https://tapol.org/publications/mounting-sources-of-discontent
Introduction
Since protests across Indonesia in late-August and early-September 2025, authorities have pursued thousands of alleged participants, keeping hundreds in prolonged detention, often without sufficient evidence. The sources of protestors’ discontent include inequality and unemployment but also a declining quality of democracy. Powerful figures are weakening democratic institutions by strengthening family dynasties. New parties, offering genuine alternatives, face substantial difficulties in reaching the political mainstream without wealthy financial backers, and need to meet a relatively high vote threshold.
Another source of dismay is President Prabowo Subianto’s militarisation of civilian institutions. Apart from contributing to democratic decline, this is proving to be very costly. There have been increasing expenditures on the ‘free nutritious meals’ programme (MBG) which has significant military involvement. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence has had more power over arms procurements since March of this year and is spending lavishly on imports and developing a domestic arms industry.
Silencing dissent
At first, protests in late-August 2025 started in Jakarta, before spreading to every major city in Indonesia. Protestors called on the government to address high unemployment, inflation, as well as concerns over legislation expanding the role of the military and police in civil roles. They also drew attention to parliamentarians' salaries, luxurious lifestyles and junkets abroad.[1] The police response to protestors was heavy handed, but anger boiled over following the death of a motorbike taxi driver, Affan Kurniawan, on August 28th, who was run over by a Brimob (Mobile Brigade) police vehicle being driven at high speed. More than 560 people were subjected to intimidation and physical violence, while 300 were injured due to use of tear gas or water cannon.[2] At least 11 people died between 28th August and 2nd September in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makassar, Solo and Manokwari.[3]
During the period 25th to 31st August, police made 5444 arrests, and released 4800 people. As of 24th September, 959 people, including children, were in detention and declared to be suspects,[4] held on charges such as incitement, acts which endanger public safety, assault and complicity in criminal acts. The NGO KontraS (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan) has documented cases where detainees were deprived of basic rights, with police neither giving them access to legal counsel, nor contact with their families.[5] There are also unanswered questions about the involvement of the military and intelligence agencies in the riots. For example, police apprehended several alleged provocateurs in Central Jakarta and Palembang who worked for military intelligence agencies (BAIS).[6]
There have been further attempts to incriminate protestors in the months since the demonstrations died down. These include Delpedro Marhaen of the Lokataru Foundation, and three other activists who were arrested on 1st September, for incitement (Article 160 of the Criminal Code). This is despite Police investigators telling journalists privately that they believed the military had been involved in incriminating Delpedro and the three other activists.[7] Although it is not possible to confirm the military’s alleged involvement, such actions could violate the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) which restricts military involvement in civilian law and order activities, such as conducting arrests.
Figha Lesmana’s file was sent to prosecutors along with those of Delpedro and others although her case is not directly related to theirs. Lesmana, a mother of a two-month old child, was arrested by police who accused her of encouraging students to demonstrate on a TikTok live feed.[8] Police “suspended” her detention in late-October on “humanitarian and investigative” grounds, although the charges are likely to still stand.[9] The files of the other four detainees were sent to prosecutors in late-October, along with that of a fifth person, Rayhan Arya Putra, who was accused of distributing instructions on making molotov cocktails through WhatsApp.
On 24th September police also arrested Arie Veriasa, a member of the Student Executive Body, (BEM, Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa) at UNY (Universitas Negara Yogyakarta). Veriasa had attended a student demonstration at Police headquarters (Polda Yogyakarta) on 29th August. Dozens of police officers attended his arrest at his house, for allegedly vandalising the police facilities.[10] The BEM UNY stated the number of officers to be disproportionate to the task; they also stated that the police lacked a warrant.[11] In late-October, Veriasa was still in detention and Yogyakarta Regional Police invited his lawyers to apply to have his case considered under a ‘restorative justice’ mechanism without explaining why.[12]
On 27th September, police arrested Muhammad Fakhrurrozi, known as Paul, for allegedly inciting an attack on the local assembly and police station, and for attacks on police, in Kediri, East Java. The Surabaya Legal Aid Institute, (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum), representing Fakhurozzi, said that although he was issued with an arrest warrant, this was not based on "sufficient initial evidence".[13] He was interrogated en route to the police station in Kediri, and contrary to correct procedure, he was named a suspect before being questioned there.[14]
On 27th November 2025, Adetya Pramandira (Dera) and Fathul Munif (Munif) were arrested at home by 24 police officers and taken to Semarang's Metropolitan Police Headquarters where they were charged with hate speech and incitement. They were released from detention on 10th December but charges against them remain.[15]
In several of these relatively well-known cases, the police have made arrests based on acts which may well fall short of the evidentiary standards for crimes they have been accused of committing. This must raise the possibility that the strategy of the police is to silence dissent rather than to prosecute crimes.[16] If so, such a strategy is only likely to create more discontent and to embolden the authorities to further restrict the right to protest.
A malnourished budget
According to President Prabowo, the Makan Bergizi Gratis programme provided 20 million ‘nutritious meals’ a day as of August 2025.[17] There are concerns over its hasty implementation, and it was said to be responsible for as many as 7,370 cases of food poisoning as of 1st October 2025.[18] Yet, the programme is part of the Government’s aim to feed 82.9 million people – school pupils, pregnant and breastfeeding women and the under-fives - by March 2026.[19]
The programme has significant military involvement. The military currently manages about 450 kitchens where meals are prepared, called Nutrition Service Fulfillment Units (SPPG - Satuan Pelayanan Pemenuhan Gizi). It plans to increase this number to 2000 SPPGs or about 15 per cent of the total. The National Nutrition Agency (BGN, Badan Gizi Nasional) - created to implement the programme - and the military are “preparing a management plan for hen farms and food crops” to source the supplies for the programme. The BGN is not free from military influence as retired military officers hold five “strategic” posts at the agency. Two dozen officers from the military and a small contingent of military wives have also recently been sent to Singapore for training in managing the preparation and distribution of meals.[20]
Funds for the MBG programme are also coming out of the education budget.[21] Some teachers say that the programme is wrongly targeted at all children including those from wealthier families who can afford meals, instead of those most in need.[22] While the programme is aimed at combatting stunting, by the time children receive the meals, most eligible children would be beyond the age at which they are most vulnerable to stunting.The President may have noted teachers’ unhappiness as he made them an independence day cash ‘gift’, also described as a wage subsidy incentive (insentif bantuan subsidi upah).[23] Yet savings that could be accrued by making access to the MBG means tested, could be better spent on giving state school teachers a permanent pay rise and ensuring that school buildings are not in a state of disrepair.[24] Whereas proposals to reduce MBG to two-thirds of its current figure were presented to Parliament’s budget committee on 23rd August, these plans were reversed shortly afterwards, when a new finance minister was appointed.[25] While the MBG is contributing to a government deficit of Rp.689 trillion (£32.8 billion), corporations get away with paying low taxes. If they were made to pay more, the deficit could be reduced or eliminated altogether.[26]
Arms purchases
In addition to calls to rethink the MBG programme, a draft Defence budget was approved by Parliament’s budget committee (Badan Anggaran DPR) for Rp.187.1 trillion (£8.9 billion).[27] A significant part of this may be explained by more arms purchases.[28] In recent months, the Ministry of Defence has been in negotiations regarding the purchase of several war planes from East Asian manufacturers. This includes talks with the Chinese Government to purchase the Chengdu J-10 fighter jet, (Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group). Similar purchases reportedly cost the equivalent of US$60 million per aircraft.[29] The Ministry of Defence has further purchased an Airbus A400M,[30] and six more T-50i Golden Eagle warplanes from the South Korean arms firm Korean Aerospace Industries, in a sale agreed in July 2021, bringing to 19 the total number of these aircraft owned by the Indonesian airforce (TNI AU). The agreed total price of the sale was US$240 million.[31]
At the APEC Summit in Gyeongju, Prabowo and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung also discussed Indonesia’s purchase of F-21 Boramae fighter jets from South Korea, in which Indonesia has a stake.[32] The project’s expense and the Government’s equity in the project, even after being reduced, means that it risks depleting public money that could be better used for other purposes.
Alongside these purchases from foreign arms manufacturers, Indonesia’s own defence industry continues to expand under the direction of the Ministry of Defence. In late-October, it was reported that a private shipbuilder, PT Tesco Indomaritim, had finished construction of the 60-metre-long warship, the KRI Belati 622 in its shipyards in Bekasi.[33] The ship is armed with weapons systems from Italian manufacturer Leonardo Marlin and cannon from Turkish manufacturer Roketsan. Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) have also delivered six of 12 MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drones at a cost of US$350 million. The other six were jointly produced by Indonesian arms company PT Dirgantara Indonesia.[34] Also in October, a prototype unmanned underwater drone was unveiled, described by a Navy spokesperson as strengthening the domestic defence industry. The drone was built by PT PAL, a state-owned company. The Minister of Defence, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin is said to have ordered the Navy and PT PAL to put the drones into production “this year” to guard narrow territorial waters (titik sempit), without specifying where these were.[35]
The legacy of Prabowo’s own role as a high-spending former Minister of Defence, partly explains why there has been extravagant spending on arms in recent years. Another important reason is that, since the amendment of the military law in March 2025, the Ministry of Defence has had more power over budgets.[36] Previously, each branch of the military spent money on arms procurements and other expenditures separately.[37] Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin has been conducting negotiations with political parties, possibly undertaken with Prabowo’s encouragement. This would place him in a superior position to another close Prabowo ally, Deputy Speaker of the DPR Sufmi Dasco Ahmad.[38] It would also place him in a superior position to the Minister of Finance, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, who is new to the job. Sadewa is apparently unaware of the details of costs of important defence deals negotiated by the Defence Ministry.[39]
Party poaching and family businesses
The protests in late August and early September 2025 were fuelled by dismay about inequality, with parliamentarians’ excessive pay, perks and behaviour, including a housing allowance of Rp. 50 million (approximately £2,400) a month, at the top of protestors’ list. This has been compounded by a mounting sense of dismay regarding democratic representation in parliament, with virtually no functional opposition in parliament since former-president Joko Widodo’s second term. The problem is in part that President Prabowo has been able to continue Widodo’s strategy of buying off opposition by awarding former opponents with positions in Ministries and Lembaga.[40]
It has also proved virtually impossible for new parties with alternative platforms to break the stranglehold of a few established parties in parliament – and individuals within these parties. Powerful figures are able to anoint new parties, and in doing so, pave the way for allies and family members to be elected.[41] In late-September, former-President Joko Widodo appeared to ‘poach’ several politicians from the NasDem party, who reportedly defected to PSI, a party led by Kaesang Pangarep, his son. Competing for the first time in 2019, the PSI obtained 1.89 per cent of the vote in the national elections of that year, failing to be elected to parliament. In 2024, it missed out on election with 2.81 per cent of votes (parties cannot be elected to national parliament without winning four percent of the popular vote).
Widodo is said to have told NasDem politicians that he wants the PSI to win seven per cent of the vote in national elections in 2029. This would be based on a strategy of having representation at the village level and broadening the party’s appeal beyond cities.[42] The only other new parties that were elected to parliament include Prabowo’s own political party, Gerindra, established in 2009; and Hanura, also created in 2009 by Wiranto, another General with a base in the New Order party, Golkar.[43]
Conclusion
Hundreds of people who allegedly carried out crimes during protests are currently languishing in jail, having had their period of detention extended. The charges against many of them may be, at best, flimsy, or at worst, made up. They should be reviewed urgently. This pattern of pursuing protestors shows that the arrests are not a serious attempt to hold accountable those responsible for criminal damage. Detentions are designed to have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and association, making this move anti-democratic.
Protestors have had legitimate concerns about democracy for many years but these problems have been brought more sharply into focus by Prabowo's presidency. Concerns relate to a failure to grasp the everyday reality of people's lives and also relate directly to democratic institutions, such as a lack of opposition in parliament, dynastic families and corruption. A further concern is militarisation: the military has its own massive budget for arms purchases but is also feeding off the free nutritious meals programme and many other areas of civilian life. Allocations have also been made from education and health budgets towards the free nutritious meals programme.[44]
The Indonesian Government needs to get used to the idea of social movements protesting against inequality and the decline of democracy in Indonesia. To those that can remember it, the dreams of reformasi look dead, and freedom of expression will be further eroded and people could become more angry if the Government continues to make small changes while silencing dissent.
[1] BBC Indonesia 'Mengapa aksi demonstrasi berujung perusakan dan penjarahan?' 2nd September 2025.
[2] Amnesty International UK 'Indonesia: Activists Face Criminal Charges for Peaceful Protests' 25th October 2025
[3] Ervana Trikarinaputri 'Pemerintah Didesak Bentuk Tim Pencari Fakta Demonstrasi Berujung Kekerasan' 5th September 2025 Tempo.co.
[5] Andi Adam Faturahman 'Bagaimana Upaya Kontras Menelusuri Tiga Demonstran yang Hilang' 16th September 2025 Tempo.co
[6] Dian Rahma Fika Alina 'Sinergi Semu TNI-Polri Menangani Demonstrasi' 9th September 2025 Tempo.co
[8] Tempo.co ‘Figha Lesmana, Ibu Muda yang Tengah menyusui Bayi 2,5 Tahun, Dituduh Polisi Memprovokasi Massa’ 25th September 2025. TikTok yielded to pressure to supply user data to the Ministry of Communication and Digital (Komdigi, Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital) from the period 25th to 31st August, having initially rejected the Ministry's request to comply by a deadline of 23rd September. Tempo.co 'Ancaman di Balik Permintaan Data TikTok Periode Akhir Agustus 2026' 6th October 2025
[9] Indonesian National Police ‘Metro Jaya Police Suspend Detention of Activist Figha Lesmana After Protest Arrest’ 10th October 2025
[10] Wijaya Kusuma, Vachry Rinaldi Lutfipambudi 'Polda DIY Persilakan Perdana Arie Ajukan Restorative Justice' kompas.com, 22nd October 2025
[11] Prihatini Wahyuningtyas 'Siapa Perdana Arie Veriasa & Kenapa Ditangkap Polisi?' 30th September 2025
[12] Wijaya Kusuma, Vachry Rinaldi Lutfipambudi 'Polda DIY Persilakan Perdana Arie Ajukan Restorative Justice' kompas.com, 22nd October 2025
[13] Tempo, 'Tempo, 'Apa Bukti Polisi..’'
[14] Tempo.co 'Cacat Hukum Penangkapan Aktivis' 30th September 2025. Under the criminal procedure code, (KUHAP), a person can only be named a suspect after being issued with two consecutive summons, although Fakhurozzi was not even issued with one before arrest. His police interview began at 12:30am, finishing at 15:30pm the following afternoon, seemingly to cause discomfort and distress.
[15] Statement in solidarity with detainees 'Arbitrary Arrest of Dera and Munif — Stop the Continuous Criminalisation of Protesters in Indonesia and Free All Human Rights Defenders Immediately' 5th December 2025 https://tapol.org/news/arbitrary-arrest-dera-and-munif-stop-criminalisation-protesters. Frontline Defenders 'Dera Pramandira and Fathul Munif released amidst ongoing police investigation' 23rd December 2025
[16] Alvino Kusumabrata 'Kriminalisasi Warga sebagai Reaksi Alamiah Kekuasaan Negara' 30th October 2025
[17] Kompas.com 'MBG Layani 20 Juta Orang Per Hari dalam 8 Bulan, Prabowo Bandingkan dengan Brazil' 15th August 2025
[18] Jakarta Post 'MBG: Rushed policy, preventable tragedy' 1st October 2025; Tempo.co 'Kasus Keracunan Makanan Program Makan Bergizi Gratis di Sukoharjo, Apa yang Bisa Jadi Penyebabnya?' 20th January 2025; BBC Indonesia 'Ribuan siswa keracunan Makan Bergizi Gratis, orang tua trauma dan larang anaknya konsumsi MBG – 'Bukannya meringankan malah mau membunuh'' 25th June 2025.
[21] There has been a year-on-year increase in the overall budget of 9.8 per cent according to former Finance Minister Sri Indrawati Mulyani, see BBC Indonesia, ‘Anggaran pendidikan terbesar sepanjang sejarah tapi hampir setengahnya untuk MBG dikoreksi – 'Guru seakan-akan dibantu' 21st August 2025.
[22] BBC Indonesia 'APBN 2026: Defisit Rp689,1 triliun – ‘Tingkatkan penerimaan, pajak kelas atas belum tergarap’ 23rd September 2025.
[23] BBC Indonesia 'Anggaran pendidikan terbesar sepanjang sejarah tapi hampir setengahnya untuk MBG dikoreksi – 'Guru seakan-akan dibantu' 21st August 2025.
[25] The former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani resigned after her house was ransacked by a mob in August 2025.
[26] BBC Indonesia 'APBN 2026: Defisit Rp689,1 triliun – ‘Tingkatkan penerimaan, pajak kelas atas belum tergarap’ 23rd September 2025
[27] Dian Rahma Fika 'Kementerian Pertahanan Dapat Anggaran Rp 187 Triliun untuk 2026' 16th September 2025.
[28] A defence budget of Rp.187.1 trillion was approved by Parliament in mid-September, a fall of 62 trillion compared with 2025. Dian Rahma Fika 'Kementerian Pertahanan Dapat Anggaran Rp 187 trillion untuk 2026' Tempo.co. 16th September 2025. Assuming total draft budget expenditures of Rp. 3,842.7 trillion, defence spending would constitute about 4.9 per cent of the total. BBC News 'APBN 2026: Defisit Rp689,1 triliun – ‘Tingkatkan penerimaan, pajak kelas atas belum tergarap’ 23rd September 2025
[29] Hafizhah Melania 'Harga Jet Chengdu J-10 yang Mau Dibeli Menhan & Kecanggihannya' Tirto.id 17th October 2025.
[30] President Prabowo said that he hopes the aircraft will fulfil an "air ambulance", disaster relief and mid-air refuelling role. Republika.id 'TNI di Tangan Presiden Prabowo..'
[31] CNBC Indonesia 'Jelang HUT TNI, Ini Daftar Senjata Baru yang Dibeli Prabowo' 28th September 2025; Defencesecurityasia.com 'Jakarta Confirms Arrival of Six New KAI T-50i Golden Eagles to Boost Training and Combat Power' 3rd October 2025
[32] Republika.id 'TNI di Tangan Presiden Prabowo: Senjata Canggih Plus Kemanunggalan Rakyat' 8th November 2025
[33] Fauzan Malufti ‘Indonesian Navy Commissions Its First Hybrid-Propulsion Warship’ Navalnews.com 25th October 2025.
[34] CNBC Indonesia 'Jelang HUT TNI..’
[35] Antaranews.com 'TNI AL sebut KSOT jadi bukti majunya industri pertahanan dalam negeri', 12th November 2025
[36] Undang-undang Nomor 3 Tahun 2025 Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Article 3 Paragraph 2.
[37] Through the amended law and Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) Nomor 85 Tahun 2025 Perubahan atas Peraturan Presiden Nomor 151 Tahun 2024 tentang Kementerian Pertahanan, the Ministry of Defence is now effectively in charge of ‘maintenance, repair and overhaul’ (MRO). Anton Aliabbas 'TNI modernization moves beyond procurement' Jakarta Post, 7th October 2025.
[39] Hafizhah Melania 'Harga Jet Chengdu J-10 yang Mau Dibeli Menhan & Kecanggihannya' Tirto.id 17th October 2025.
[40] TAPOL 'Third time unlucky for Indonesia as Prabowo Subianto is elected president' 3rd April 2024.
[41] Projectmultatuli.org ‘Bibit Otoritarianisme yang Perlu Kita Cegah Bersama’ 8th September 2025
[43] Adrian Pratama Taher 'Kans Partai Politik Baru & Mengapa Selama Ini Sulit Masuk Parlemen?' 18th August 2022 tirto.id. Between 2014-2019, the NasDem party was the only ‘new’ party elected to parliament, the chair of which was Metro TV owner Surya Paloh.
[44] detik.com ‘Resmi! MBG Dapat 335 T dari APBN 2026 Ambil Jatah Anggaran Pendidikan’ 23rd September 2025
Photo: Projectmultatuli.org/Adrian Mulya
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