn up for the military and Ministry of Defence to be key players in these Food Estates.9
We warned in late-2022 that Food Estates could lead to a “major expansion of military business”.10 Indeed, civil society organisations have recently said that 38 companies may be the real beneficiaries of Food Estates, including sugarcane, bioethanol and palm oil plantations, amounting to 1.5 million hectares of land. These are mainly export crops, not staple foods. The biggest losers would be indigenous communities who stand to lose more than half a million hectares. The overall impact constitutes an immeasurable loss of livelihoods, cultural sites, and knowledge such as sources of traditional medicine.11
Prisoner Release
President Prabowo’s plan to give amnesty to 44,000 prisoners is being done for cynical rather than altruistic reasons. Despite claiming that the policy is humanitarian,12 there have been changing rationales for the policy. Ulterior motives include providing cheap labour and softening Prabowo’s image, and the policy also carries the risk of worsening conflict in Papua.
The amnesty initially focused on vulnerable groups and those imprisoned for offences which should be protected under the right to freedom of expression13 but it has since been expanded to include those involved in drug-related cases,14 altogether accounting for 39,000 of the 44,000 total.15 Furthermore, the policy may have the main objective of easing pressure on prison capacity, due to a huge problem of prison overcrowding.16 There has even been talk of putting those released in the amnesty immediately to work on government projects, including Food Estates.17 Such cheap labour could lead to their faster growth, and this may well fuel further violence and displacement of indigenous people in Papua.
Furthermore, while initial plans have been announced for the release of 18 Papuan activists, originally including only those involved in nonviolent actions,18 this has since been expanded to those imprisoned for armed activities. This has been framed as a way of promoting human rights and to find a solution to the conflict. However, this is not a new approach.19 Activists say it has been done to improve the image of the Government,20 and Prabowo probably hopes that it will soften his own image. But the numbers planned for release do not come close to the numbers of Papuan political prisoners currently in Indonesian jails,21 with Papuans Behind Bars indicating that 77 people are imprisoned due to political actions (24 people) and because of actions related to the armed conflict (53 people).22 It is clear then that the claims to be providing amnesty so as to strengthen human rights and end armed conflict are not being made in good faith.
Conclusion
Prabowo’s first 100 days suggest that what were already minimal checks on the power of the military are being further eroded with plans to expand the number of officers working in civilian government posts. Moreover, if the legal provision to prevent the military holding business interests is to be scrapped, it would allow the military to deepen its involvement in resource-rich areas including Papua. Food Estates, which Prabowo has pledged to expand across Indonesia, will primarily benefit military and corporate interests, rather than strengthen food self-sufficiency.
Meanwhile, a prisoner amnesty looks to be primarily aimed at relieving pressure on an overcrowded prison system, even though it is being framed as a way to improve the Prabowo administration’s human rights credentials and to soften his image. A planned provision to provide ex-prison labour on Food Estates may benefit the military and corporations at the expense of indigenous Papuans and will do little to improve food self-sufficiency.
A plan to release Papuan political prisoners, if it is to be carried out on human rights and humanitarian grounds as claimed, must be accompanied by a comprehensive change of approach. The security approach must be replaced by dialogue, the judicial system and criminalisation of treason must be reviewed, and the security forces must be subjected to rigorous accountability mechanisms in order to ensure that human rights are respected.
1Sjamsuddin was a senior military commander during the destruction of East Timor in 1999. Like Prabowo, he was a member of Kopassus, an elite military special forces unit. In the aftermath of the 1999 referendum in East Timor, he reportedly met senior TNI commanders to discuss the destruction of infrastructure and the killing of pro-independence leaders “in the event that the ballot result favoured independence.” See G. Robinson, ‘East Timor 1999. Crimes against Humanity. A Report Commissioned by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights', 2003.’ Dili: Assosiasaun Hak, 2003, p.96.
2Kompas.com, ’Revisi UU TNI Diusulkan Masuk Prolegnas DPR RI’, 12 November 2024. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/11/12/17291871/revisi-uu-tni-diusulkan-masuk-prolegnas-dpr-ri
3N.R. Aditnnya, D. Prabowo, ‘72 Kolonel TNI Pecah Bintang, Ini Daftarnya’, 12 December 2024. Kompas.com
4Tempo.co, 'Imparsial Kritik Kebijakan Mutasi TNI yang Terkesan Cepat’, 11 December 2024. A reformed law would also allow an expansion of ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW), described as allowing the military involvement in potentially "aiding the government in mitigating cyberattacks and stamping out illicit drug circulation”. See Jakarta Post, ‘Not the Military’s Business’, 22 July 2024.
5TAPOL, 'Militarisation, Conflict and Injustice in Maybrat Regency, West Papua', 17 February 2022, and TAPOL, 'Maybrat: Return of Displaced People Fails, Injustices Continue', 5 October 2024.
6Republika.id, ‘Attending indonesia-Brazil Business Forum Prabowo Reveals Indonesia's Reasons for Joining BRICS’ 18 November 2024. At the Indonesia-Brazil Business Forum, Prabowo instructed advisors to study Brazil’s free school meals programme. In April 2024, after the election but before his inauguration, Prabowo had already signed a “note of understanding” with the Government of China to provide direct food supplementation. Max Walden and Erwin Renaldi, 'Beijing and Washington stops provide clues for Indonesia's direction under Prabowo Subianto’, 13 November 2024. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-11-13/what-prabowo-visit-china-and-united-states-mean-for-the-region/104591024 Free school meals were held to be the reason for Prabowo’s high approval ratings in early 2025, according to one poll. See Reuters, 'High approval rating for Indonesia's Prabowo after first 100 days, poll shows', 20 January 2025.
7Jakarta Post, 'Government halts big infrastructure in trade-off for food security: Minister', 19 November 2024.
8Stefanno Sulaiman, ‘Indonesia's Prabowo visits Papua to check key food estate project’, 5 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesias-prabowo-visits-papua-check-key-food-estate-project-2024-11-03/
9For a history of Food Estates, see TAPOL and Awas MIFFEE, ‘Pandemic Power Grabs: Who Benefits?’, 29 April 2022. pp.9-13.
10TAPOL and Awas MIFFEE, ‘The Military’s Role in Food Estate Plans’, 2 November 2022.
11Yayasan Pusaka Bentala Rakyat, ‘The National Strategic Project (PSN) of Food and Energy Development in Merauke Regency, South Papua Province: Violating Human Rights and Worsening Environmental Crisis’, September 2024.
12Minister of Human Rights, Natalius Pigai, has stated that this is being done for reasons of “humanity and reconciliation.” Tempo.co, ‘Prabowo Beri Amnesti 44 Ribu Narapidana, Menteri HAM: Demi Kemanusiaan dan Rekonsiliasi’, 16 December 2024. https://www.tempo.co/hukum/prabowo-beri-amnesti-44-ribu-narapidana-menteri-ham-demi-kemanusiaan-dan-rekonsiliasi-1181966
13Tempo.co, ‘Prabowo Beri Amnesti 44 Ribu Narapidana, Menteri HAM: Demi Kemanusiaan dan Rekonsiliasi’, 16 December 2024.
14VOI, ‘Menteri HAM: Napi Dapat Amnesti Ikut Pendidikan HAM Agar Lebih Humanis’, 8 January 2024. https://voi.id/berita/449389/menteri-ham-napi-dapat-amnesti-ikut-pendidikan-ham-agar-lebih-humanis. Pigai also talked of the need for those released to receive “human rights education”, indicating changing justifications.
15Amara, A.N., Kabar24, ‘DPR Sambut Baik Rencana Prabowo Beri Amnesti 44.000 Napi, Ini Alasannya!’, 19 December 2024. https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20241219/15/1825529/dpr-sambut-baik-rencana-prabowo-beri-amnesti-44000-napi-ini-alasannya
16The prison population in Indonesia is reportedly up to 88.2% over capacity. See Sidqi, M. A, katadata.co.id, ‘Cek Data: Presiden Amnesti Ribuan Napi, Benarkah Penjara Kelebihan Kapasitas?’, 20 December 2024. https://katadata.co.id/cek-data/6764e9278b831/cek-data-presiden-amnesti-ribuan-napi-benarkah-penjara-kelebihan-kapasitas. The Institute of Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) have expressed concern that the amnesty process needs to be done in an accountable and transparent way, backed by relevant legislation. ICJR, ‘Rencana Amnesti terhadap 40.000 Narapidana Harus Akuntabel dan Direspon Perubahan Legislasi Terkait’, 15 December 2024. https://icjr.or.id/rencana-amnesti-terhadap-40-000-narapidana-harus-akuntabel-dan-direspon-perubahan-legislasi-terkait/
17C. Y. Nuralam, Media Indonesia, ‘Komcad Jadi Syarat Pemberian Amnesti Narapidana? Ini Alasan Menteri Hukum’ 27 December 2024. https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/729770/komcad-jadi-syarat-pemberian-amnesti-narapidana-ini-alasan-menteri-hukum
18K. W. Prabowo, Media Indonesia, ‘18 Aktivis Papua akan Dapat Amnesti’, 13 December 2024. https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/726109/18-aktivis-papua-akan-dapat-amnesti
19This is similar to what President Joko Widodo did in 2015, when he gave a presidential pardon to those involved in an armed attack on TNI facilities. Sari, H.P. and Prabowo, D., Kompas.com, ‘Prabowo Pertimbangkan Beri Amnesti Untuk Kelompok Bersenjata di Papua’, 22 January 2025. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/01/22/17192731/prabowo-pertimbangkan-beri-amnesti-untuk-kelompok-bersenjata-di-papua
20BBC Indonesia, ‘Prabowo berencana beri amnesti kepada kelompok pro-kemerdekaan Papua – Apa itu amnesti dan apa pengaruhnya bagi penyelesaian konflik di Papua?’, 23 January 2025. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c93qle3639eo
21Suara Papua, ‘Gustaf Kawer: Pembebasan Tapol Makar Harus Dilakukan Secara Konprehensif’,’ 22 December 2024. https://suarapapua.com/2024/12/22/gustaf-kawer-pembebasan-tapol-makar-harus-dilakukan-secara-konprehensif/ This includes both those who have been imprisoned for treason and those accused of many different crimes but imprisoned due to their activism and opinions against the Indonesian Government. See more at ‘Cenderawasih Pos ‘Amnesti Sebatas Pencitraan?’, 24 December 2024. https://cenderawasihpos.jawapos.com/berita-utama/24/12/2024/amnesti-sebatas-pencitraan/
22Papuans Behind Bars, https://tapol.uwazi.io/en/library/?q= (Accessed 23 January 2025).
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