Thursday, June 18, 2020

1) 816 security personnel deployed in Jayapura as precautionary measure


2) The stigma of ‘Free Papua’ mutes other humanitarian issues in Papua

3) Thousands of Papuan rights defenders victimised under Widodo’s watch
4) Contemporary and Future Challenges in Indonesia:
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1) 816 security personnel deployed in Jayapura as precautionary measure  
15 hours ago



Tens of young Papuans in Jayapura, Papua Province, staged a rally demanding the release of seven youths, tried at the Balikpapan District Court in connection with treason case. ANTARA/HO


Jayapura, Papua (ANTARA) - Some 816 police and military personnel are on standby in areas around Jayapura, Papua, as a precautionary measure against likely local protests over Balikpapan
District Court's guilty verdicts against seven Papuan youths accused of treason.

The deployment of police and military personnel will be conducted to secure areas, such as Abepura and Zipur Waena T-junction, Jayapura City Police Chief Adjunct Sen. Coms. Gustav R. Urbinas stated here on Wednesday.

Ferry Kombo, Alex Gobay, Hengku Hilapok, Irwanus Urobmabin, Buchtar Tabuni, Steven Itlay, and Agus Kossay were the seven Papuan youths, who stood trial in the Balikpapan District Court in East Kalimantan Province.

According to media reports, the court's panel of judges handed out their verdicts on Wednesday, under which they received 10 up to 11 months in jail or significantly lower than five to 17 years that the prosecutor had asked.

The local police also stationed several tactical vehicles to back up the security personnel, including placing water cannon and Barracuda, Urbinas remarked.

Related news: Seven Papuans tried in Balikpapan are not political prisoners: police
Related news: Ministry, military join hands to rebuild Wamena's damaged facilities

On Wednesday, tens of people congregated in the Perumnas III of Waena neighborhood area and front gate of the Abepura-based Cenderawasih University campus to vociferously echo their demands for the release of the seven Papuan youths.

In the meantime, Indonesia's National Police spokesman, Inspector General Argo Yuwono, dismissed a claim that the seven Papuan youths, tried in connection with a treason case at the Balikpapan District Court in East Kalimantan, are political prisoners.

Tendering a clarification to this end, Yuwono stated in Jakarta on Wednesday that Papuan youngsters were purely criminals, who had allegedly incited a string of deadly violence and rioting in Papua Province, especially in the areas of Jayapura, last year.

As a consequence of their provocative acts, violence and riots broke out in the easternmost province, resulting in several locals incurring material losses and resulting in destruction to personal property, he expounded.

Hence, Yuwono rebuked the rumors circulated by small demonstrating groups among members of the public in their recent rallies of Papuan youths standing trial in the Balikpapan District Court being political prisoners, calling them completely baseless and groundless.

"They are obviously criminals, and their court proceedings have met the legal basis in accordance with what they did," Yuwono stated, adding that the youths' trial was not viewed as being a political matter since it was purely related to their acts of crime.

ANTARA noted that Papua and West Papua had come under the radar of both Indonesian and foreign media after a spate of violence broke out in several parts of these two Indonesian provinces in August and September 2019.

On August 28, 2019, violence erupted in Deiyai District, some 500 kilometers away from Jayapura, resulting in the deaths of an army soldier and two civilians.

The indigenous Papuan residents of Jayapura again protested on August 29, as they vented out their ire over the alleged racist behavior against their Papuan compatriots in Surabaya, East Java, but their rally then took a violent turn.

On September 23, a deadly riot had erupted in Wamena, the capital city of Jayawijaya District, Papua Province, which claimed the lives of 33 civilians, including a senior medical doctor, who had served the native Papuans for 15 years.

The Indonesian police accused Benny Wenda, a member of the West Papua movement separatist group, of involvement in the spread of fake news to instigate native Papuans.

Related news: Government offers security guarantee to all Indonesians in Papua
Related news: Thousands seek refuge at Jayawijaya Police Headquarter after riots

Reporter: Hendrina DK, Rahmad Nasution
Editor: Sri Haryati
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2) The stigma of ‘Free Papua’ mutes other humanitarian issues in Papua
Published
 1 day ago
on
 17 June 2020


Makassar, Jubi – Academic from the Cenderawasih University of Jayapura, Elvira Rumkabu, stated the stigmatised Free Papua to indigenous Papuans had killed other issues in Papua, humanitarian issue, for example.
The statement revealed in an online discussion “Racism vs Treason” held by Jubi on Saturday (13/06/2020).

She said the political construction has bred two identities to Papuans, namely free-Papua (separatist) and pro Indonesia (nationalist). Separatist is a stigma attached to indigenous Papuans. “If we talk about Papua, it raises only two things, 
Free Papua or Indonesia is undisputed. For me, this construction is terrible. It has killed people’s aspirations, like humanitarian issues in Papua, “Rumkabu said.
With this stigma attached to Papuans, she said it means Papuans are not given a space to talk about other issues because of the fear of being accused of treason. “For example, the Nduga case. Sometimes we are afraid to talk about Nduga because of 
this stigmatisation,” she said.
Further, Rumkabu also believes that racism and treason issues in Papua are two things that are closely related. Racism towards indigenous Papuan has existed since the Dutch era, where at the time there were three categories of social status which
 are Dutch elite in the first class, and Indonesian in the second class left the native Papuans in the lower rank.
According to her, this stigma is still attached to Papuans until today. Not only in society but also constructed by the state, and the perspective of racism has affected the state’s institutions in treating indigenous Papuans. That’s why, she said, the accusation of 
treason is easily attached to Papuans in voicing their aspirations or speaking about the racism issue, which in her opinion is a humanitarian issue.
“Racism is the root of the state’s perspective towards native Papuans, and it disguises the aspirations among Papuan people, even when they talk about democracy and humanity,” said Rumkabu.
Therefore, she said, the issue now is beyond the demand to release the seven political prisoners in East Kalimantan, but to change the state’s perspectives, the rule and structure.
In the same forum, lawyer Latifah Anum Siregar from the Papua Law and Human Rights Enforcement Coalition Team said the treason article could be used to someone if he is proven to make a physical attack on the authorities.
In the case of the seven Papuan Political prisoners, she gave an example, that the defendants were arrested and tried after a demonstration protesting racism against Papuan students in Surabaya in August with a charge of being the
 actors behind the demonstration.
“I think this is a mistake because it precedes the legal process. The political prisoners are always called as the actors of the riot. What exactly does it mean? If you want to say that they are the mastermind behind the riot, you should use the
 articles related to destruction and arson instead of the treason article,” said Anum.
According to him, it is a mistake if the Papuan political prisoners are accused of treason only for shouting ‘Free Papua’ and ‘referendum’ because it relates to the context of a democratic country. She also said the defendant could 
not be charged with the treason article if they brought the Morning Star flag during the demonstration or dropped the Indonesian flag or raised the Morning Star flag during the protest in front of the Governor’s office. It is incorrect because the
 treason article does not include the clause about flags.
“When talking about flags, we should refer to Law number 24 of 2009 about the flag as the symbol of the state. There (in that article) clearly stated it is a crime. So, where is the context of treason in their case? It’s not clear. So don’t get it wrong,” she said. (*)
Reporter: Arjuna Pademme
Editor: Pipit Maizier
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3) Thousands of Papuan rights defenders victimised under Widodo’s watch
CNN Indonesia – June 17, 2020
Jakarta – The Civil Society Coalition for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders says that thousands of human rights (HAM) activists advocating Papuan issues have been victims of violence under the administration of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. There have been at least 72 cases of legal violations and violence against them.
These violations have taken the form of threats, persecution, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment, physical violence and criminalisation.
“During President Joko Widodo’s administration, there have been at least 72 cases of violations and violence against Papuan HAM defenders, with the number of HAM defenders falling victim in the thousands”, said Ardi Manto, a researcher from Indonesian Human Rights Watch (Imparsial), one of the non-government organisations (NGOs) in the Coalition during a virtual discussion on Tuesday June 16.
The Coalition believes that the violence experienced by Papuan human rights defenders originates from their stigmatisation as supporters of separatism or as rebels.
As a consequence of this stigmatisation, it is as if these actions that demean human dignity and violate legal stipulations, which are committed by government officials as well as civilians, can be justified in cases of Papuan political prisoners and human rights defenders.
“One of the practices of violence and stigmatisation is discrimination and racism against the Papuan people”, said Manto.
The Coalition notes that over the last two years many human rights defenders, civil society activists and student groups in Papua who have held peaceful protest action have been arrested and jail on charges of makar (treason, subversion, rebellion).
Yet this represents a form of expression that is protected under Indonesia’s constitution.
“This discriminatory and even racially bias behaviour is reinforced by the government through the practice of impunity which takes place in case of violence that befall HAM defenders in Papua”, he said.
National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) Commissioner Beka Ulung took the opportunity to say that under a democratic state, activists and human rights defenders should be afforded space so they can speak out about human rights violations in Indonesia.
“It also has to be understood that it’s not just in Papua, but when we speak about the issue of HAM defenders, the situation is almost identical in other parts of the country”, said Ulung.
However, said Ulung, up until now the state’s commitment to protecting human rights defenders has been weak. Komnas HAM has recorded many policies or laws which can be used a hold for activists and human rights defenders.
“In my view if indeed there is an opportunity to revise the laws on HAM, there are special articles that speak about the issue of HAM defenders. It is important to ask what is the context of HAM defenders under specific laws which regulate HAM in Indonesia”, said Ulung.
Speaking separately, President Widodo’s special staff member for Papua, Lenis Kagoya, was reluctant to comment on the Coalition’s remarks. According to Kagoya, it is up to law enforcement officials to respond to the issue. (yoa/pmg)
[Translated by James Balowski. The original title of the article was “Ribuan Pembela HAM Papua Jadi Korban 72 Kasus Era Jokowi”.]

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4) Contemporary and Future Challenges in Indonesia:
Ross Taylor
18 JUNE 2020 Leighton G. Luke, Research Manager, Indo-Pacific Research Programme 


Key Points
  • The response of the Indonesian central government to the Covid-19 pandemic has 
  • been one of confusion, in contrast to some of the provincial governments.
  • Indonesia’s decentralised, three-tiered regional autonomy structure of governance
  •  exacerbates the difficulty of doing business in the country and has heightened those 
  • confused responses to Covid-19.
  • While Australia and Indonesia are working very well together across a range of issues, 
  • awareness of it needs to be raised in both countries because any coverage of the 
  • relationship still tends to be dominated by the things that go wrong, rather than by 
  • all the things that are going right.
  • The Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA)
  •  brings an opportunity for the business community to deepen the relationship. If IA-CEPA 
  • is to really bring true benefits, though, there needs to be more of a partnership approach 
  • to doing business together.
  • The status of Papua is going to be an issue that will come to the fore in the future and, 
  • when it does, it will again test the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. 
  • Australians generally do not appreciate that, in the Indonesian perspective, the Papua 
  • question feeds into a deeper fear of the breakup of Indonesia.
Introduction
FDI is delighted to discuss some of the main issues confronting Indonesia now and into 
the future with Mr Ross Taylor, the President and Founder of the Perth-based Indonesia Institute.

Commentary
FDI: Thanks for meeting with us today, Ross. Would it be correct to say that the single 
biggest issue confronting Indonesia right now is the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions?

RT: Yes, it is. As is the case for every country right now, Covid-19 presents both public 
health and economic challenges. In Indonesia, it is also having an impact on the political scene.
In looking at the numbers involved, Indonesia officially has just over 41,400 infections 
and 2,276 deaths. The common view among experts from around the world is that those 
figures are very much understated. It is still the case that fewer than 300,000 people out
 of a population of just under 270-million have actually been tested, so the reality is probably 
that no-one really knows what the correct numbers are. Indonesia has, in some respects, been 
quite roundly criticised for its handling of the Covid-19 crisis.

FDI: It didn’t really get off to a good start, did it? Why was that the case and what are the 
consequences of Covid-19 on the political, economic and health levels?

RT: It did get off to a bad start. Most famously, of course, right at the very beginning, 
the Health Minister said to the country, ‘the one way that we can really stop this virus 
from spreading is for all of us to go to our mosques and churches and temples, and pray’. 
So, large numbers of people went off and did that, which horrified the rest of the world,
 because what is really needed when working out how to confront something like Covid-19 i
s to have a structure in which the central government can co-ordinate effectively with the state 
or provincial governments, and then down to the local council level, to implement an action plan.

In some respects though, to see what is happening in Indonesia with Covid-19 and the confused 
state of play in dealing with it, perhaps shouldn’t come as a great surprise. I think that 
President Widodo – aka “Jokowi” – originally had probably three things on his mind in 
terms of dealing with Covid-19. The first was the public health aspect of it and the second 
was to not alarm the population about the need to go into isolation as Ramadan approached; 
he has already been accused of being anti-Muslim, so I think that would have been very much
 on his mind. The third aspect would have been the effect on the economy, because Indonesia 
has a history of social unrest breaking out when people start to perceive that they are beginning 
to really suffer without any end in sight.
Officially, there are about 25-million Indonesians already living in poverty but, considering
 that poverty in the Indonesian context is defined as living on about US$1.60 per day – the
 international poverty line is defined as US$1.90 per day – it’s necessary to also think of 
the “near poor”, who are living on about US$5.00 per day. When they are factored in, that
 number rises to about 100-million people. So, in many small villages, in a situation of social 
isolation, people can actually starve.

One of the problems that I have with the focus shifting more and more towards the economy,
 though, is that the situation in Indonesia could end up being one in which those who contract 
Covid-19 just end up being “collateral damage”, as already happens with a whole range of 
health issues. We may never know just how many people in Indonesia have died from Covid-19.
Another complication is the fact that the Indonesian health system is among the worst in 
South-East Asia. Not only was it hopelessly unprepared to treat patients with Covid-19, it 
was even less prepared to conduct testing for it. As has been seen from the official statistics,
 it was also hopelessly unprepared to collect the data detailing the number of infections, deaths
 and recoveries. If you put all of that together, and without being too negative, it paints the picture 
of where things are today as Indonesia deals with this very difficult situation.
I will just add though, that there are a number of provinces which, in line with the economic
 progress that they have made over the last twenty years, approached the Covid-19 situation 
by implementing policies that were not too dissimilar to those taken by Australia.
They have done very well, but it really is hit-and-miss
 and that is a consequence of a lack of co-ordination among the different levels of government.

FDI: What sort of challenges are posed or exacerbated by Indonesia’s internal 
governance structures? 

When I try to understand why the situation is so confused, I find that the easiest way is to go 
back to the concept of regional autonomy, which was introduced when B.J. Habibie became 
president. Prior to then, absolutely everything was run from Jakarta. Habibie
introduced regional autonomy, with a three-tier system of government that is probably
not all that different from how Australia operates. There was a need 
for power to be decentralised, with specific powers given to the provinces and the regencies, 
which are quite similar to local governments in Australia. In that process, there was concern that 

if too much power were given to the provincial governments, it might lead to the
 development of 
more separatist movements. So, many powers were actually devolved past the provincial
level and 
down to the regencies, or local governments. While the principle of regional autonomy is 
excellent, the implementation of it in a country of 34 provinces, 400 to 500 local councils, 
and 300 to 400 different ethnic groups, was always going to be very complicated.

I think that what also made it even more complicated was the fact that the Indonesian legal 
framework is built upon 300-odd years of Dutch colonial influence and, it could be argued, 
Indonesia did not inherit the best of legal systems. 
Not only were they trying to decentralise their government, they were doing it with a legal 
framework that either did not address such issues or, if it did, it did so very inconsistently.
So, regional autonomy is a very confused process – and that’s all pre-Covid-19, of course. 
It’s a situation in which a business that wants to set itself up in Indonesia can go and get all the
 right permits from the central government, only to have the local council – the regency – 
and its bupati, or local mayor, stop everything. Or, it 
can happen exactly the other way around. Either way, the legal process to work out which level
 has the appropriate authority is very confused.

The result is that one of the main complaints that companies have about doing business in
 Indonesia is that it is so unclear and that there are such high levels of confusion to be navigated 
when operating there. That confusion goes beyond just doing business; it goes into the likes 
of healthcare, welfare, logistics and distribution, and taxation and revenue collection.
Regional autonomy is still very much a work in progress and we have seen dramatically 
different rates of progress among the regencies and the provinces as they have gained greater
 autonomy. East Java, for instance, has just progressed enormously, it’s very business-orientated, 
but there are many other provinces and regencies where government is just seen as a honeypot
 to facilitate the accumulation of wealth. So, there are very different levels of progress among
 all the different regencies and provinces with, as I said, that confusion between the three 
different levels of government.

FDI: Do you see the possibility of more of a centralised approach to governance starting to emerge 
as a result of the Covid-19 issue?

RT: I think that there is no doubt that with Covid-19, there has been a pulling back to a more 
authoritarian approach; the number of military people who are now in key positions in the
 national government, for instance, is very high. Now, to what degree a return to centralisation
 might happen is, I think, still somewhat unknown, given the power base enjoyed by a number 
of the key provincial governments. I do think that there is no question that – and this is
even before Covid-19 – we have seen Jokowi taking a more authoritarian approach to a
whole range of issues, some of which was starting to worry people working in the human
rights field.
I would be very surprised, though, if we were to see anything like an opportunity for the
 overthrow of Jokowi, for example, as a result of all this; I doubt that very much. He still
has popularity among the public but I think that the worry for him, as president, would be
 the effect on people’s lives of a deep economic downturn. As I said earlier, Indonesia can
rise up very quickly and that could be very destabilising for Jokowi and his government.
It could also create an environment in which the military people might be well placed –
not to take over – but to gain more control over the machinery of government.

FDI: As the Covid-19 situation evolves, are we likely to see some provinces opening up 
sooner than others? Is that something that, in terms of Bali and its tourism industry, could
 also involve Australia?

RT: Australia had regained from China the title of biggest provider of tourists to Bali.
In 2019, 
there were 1.24 million Australians who travelled to Bali – 400,000 of whom came
from Western
 Australia – and the number of visitors from China had dropped from about 1.35 million to 
about 1.1 million. Together, Australia and China account for a massive proportion of the tourists 
visiting Bali, with a tourism industry that makes up about 70 per cent of the Balinese economy. 
An argument can be made that it’s only 24 per cent of the economy, but I think that when talking 
about the tourism sector, it’s important to include all the ancillary industries that also rely 
upon it: taxi drivers, restaurant chefs and waiters, and so on. It has a multiplier effect, which
 takes it back to that 70 per cent figure. Now, of course, all of that has gone.
There have been complications and the Governor of Bali has said that he would like to see 
Bali opened up again to international tourists sometime between June and October. Personally, 
however, I find it difficult to see how Australia can agree to a “travel bubble” with Bali, when 
Bali is inviting in flights and visitors from 
other countries, many of which are still having great problems with Covid-19. I can’t see that 
working out at all and I would be surprised to see any Australians returning to Bali before 2021.
 Obviously, that is news that the Governor, Mr Wayan Koster, would probably prefer not to hear,
 but he will understand the reasons for it.

FDI: Given the greater dependence on China that could result for Indonesia from a general 
absence of Australians across the board, what implications does China’s increasingly assertive 
stance have for the Indonesia-Australia relationship?

RT: There are those who have said that not only should we embrace the relationship in terms of
 naval patrols in the South China Sea and the Natuna Islands, but that it would be good to see the 
Australian and Indonesian navies continue to increase their co-operation and work even more 
closely together, because the indications are that China may become even more belligerent. 
That then makes the relationship between Australia and Indonesia even more important.
In terms of building public support for that, however, Australia has to somehow raise the 
awareness of the relationship with Indonesia beyond the very small number of people who 
know a lot about it and have it filter out into the broader community. Australia and Indonesia 
are doing some great work together in terms of policing and security, intelligence-sharing, 
education and health, for instance, but it’s just not widely known in either country and I think 
that we need to work out how to market that a lot better in both Indonesia and Australia. 
We’ve actually got a very, very good neighbourly relationship with – in the words of Professor 
Tim Lindsey – “the strangers next door” and we do work well together. Unfortunately, there is 
also an incredible ignorance about Indonesia which means that, while the bilateral relationship 
is very broad, in terms of depth, it’s very shallow.
In terms of the future of our region, I think that both countries are going to need each other 
more than ever and that with the entering into force very shortly of the Indonesia-Australia
 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA), I think that there is now the
 opportunity for business to step up and start to deepen that relationship. I will say, however, 
that that for IA-CEPA to really bring true benefits, there needs to be more of a partnership 
approach to doing business together. It’s a cliché, but it’s true.

FDI: What industries would lend themselves to that approach?


RT: One area in which it could really work is the beef industry. As it stands, we sell and 
they buy. But, there’s been an opportunity for over fifteen years now for our industry and 
the Indonesian industry to get together and move beyond just supplying Australian beef to
the Indonesian wet markets for lower- and middle-income customers. There is a wonderful 
opportunity to actually form partnerships that add value to quality Australian products in Indonesia,
and then, subject to government reforms and approval – it is illegal to do this at the moment – 
to package Australian beef products in Indonesia to be sold to north-east Asia or as halal products 
to the Middle East. I think that’s a great opportunity for the future, because both countries are 
equally invested and it moves us to a situation in which we’ve become strategic partners.
 That’s just one example, but it’s a big industry and, with the right regulatory changes, 
it could actually work.

FDI: In looking at matters from an Indonesian perspective, a frequent concern is the possibility 
of Indonesia collapsing into a series of semi-autonomous states or the like. Is it fair to
 characterise such “Balkanisation”, as it has been termed, as an existential threat to 
Indonesia as a state?

RT: Well, I think that is exactly why Indonesia is so concerned by any coverage to do 
with Papua, for example. I believe that Papua is going to be an issue that will come to 
the fore in the future and, when it does, it will once again really test the relationship 
between Indonesia and Australia. At the moment, other than the small group who are
 passionate it, Papua is just not something that is on the radar of everyday Australians. 
Whether or not it should be may be a totally different matter. But, in the meantime,
 I think from the Indonesian perspective, Jakarta would prefer that it stayed that way.
Also, I think, a lot of Australians don’t appreciate that, for Indonesia, it’s not just about
 Papua; it’s exactly that existential fear of Balkanisation. The concern among Indonesians 
is that if it happens in Papua, where next? What about Aceh? What about Riau? And it goes
 from there. At the expense of the Papuan people, who want to have their independence, 
the regional geopolitical implications of some future Balkanisation or breakup of Indonesia
 would be immense. Now, I don’t think that will happen, but if it did, the implications for 
Australia would be enormous.

FDI: Let’s conclude by coming back to Australia. What would be the ideal relationship for 
Australia to have with Indonesia? What would Australia need to do to have that relationship? 

RT: Well, I do think that all that is happening right now is coming on the back of, 
generally speaking, really quite good relations between Indonesia and Australia. 
As I said, at all levels, and given the fact that we’re very different people, we work 
well together across a whole range of issues. Unfortunately, of course, the relationship 
still tends to be dominated by the things that go wrong rather than by the things that are 
going right.
I’ve been associated with business in Indonesia for twenty-five years and I’ve just about 
seen it all, I think. I’ve got to say that, whether it be East Timor, or the executions of 
Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, or any other issue, the impact on business has
 been fairly minimal, overall.
Now, there are certainly some issues there and one thing that I do think Australia needs 
is a change of mindset whereby we can deepen that relationship by sharing our considerable 
scientific, technological, healthcare, educational and agricultural expertise, for example, 
to make a mutually-beneficial, financially-rewarding contribution to the enormous future
 growth of Indonesia. So, it needs to be a change from that mindset of ‘what can we flog 
off to them?’ to finding partnerships that enable us to work together for the benefit of both countries.

*****  

About the Interviewee: Ross Taylor is the President and Founder of the Perth-based 
Indonesia Institute. He is a former WA Government Regional Director to Indonesia and
 has held numerous senior industry positions, including National Vice-President and WA 
State Chair of the Australia-Indonesia Business Council, and with Wesfarmers Ltd and 
Phosphate Resources Limited. He also operated his own business in Medan, Sumatra 
for three years.
Ross is involved in philanthropy and cancer-charity work throughout the region and is 
one of Australia’s leading commentators on Indonesia-Australia relations, writing opinion 
articles for The Australian, The West Australian and Jakarta Post newspapers on a regular 
basis and commentating on Sky News and ABC Radio programmes. Ross is also the author
 of three published books.
In 2013, Ross was appointed by the Governor-General of Australia as a Member of the 
Order of Australia (AM) for significant services to Australia-Indonesia relations and to 
the philanthropic community. Ross was also selected, in July 2013, by the Indonesian 
Government as Australia’s “Presidential Friend of Indonesia 2013.”
*****

Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of 
Future Directions International. 
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