2) Dangerous for me and the people: Philip Mark Mehrtens responds to Indonesian Military dropping bombs in Nduga
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1) Special operations needed to counter guerrilla warfare in Papua
D. Nicky Fahrizal (The Jakarta Post)
PREMIUM Jakarta ● Fri, April 28, 2023
Last weekend’s fatal attack by an armed criminal group on Indonesian Military (TNI) soldiers who were on a mission in the Papua Highlands regency of Nduga to free New Zealand-national pilot Philips Mehrtens calls for meticulous evaluation by the government.
This situation is of the utmost significance considering the rise in the frequency of attacks by such groups, the apparent consolidation of the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and their full use of guerrilla warfare strategies. In terms of evaluation, policymakers must delve deeply into the factors that contributed to the unsuccessful rescue operation and identify the individuals or entities responsible for assessing the hostage rescue policies.
Two main recommendations have arisen related to the handling of the armed group in question. The first is firm and measured action to deal with the group, which should not be implemented randomly, so as not to trigger adverse reactions from the local people.
The second is giving priority to dialogue and negotiation involving community leaders whom both parties trust (Kompas, April 19). Furthermore, The Jakarta Post editorial on March 2 warned that the use of military-heavy approaches would extend the cycle of violence and instill fear and resentment toward the government among indigenous Papuans.
Therefore, the optimal action for the government would be to delegate the job to release the New Zealand national to a negotiation team consisting of acting Nduga regent Namia Gwijangge and religious leaders. Taking the aspirations into account, special operations are needed to neutralize the armed group’s warfare capacity and secure the release of Mehrtens, involving skilled, experienced and capable personnel, who must receive solid and legitimate support.
To prevent further loss of security personnel, it is necessary to consider three crucial factors. First, the heightened frequency and intensity of attacks by the armed group indicate improvements in their mobility, combat proficiency and innovative warfare tactics. Furthermore, they have demonstrated an increased capability in guerrilla warfare, which includes rapid mobility, surprise elements, ambush tactics, propaganda and local community support. The pyramid of resistance approach helps us understand the OPM movement and its military factions. In this case, the OPM’s movement is both overt and covert.
On the overt level, activities consist of civil-political and armed activities. Civic activities require negotiating with governments, organizing shadow governments, engaging in political dialogue and communicating strategically with the international community. Meanwhile, the category of armed activity involves small-scale and large-scale military actions.
On the covert level, the main activities consist of espionage, antigovernment campaigns, agitation and propaganda, acts of terror and sabotage, as noted by Tompkins (2013) and Kilcullen (2019). Adopting the resistance pyramid approach, efforts to increase combat readiness in response to the death of a TNI soldier last week may prove counterproductive.
Engaging in battle could result in civilian casualties and destruction of civil infrastructure. This use of force is unlikely to neutralize the separatist movement; instead, it will exacerbate the frustration of the indigenous Papuans, which stems from their political, legal, economic and cultural marginalization. Second, the mobility factor and element of surprise in guerrilla war require policymakers to have a clear, focused mindset and proactive mentality. There is a need to plan and prepare special operations to counter guerrilla warfare and rescue the hostage.
During the planning and preparation of the special operations, policymakers have to identify targets, conduct intelligence analysis, develop action plans and ensure the availability of resources. The policymakers need efficient mobilization of special forces to free the hostage. It is important to note that special forces are a strategic asset that can be adapted to meet specific demands and policy objectives. They have a tactical advantage, a reputation for effectiveness and the ability to identify and exploit enemy vulnerabilities (Gray, 1999). T
o neutralize the capabilities of the armed group, an optimal strength of light infantry troops is needed, because of their high mobility. These units used to be deployed within a counterinsurgency framework and possess a high degree of cultural awareness that enabled them to implement doctrines to win the hearts and minds of the Papuan people. Finally, light infantry units can conduct offensive operations and direct actions inside the opponent's lines of defense or lines of communication and logistics, as well as long-range penetration patrols.
The success of the Wingate Chindits tactics during World War II in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theatre, where jungle warfare was prevalent, demonstrated the effectiveness of disrupting the opponent's defense and decision-making processes and damaging logistics and communication lines of the Japanese army through modified penetration warfare, specifically long-range jungle penetration (Anglim, 2010). Third, to deal with the armed group, secure the release of the hostage and address the roots of separatism in Papua, it is vital to have a clear policy that can lead to the right strategy. In line with Article 5 of Presidential Regulation No. 68/2019 on the organization of state ministries and Articles 5 and 13 of Presidential Regulation No. 94/2022 on the Defense Ministry, the defense minister is responsible for developing and implementing defense policies. In the context of policy evaluation, the responsibility lies with the Directorate General of Defense Strategy.
Therefore, within this legal framework, the defense minister has the authority to formulate policies and strategies to respond to the activities of the Papuan armed group. The hostage-taking has revealed three essential policy needs. First, political communication and coordination must occur between the Defense Ministry, TNI, National Police and intelligence agencies to formulate cohesive policies and actions.
Second, adopting special operations requires clear and measurable policies, which can provide political and legal justification and minimize political sensitivity. Furthermore, through policy clarity, special forces and counter-guerrilla tactics can avoid potential human rights violations. Third, the defense minister must issue clear policies to demonstrate democratic control over military capabilities and responsibilities in the defense sector.
To conclude, there is an urgent need for special operations to counter guerrilla warfare in Papua and rescue Mehrtens. Special operations represent a concrete and immediate response, given the armed group’s increasing proficiency in commando and guerrilla combat, emphasizing mobility, surprise and evolving tactics. Of course, special operations are the last resort, considering the gravity of the Papua issue. Making the mission a success is as crucial as minimizing the risk of unintended consequences.
*** The writer is a researcher specializing in law and security at the Department of Politics and Social Change at the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of The Jakarta Post.
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2) Dangerous for me and the people: Philip Mark Mehrtens responds to Indonesian Military dropping bombs in Nduga
News Desk - Captain Philip 28 April 2023
According to Mehrtens, last weekend, the Indonesian Military (TNI) dropped bombs on the area where he was with other Nduga residents.
“Indonesia dropped bombs on this area [Nduga] last weekend, and it was unnecessary because it was dangerous for me and the people here,” Mehrtens said through a video recording made on Monday, April 24, 2023, and received by Jubi on Thursday.
In the 1-minute 38-second video, Mehrtens was seen wearing a black t-shirt and shorts. He was sitting and flanked by two men, allegedly TPNPB members. He also explained that he was in good health.
“Today, April 24, 2023, it has been almost three months since the TPNPB captured me in Paro. I am alive and well. I live with the people here, sit together, walk together, rest together, there is no problem with me,” Mehrtens said in the video, alternating between two languages, Indonesian and English.
In a written statement, TPNPB spokesperson Sebby Sambom urged President Joko Widodo to immediately stop military operations in Nduga and asked Indonesia to open negotiations.
“We emphasize that the release of Philip Mark Mehrtens must be through negotiations, not through military operations. Therefore, Indonesian President Joko Widodo must stop military operations in Nduga immediately, otherwise they only jeopardize the pilot’s life,” Sambom said.
Sambom said the video containing Mehrtens testimony was also addressed to the New Zealand Government and Mehrtens’ family.
“We initially made a video showing Mehrtens in good health for the New Zealand Government and the pilot’s family in New Zealand. However, because Indonesia is bombing the Nduga Region, we want the people to know,” he said.
Mehrtens has been held hostage by TPNPB for 79 days since he was arrested on February 7. The Indonesian government so far has increased the status of military operations. On April 18 in Timika, TNI commander Adm. Yudo Margono upgraded operations in Papua to a land combat alert.
Yudo said the operation was upgraded after TPNPB attacked TNI personnel on April 15. He said the increase in the status of this operation aimed to awaken the combat instincts of TNI soldiers.
“The land combat alert means the operation is increased,” Yudo said at that time at Yohanis Kapiyau Air Base in Central Papua’s Timika.
Military observer from the Institute For Security & Strategic Studies (ISSES) Khairul Fahmi said the combat alert in Papua meant that all troops were ready to fire.
“’Combat alert’ is the term for the condition of the troops ready for battle. This means that soldiers are allowed to shoot their weapons at any time whenever the threat is present. The troops no longer need to hesitate to open fire if there is an obstacle or attack,” Fahmi said on April 20, as quoted by Antara. (*)
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