Monday, March 2, 2020

1) Indonesia’s point man for palm oil says no more plantations in Papua


2) Activists skeptical of win as court orders Papua plantation maps published

3) Joni Botak led Papuans who killed policeman  
4) TAPOL Briefing The proposed insertion of serving military officers into civilian government posts
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1) Indonesia’s point man for palm oil says no more plantations in Papua

by  on 2 March 2020
  • The Indonesian minister in charge of investments has declared there will be no new permits approved for oil palm plantations in the country’s Papua region, and that crops such as nutmeg and coffee will instead be prioritized.
  • Luhut Pandjaitan, who owns several palm oil companies, said control of existing concessions in Papua was concentrated in the hands of foreign companies and wealthy domestic conglomerates and that their investments hadn’t always benefited the locals.
  • Activists are skeptical about the minister’s U-turn, given that Luhut has been the government’s most vocal defender of the palm oil industry amid the growing international backlash against the commodity and its associated environmental damage.
  • They also warn that the move might simply replace large-scale deforestation for palm oil with large-scale deforestation for other crops.
JAKARTA — A top Indonesian official has declared a halt to new oil palm plantations in the country’s heavily forested Papua region in favor of other, “greener,” crops, apparently contradicting his vigorous earlier defenses of the industry.
The remarks by Luhut Pandjaitan, the chief minister in charge of investments, including in the palm oil industry, come in the wake of a court verdict ordering the government to publish maps and concession-holder details for plantations in Papua.
“We agree that [we] no longer want palm oil development here [in Papua],” Luhut said on Feb. 27 as quoted by CNN Indonesia. “We’ve announced a moratorium on [new] palm oil [plantations] but now we’re strengthening it.”
Luhut, speaking during a visit to the district of Sorong in West Papua province, saidthe companies investing in the palm oil industry in Papua were predominantly foreign ones or those controlled by wealthy Indonesian businesses, and that their investments “don’t necessarily benefit local people.”
“Don’t [let] only rich people cut down the forests and destroy us all,” he added.
                 The rainforest of Boven Digoel. Image by Nanang Sujana for The Gecko Project.

‘Not being consistent’

Edi Sutrisno, the executive director of TuK Indonesia, an NGO that advocates for social justice in the agribusiness sector, questioned the about-face by Luhut, widely seen as the Indonesian government’s most vocal defender of the palm oil industry.
“We’re confused because he’s not being consistent,” Edi told Mongabay. “So far, he’s been the main supporter of palm oil. So why did he issue such a statement?”
Luhut has led Indonesia’s diplomatic battle against European Union’s plans to end recognition of palm oil as a biofuel by 2030, even threatening to withdraw Indonesiafrom the Paris climate agreement in retaliation. He also owns, through his family-run conglomerate, a string of palm oil companies. Last year, he declared palm oil a key commodity for Indonesia, which is the world’s top producer, and credited the industry with helping to alleviate poverty. (An estimated 20 million Indonesians are engaged in the palm oil industry.)
“We’ll fight whoever hampers the development of the palm oil industry in Indonesia,” Luhut said last April as quoted by local media. “The palm oil industry has played a significant role in reducing the poverty rate and creating jobs.”
Papua is home to a large variety of indigenous communities and Indonesia’s last great expanse of tropical rainforest. It’s an area increasingly targeted by the plantation and logging companies that have depleted much of the tropical rainforests of Sumatra and Borneo.
The combined area of oil palm concessions in the Papua region, comprised of the provinces of West Papua and Papua, is 18,099 square kilometers (6,988 square miles), according to the latest figure from Papua Atlas. Papua Atlas is a real-time interactive map showing the spread of plantations and roads in Papua region developed by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR).
A fifth of that figure, or 3,914 km2 (1,510 mi2), was controlled by just seven conglomerates as of 2017, according to a report by TuK Indonesia. That figure includes both developed (cleared) and undeveloped land.
“These figures show that palm oil plantation development in … Papua is almost exclusively in the hands of tycoon-controlled groups,” TuK Indonesia said in its report.

‘There’s no point’

Luhut said there were other crops better suited for the Papua region than oil palm, such as nutmeg, coffee, cacao and seaweed, which he presented to potential investors during his visit to Sorong in a “green investment” pitch.
“With green investment, people will start economic activities,” Luhut said as reported by CNN Indonesia. “The nature-based economy [will] grow and people can reap social benefits from it.”
He added the concept of green investment would contribute to protecting the forests of Papua, home to the third-largest expanse of tropical forest in the world, after the Amazon and the Congo Basin, and maintain the region as an important carbon sink in the fight against climate change. The plan calls for $200 million in investments, said to directly benefit 60,000 households in the Papua region. He said Starbucks had agreed to invest there.
But activists are skeptical about the proposed switch, raising concerns that large-scale deforestation for palm plantations will simply be replaced by large-scale deforestation for other crops.
Franky Samperante, the director of Pusaka, an NGO that works with indigenous communities across Indonesia, said the problem with industrial-scale agriculture in Papua was not the commodity, but the development model. The top-down model as it works now, he said, fails to prioritize the needs of the local and indigenous communities, and fails to recognize their rights.
He cited the example of nutmeg, now being grown on land from which indigenous tribes were evicted in the district of Fakfak in West Papua province.
“So Luhut’s statement needs to be clarified,” Franky told Mongabay. “Green investment doesn’t only mean sustainable but we also need to ask who does it side with? If it’s only green but doesn’t side with the people, then there’s no point.”
The governor of West Papua, Dominggus Madacan, also advised residents against selling out their land to investors. He said history had shown that those who did so were inevitably impacted by deforestation and environmental degradation, including landslides.
“If you sell the land, the trees all around will be cut down and you’ll be left with bare land,” Dominggus said in Manokwari district on Feb. 25. “Then when disaster strikes, who will you blame?”

‘Textbook land grab’

Edi said the plan to invest in crops other than palm oil was similar to the government’s Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) program, launched in 2011 to turn Papua’s Merauke district into the “future breadbasket of Indonesia.” That project, pitched by the government as the answer to Indonesia’s food security needs, has become a “textbook land grab,” activists say.
Only two of the 10 proposed blocks in the MIFEE project are supposed to include oil palm, but Greenpeace has noted that “significantly” more oil palm concessions will be included.
“They said that MIFEE was aimed to develop rice fields, but instead it’s oil palm plantations that are being developed,” Edi said. “Don’t let the statement [by Luhut] be a manipulation to make it seem like other commodities will be developed to make the public open to the idea, when in the end it’s all about palm oil.”
He said that despite the talk of prioritizing other crops deemed to be “green,” the fact remains that palm oil continues to be the most privileged in terms of incentives and other favorable policies offered by the government.
“The tendency is for the government to give incentives only for palm oil, not for other commodities,” Edi said. “So if civil society is skeptical, it’s normal because we don’t see incentives for other crops, such as cacao. Are there any factories to process cacao in Papua?”
Franky said he was concerned the voices of indigenous Papuans would be silenced, as they have been during the palm oil rush, under the plan to attract “green investments” to the region.
“In the meeting [on green investment in Sorong], I didn’t see representatives from local communities,” he said. “I only saw representatives from the local government. So I don’t know what the people think about it. The voices so far continue to be those of the central [government] and the investors there.”

Enforcing the moratorium

Franky said that if Luhut was serious, he should follow up his latest stance with concrete action.
“There needs to be a strong policy to support Luhut’s statement,” he said. “We can’t just accept a statement from an official who’s a politician and has investments there.”
He said there needed to be stronger enforcement of a prevailing moratorium on issuing new plantation permits, as well as greater scrutiny of existing permits. President Joko Widodo imposed the moratorium in September 2018 in response to fires in 2015 that razed large swaths of forest, including inside oil palm concessions. The moratorium is expected to end no later than September 2021.
But enforcement of the moratorium has been patchy, according to a report by Pusaka. It shows that the agrarian ministry, in charge of approving the plantation permits known as HGU, issued one to the company PT Permata Nusa Mandiri for a concession Papua’s Jayapura district in November 2018 — two months after the moratorium was enacted. The report also identified continued instances of deforestation in areas earmarked for plantations, with 2,285 km2 (882 mi2) of forest cleared last year.
Given how much land has already been allocated for oil palm plantations, the government must conduct a sweeping review of the issued permits and do more to recognize indigenous claims to disputed land, Franky said. Short of that, he said, Luhut’s statement will ring hollow.
The government’s lack of recognition indigenous land rights is the missing key to the development of Papua, Franky said. Indonesia is home to hundreds of indigenous groups, but for decades their land rights were trumped by state control over all public land in the country. In 2013, a historic Constitutional Court ruling removed customary forests from under state control. Since then, President Widodo has vowed to grant customary forest ownership titles to indigenous groups.
The Papua region, covering the western half of the island of New Guinea, is home to the greatest number of indigenous groups in Indonesia, but none have been granted titles to their ancestral forests. In Papua province alone, an estimated 6,400 km2 (2,500 mi2) of forest qualify as customary land.
 
Banner image: A jungle river in Indonesian Papua. Image by Rhett A. Butler/Mongabay.
 
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2) Activists skeptical of win as court orders Papua plantation maps published
by  on 28 February 2020

  • Indonesia’s agrarian ministry must release plantation maps and data about concession holders for the country’s Papua region, a court has ruled.
  • The region is home to the largest remaining undisturbed swath of tropical rainforest in Indonesia, and is increasingly being targeted by the plantation and logging companies that have already depleted the forests of Sumatra and Borneo.
  • Environmental and indigenous rights activists have welcomed the court ruling, which they say will help address land grabs and other illegal practices, but add they’re skeptical the agrarian ministry will comply.
  • The ministry is already subject to previous rulings, including from the Supreme Court, to release plantation data for other regions of the country, but continues to stonewall with a variety of excuses………………..
  • https://news.mongabay.com/2020/02/indonesia-papua-plantation-maps-palm-oil-transparency-hgu/
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https://en.antaranews.com/news/142542/joni-botak-led-papuans-who-killed-policeman

3) Joni Botak led Papuans who killed policeman  
1st March 2020
Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA) - Joni Botak led a group of Papuan criminals involved in a two-hour gunfight with Indonesian security personnel in Jipabera, Tembagapura Subdistrict, in Mimika District, Friday, February 28, Papua Police Chief Inspector General Paulus Waterpauw said. Police Constable Doni Priyanto, of the mobile brigade unit, who was wounded in the gunfight died of his injuries early Saturday, Waterpauw told ANTARA in Jayapura, the capital of Papua Province, Saturday.

The policeman who belonged to Jakarta's Kelapa Dua Mobile Brigade Division had been evacuated to Timika, the capital of Mimika District. His body would be airlifted to Jakarta for burial, Waterpauw said.

The Joni Botak-led armed group which operated around the Kali Kabur area of Tembagapura Subdistrict might have also been responsible for the abduction of three contract teachers, according to Waterpauw.

The law enforcement efforts to crush these notorious criminals would continue until they surrendered, he added.

Related news: Policeman dies in shootout with armed criminal group in Papua
Related news: 80 percent of marijuana in Papua smuggled from PNG: BNN


The security situation in Papua remains vulnerable to acts of deadly violence by notorious Papuan separatists.

The rebels were engaged in repeated exchanges of fire with the Indonesian military and police personnel. The rebels have also launched deadly attacks on civilians over the past years and killed a number of them.

From early January to December 28, 2019, a total of 23 shooting and criminal cases involving the Papuan groups had claimed the lives of 10 members of the Indonesian police and military as well as 10 civilians, the Papua Police recorded.

The Papuan criminals committed such acts in the administrative areas of the districts of Puncak Jaya, Jayawijaya, Mimika, and Paniai in 2019, Waterpauw said on December 28, 2019.

Apart from the endeavors of the central and provincial governments to persuade the rebels to end their acts of violence and return to their families to resume a normal life, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) has officially declared war against Indonesia.

The implication of this OPM's declaration that its spokesman Jeffrey Bomanak made in Port Moresby, the capital city of Papua New Guinea (PNG), on January 31, 2019, has prolonged the circle of violence. 

Related news: Three wounded in exchange of fire in Nduga, Papua
Related news: Former Papuan separatist hands over rifle to military

Reporter: Evarukdijati, Rahmad Nasution
Editor: Mulyo Sunyoto
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TAPOL Briefing

4) The proposed insertion of serving military officers into civilian government posts

 
March 1, 2020
 
Introduction
 
It has been more than two decades since a process of democratic reform was initiated in Indonesia under which the military stepped back from its political role. As part of the reforms, the military were gradually removed both from legislative posts that guaranteed it political representation and also posts in Indonesia’s civilian bureaucracy. 
 
However, in 2019, the military indicated its wishes to re-insert serving military officers into the bureaucracy, in Ministries and Departments not directly concerned with military and security affairs. In this briefing, we address this issue by placing it in the context of broader military reform. We argue that, although some reforms after the fall of the New Order regime under President General Suharto were effective, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) avoided committing to further meaningful reforms, by cloaking military influence under the banner of ‘professionalisation’. 
 
His successor, President Joko Widodo, has now effectively rowed back on a key plank of earlier reforms by giving his approval for the re-insertion of the military into the bureaucracy. If realised, the proposed policy would significantly increase the military’s power and influence, notwithstanding its formal removal from the frontline of politics. It would therefore represent another retrograde step in Indonesia’s declining democracy in which the military is playing and is set to play a more prominent role in political and social affairs.
 
What has happened?
 
In January 2019, the Commander of the Armed Forces, General Hadi Tjahjanto, publicly announced that he wanted to see military officers serving in the civilian bureaucracy. He argued that doing so would reduce the number of ‘unemployed’ serving officers from 500 to between 150-200 officers. The move would require a change to the law governing the Indonesian military.Article 47 part 2 of the current law allows soldiers (prajurit) to occupy positions in a limited number of public institutions concerned with ‘politics and the security sector’, ‘national defence’, the Constitutional Court and other areas, on request from those institutions. The proposed revision would allow serving middle- and high-ranking officers (perwira) to work in public institutions not concerned with defence and security. 
 
During February 2019, the proposal was given a negative reception by the Chair of Commission I of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and was described as having the potential to cause conflict between military personnel and civilian civil servants by Commission II members.In mid-2019, President Joko Widodo passed a decree3 that permitted serving military officers to take up “functional” roles in the civilian bureaucracy. The criteria for appointment to these posts in the decree are vague and purport to be based on serving soldiers’ objective ability (Article 6, 1) and are structured around two grades, a senior grade (‘jabatan fungsional keahlian’), subject to appointment by the Head of the Armed Forces, and a more junior grade (‘jabatan fungsional keterampilan’) appointed by either the Head of the Armed Forces or forces’ Chief of Staff (the head of each division of the armed forces). The appointments are therefore regulated by presidential decree but they do not require the approval of the President or legislature to confirm them: appointments take place at the discretion of the forces’ Chiefs of Staff. In January 2020, reforming the 2004 Military Law - including employing serving officers in the civil service - was put on the legislative agenda for 2020.4
 
Background to moves to re-insert officers into the bureaucracy
 
The move to appoint serving military officers in non-security-related civilian posts was developed under New Order rule. During the New Order regime (1966-1998), members of the military were appointed to bureaucratic posts.This policy, called ‘kekaryaan’, was an important part of maintaining military influence through involvement in ‘sociopolitical’ as well as military affairs, being part of the military’s so-called dual function (dwifungsi) ‘doctrine’.‘Kekaryaan’, and military involvement in socio-political affairs more generally, was justified because of the alleged lack of ability of civilian bureaucrats. However, the move also had the practical intent of replacing the many serving bureaucrats who were massacred during anti-leftist pogroms7, the foundational event of the New Order regime. 
 
After 1998, civilian politicians began to reform dwifungsi, referring to a ‘new paradigm’ that they intended to implement.8 This included reducing, then eliminating, the legislative posts which guaranteed the New Order regime majorities in parliament, the DPR and the MPR (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat), a process which had already commenced to a limited extent in the 1990s.Meanwhile, about 6900 active military officers who were working in the civil service were given either the option of retiring from the military and taking up jobs in the bureaucracy, or resigning their bureaucratic posts to continue their careers in the military.10 A clear majority, 69 percent, chose the former option11, which has been attributed to a desire to enhance their promotional prospects in the bureaucracy, and take advantage of its occupational and extra-occupational benefits, including associating with businesspeople and accumulating wealth.12
 
These opportunities for personal enrichment through bureaucratic posts were in part made possible by decentralisation, which devolved both authority and budgets to local government, and also led to the creation of new provinces and districts (pemekaran), the last province having been created in 2012. In the process, thousands of new bureaucratic posts were created.14 In contrast, and partly due to a failure of military reform, many military officers awaited promotion within the military, meaning that a ‘logjam’ developed.15 In part, then, the civilian bureaucracy is seen as able to accommodate serving officers due to an abundance of posts, even if this is neither realistic nor legal; and indeed not all these new posts are necessarily at senior levels.
 
Meanwhile, as noted, military reform stalled with important issues left unresolved in the form of military businesses, the military’s territorial structure and justice, including trying military officers in civilian courts.16 As noted above, retired officers became involved in ventures with businesspeople, but the military also owned a network of businesses. The law governing the post-reformasi TNI stipulated that the military had to divest its business interests to the State by October 2009, but civilian politicians failed to compel the military to do this.17 
 
A related issue was the military’s territorial structure under which it had a substantial presence throughout Indonesia. Even against the move to decentralise, this structure was left intact after 1999 allowing the military to continue to profit from its local businesses (often in resource-rich islands outside Java). Crucially, the military therefore possessed its own administrative structures which mirrored the civilian bureaucracy of government down to the grassroots level. As noted above, the Yudhoyono administration did declare its intention to produce an alternative to the territorial structure under the banner of a broader ‘professionalisation’ of the military in 2012 but, although Yudhoyono produced a blueprint for a new structure, it did not dismantle the territorial structure.18 Indeed, the military was largely left to regulate its own ‘reform’. 
 
Developments under President Joko Widodo
President Joko Widodo (2014-present) initially put human rights on the political agenda during campaigning for the presidency in 2014 and many hoped that military reform would also be given long overdue attention. However, his rule has seen several developments that have contributed to a stronger and more prominent role for the military in its ability to wield power and influence. 
 
First, Widodo made a series of cabinet appointments of retired generals, appointing General (Ret.) Ryamizard Ryacudu as Defence Minister. Previously, Ryacudu was Head of the Armed Forces (2002-2005) under President Megawati Soekarnoputri (in office 2002-2004) and he was known as being a vocal opponent of reform, a defender of the territorial structure and prosecuting war in Aceh in the face of evidence that it was leading to hardship and misery for the population of the province.18
 
In a 2016 cabinet reshuffle, Widodo appointed General Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs. In 2003, Wiranto had been indicted by the UN Special Panels for Serious Crimes for Crimes against Humanity in East Timor. A number of other former retired military figures were also appointed to cabinet.19 In October 2019, following re-election, Widodo announced other cabinet appointees with military backgrounds. The most prominent among these was the appointment of Prabowo, Widodo’s opponent in the 2019 presidential elections. Like Wiranto, Prabowo, who was the son-in-law of former President General Suharto, has an atrocious human rights record, having commanded Kopassus in East Timor, and admitted involvement in the disappearance of activists in 1998.20
 
 
Through these appointments, Widodo intended to incorporate strategically important political elements in his cabinet21, while a network of retired officers (purnawirawan) had already begun to occupy important posts in civilian-led political parties after 2004.22 But Widodo’s presidency has also seen active military officers pronounce on political affairs in a way that they previously did not. For example, in 2017, the Commander of the Armed Forces, General Gatot Nurmantyo, openly denounced democracy as an impediment to the national ideology, Pancasila.23
 
Another important avenue through which the military has expanded its influence is through ‘non-war operations’ or, as it is described in law, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).24 This includes making a series of deals directly with government Ministries by signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)25 to provide ‘services’ in areas such as health and education (the Ministry of Defence, packed with serving and retired officers, is unsurprisingly unable or unwilling to put an end to this). As noted above, retired military officers have transitioned to bureaucratic roles where they have been able to influence policy and accumulate power and wealth. Moreover, by broadening the scope of its operations under MOOTW, the military has been able to work closely with civilian bureaucracies, a strong indicator that military influence was already considerable among the bureaucracy prior to proposals to insert officers into bureaucratic posts. 
 
 
 
Recommendations:
1.          To the Indonesian Parliament: TAPOL strongly urges Indonesian parliamentarians to reject proposals to appoint serving military officers to non-military and security-related roles in the civil service. We furthermore urge policymakers to revise legislation so that an independent civil service watchdog is established to oversee and, if necessary, to veto appointments and promotions of personnel to middle- and high-ranking positions.
2.          To civil society organisations: TAPOL encourages civil society to unite and re-double its efforts to check militarism in Indonesian society and to promote and support the process of military reform. Such reforms involve, inter alia, abolishing the military’s territorial structure, making comprehensive provisions for the divestment of military businesses, substantially reducing the size of armed forces personnel, and making crimes committed by military personnel subject to trial in civilian courts.
3.          To the international community: TAPOL urges the international community to provide support to elements within the Indonesian Government and pro-democracy activists who wish to re-start the process of military reform. Only by re-commencing these difficult reforms will a proper democratic subordination of the military to civilian authorities be realised. 
 
1. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia.
2. The remit of Commission I is Defence, Foreign and Information Affairs; the remit of Commission II is Home Affairs, Regional Autonomy, Administrative Reforms and Agrarian Affairs.
3. Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 37 Tahun 2019 Tentang Jabatan Fungsional Tentara Nasional Indonesia.
4. B. Putri, ‘Revisi UU TNI Masuk Prolegnas, Aktivis Desak Reformasi Militer’, 25thJanuary 2020.https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1299587/revisi-uu-tni-masuk-prolegnas-aktivis-desak-reformasi-militer.
5. C. Budiardjo, ‘Militarism and Repression in Indonesia’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 October1986, p.1222.
6. J. Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia. Routledge, 2003. 
7. A. Croissant, D. Kuehn, P. Lorenz, P.W. Chambers, Democratization and civilian control in Asia. Palgrave, 2013, p.99.
8. Honna op.cit.
9. Croissant, et al., op cit. p.102. Hence, while 75 of 500 members of DPR members were serving military officers in the period 1997-1999, by the period 2004-2009, military representation in the DPR had fallen to zero.
10. S. Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order, NIAS Press 2005, p.153. A further 5547 retired officers worked in the civilian bureaucracy.
11. The exact number of current military, police and state intelligence officials (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) serving in the civilian bureaucracy is unknown. A recent study of Indonesia’s civil service did not include these officials. ‘Mapping Indonesia’s Civil Service’ World Bank, Jakarta/Washington, 2018, p.5, n.1. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/643861542638957994/pdf/126376-Mapping-Indonesia-Civil-Service-14977.pdf
12. Rinakit, op. cit. pp.155-156.
13. R. Diprose, D. McRae & V. R. Hadiz, ‘Two Decades of Reformasi in Indonesia: Its Illiberal Turn’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49:5, 2019, p.694. 
14. E. Laksmana, ‘Reshuffling the Deck? Military Corporatism, Promotional Logjams and Post-Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia’ Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49:5, 2019.
15. M. Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance,East-West Centre, 2007.
16. Human Rights Watch, ‘Unkept Promise: Failure to end military business in Indonesia’, 2010.
17. A.B. Gunawan, ‘Civilian Control and Defense Policy in Indonesia’s Nascent Democracy’ in A. Croissant and D. Kuehn, Reforming civil-military relations in New Democracies,Springer 2017.
18. J. Roosa, ‘Finalising the nation: The Indonesian military as the guarantor of national unity’ Asia-Pacific Viewpoint, 48:1 April 2007, p.102.
19. Laksmana, op. cit. p.807. The other first-term appointments included General Luhut Pandjaitan (Co-ordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs), General Moeldoko (Chief of Staff) and General Agum Gumelar (Presidential Advisory Board).
20. For example, Prabowo was mentor to Kopassus member and East Timor militia leader Joanico Cesario Belo. G. Robinson,East Timor 1999. Crimes Against Humanity. A Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,Hak Association and Elsam, Dili & Jakarta, 2003, p.118. In the presidential election TV debates in 2019, Prabowo lamented Indonesia’s low defence budget.Some months after his electoral defeat, Prabowo met former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, leader of PDI-P, an important partner in Widodo’s governing coalition; he was shortly after appointed Defence Minister. 
21. E. Warburton, ‘Jokowi and the New Developmentalism’ Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 52:3, 2016, p.302.
22. M.F. Aminudin, ‘The Purnawirawan and Party Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, 1998–2014’. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36:2, 2017, pp.3–30.
23. V.R. Hadiz, ‘Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 53:3, 2017, p.263.
24. Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Article 7, 2.
25. IPAC,‘The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military’. Report no. 19, 2015.

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