Friday, June 3, 2022

1) Penny Wong’s Pacific mission


2) Police guards protest by Papuan People’s Petition in Jayapura 
3) People’s aspiration rejecting Biak spaceport rejected by govt, supported by church 
4) Mystery surrounds how munitions imported for Indonesia's civilian spies were used in attacks on villages
5) Albanese’s trip to Jakarta a chance to strengthen Australia–Indonesia ties

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https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2022/06/04/penny-wongs-pacific-mission#mtr

Australia’s new government is racing to repair relationships with Pacific Island nations as China works to expand its influence across the region. By Edward Cavanough.

1) Penny Wong’s Pacific mission

“The first thing I wanted to do after being sworn in, is to share a few thoughts with our Pacific family,” said Penny Wong with a wry smile in her first public statements as Australia’s 40th minister for Foreign Affairs.

Within minutes of assuming her new role, Wong made it clear that the perceived inattention towards the Pacific under the former government was over. Australia promised to listen, Wong said, in a pitch that opened a frantic first fortnight on the world stage. After an extraordinary election campaign in which, unusually, foreign policy challenges were front and centre, the government needed to hit the ground running.

Within two weeks of taking office, Anthony Albanese and Penny Wong will have held direct, in-person talks with seven nations, with the foreign minister also delivering a keynote address to the Pacific Islands Forum, the key multilateral body in the Pacific. The pace reflects a genuine urgency within the Albanese government to recast Australia’s global reputation, and an awareness of the activist foreign policy role Australia now has to take in order to manage increasingly fraught international and regional dynamics.

The new government’s Pacific focus is no accident. During the campaign, Albanese argued that the Morrison government’s lack of regard for Pacific concerns had undermined Australia’s standing in the region and potentially led to Beijing’s increasing engagement. This week, concerns about China’s role in the Pacific reached new heights as the nation’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, embarked on a 10-day, eight-nation sweep of the Pacific Islands. Starting with the signing of a controversial security pact with Solomon Islands, Wang subsequently stitched up bilateral deals with Samoa, Fiji, Niue and Tonga.

Most controversially, the Chinese foreign minister had sought to sign a region-wide deal covering issues as diverse as economic engagement, fisheries management, policing and IT support. The deal, which was leaked to Reuters by a disgruntled Pacific government, was ultimately knocked back. But its ambition represented a marked shift in China’s approach to the Pacific, causing even more anxiety to security officials in Canberra who had already been caught off guard by Solomon Islands’ increasing embrace of Beijing.

The Pacific ministry was once a low-profile portfolio, often occupied by junior members of parliament under the Coalition. But the centrality of Pacific affairs during the election campaign has elevated the role. Given the Albanese government’s overt focus on the region, pressure will be on newly sworn-in minister Pat Conroy to deliver.

“Pacific Island nations are sovereign countries who will make decisions based on what’s in the best interests for their people,” Conroy tells The Saturday Paper. “Ultimately I believe that’s why China’s proposed deal fell through.”

Dr Tess Newton Cain, who heads Griffith University’s Pacific Hub and is a leading analyst on Pacific Island affairs, agrees. She believes China’s ambitious attempt to sign a region-wide deal reflected a misunderstanding about how things get done in the Pacific. 

“[The deal] was all a bit rushed. It was very wide-ranging. There was a sense that [Pacific nations] had to take it all and there were certain aspects that people were uncomfortable with,” she says.

On region-wide issues, Pacific Island countries typically try to seek consensus before agreeing to major initiatives. China’s inability to achieve a quiet consensus prior to its sweeping regional tour this week is being viewed as a significant misstep. “The process issue is almost as significant as the content issue,” says Newton Cain of the deal.

The Samoan prime minister, Fiamē Naomi Mata‘afa, was among those who criticised China’s process in the lead-up to the deal.

“We have not made a decision, as we didn’t have enough time to look at it,” she told local media in Samoa.

But Samoa’s reticence to sign a region-wide deal with China did not stop it signing its own bilateral agreement with Beijing when Wang visited Apia.

In Tonga, another stop on Wang’s tour, China’s rushed multilateral approach is also meeting criticism. Lord Mata‘i‘ulua ‘i Fonuamotu, a former member of Tonga’s parliament, told The Saturday Paper the China deal wasn’t necessarily a failure but “what was presented was merely done so through the wrong channels and not enough time was given for any well-thought-out consideration”.

This week, Penny Wong has returned to the region. She is visiting both Tonga and Samoa to continue spruiking her message of change. On Thursday in Samoa, Wong announced an eight-year partnership to support human development in the nation.

But the task for the Labor government in the Pacific is daunting. During the election and in its first days in office, Labor announced significant policies related to the Pacific, including expansive reforms to visa arrangements, more than $500 million in additional aid spending, as well as new ideas such as a Pacific Climate Infrastructure Financing Partnership, which is intended to tackle issues including energy poverty. Delivering on these pledges could prove fraught.

Tess Newton Cain believes some Pacific Island countries will be concerned that the Australian visa policy, for example, could lead to “brain drain”, with the best and brightest Pasifikas seeking a future in Australia to the detriment of their own countries. Although Labor’s other pledges are being well received, Pacific countries are used to big promises from international donors that never materialise.

Pacific Islanders are saying of Australia’s new approach “this sounds good, we like the tone”, says Newton Cain, “but we need to see how this plays out”.

Perhaps the strongest pledge the new government has made is its commitment to “end the climate wars” in Australia and recognise the existential threat climate change presents to Pacific Island nations.

“Unfortunately the previous government did not take this seriously and at times made jokes about the effects climate change was having on our neighbours,” Conroy tells The Saturday Paper. “So we will take climate action seriously, and we will deliver on our commitments, which will go a long way to repairing our relationship with our Pacific family.”

In July, when the Pacific Islands Forum next convenes, Labor’s climate pledges will be heavily scrutinised, Newton Cain believes. The region’s leaders “are going to want more, and they’ve already made that clear”, she says.

While improving ties with the Pacific has been an immediate focus of the new government, Albanese is now turning his attention to South-East Asia. This weekend, the prime minister travels to Indonesia to confer with President Joko Widodo. The country is traditionally the first stop on a new Australian prime minister’s itinerary but Albanese’s required presence at the Quad in Japan interceded.

Indonesia – the world’s third-largest democracy after India and the United States – is quickly emerging as an economic superpower. But the new government faces a delicate balancing act between realising its determination to be a better friend to the Pacific and its commitments to strengthen ties with Jakarta. The long-running struggles in West Papua, which is controlled by Indonesia, remain a sore point for many Pacific nations, especially Vanuatu. Since the 1960s, West Papuans have been pushing for independence, with dissidents facing increased violence at the hands of Indonesian authorities in recent years. In the lead-up to his visit, Albanese is facing calls to do more to address concerns over the province.

Veronica Koman is an Indonesian lawyer who has represented numerous West Papuan dissidents in Indonesian courts, and is now living in Australia working for Amnesty International.

“The Albanese government’s approach towards the Pacific family is promising, but the issue of West Papua will be the litmus test if this new approach is real or just an empty promise,” says Koman.

She contends that many people in the Pacific “have always regarded West Papuans as part of their family”, with some viewing issues in West Papua as “the next biggest problem in the Pacific after the climate crisis”.

Dr Camellia Webb-Gannon is a scholar at the University of Wollongong and author of Morning Star Rising, which tracks West Papua’s independence struggle. She tells The Saturday Paper that, while Australia cannot solve the West Papuan issue, working with Jakarta on the issue presents an opportunity to reinforce the bilateral relationship.

“Australia’s contribution to addressing human rights in West Papua could ultimately strengthen ties between the two countries,” she says. “The longer Australia shirks its responsibility to West Papuans, the more dire the consequences for West Papuans’ wellbeing, Indonesia’s democratic reputation and long-term investment from Australia in dealing with the spillover effects of violence.”

This article was first published in the print edition of The Saturday Paper on June 4, 2022 as "Penny in the Pacific".

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https://en.jubi.id/police-guards-protest-by-papuan-peoples-petition-in-jayapura/


2) Police guards protest by Papuan People’s Petition in Jayapura   
Protest Rejecting Otsus And DOB & Asking For Referendum -
 News Desk 3 June 2022

Jayapura, Jubi – The Jayapura City Police deployed its forces this morning to a number of locations where the Papuan People’s Petition (PRP) mass protested on Friday, June 3, 2022, claiming to secure the action.

The PRP previously announced their plan to take to the streets to reject the new Papua Special Autonomy (Otsus) Law, the government’s plan to build a new autonomous region (DOB) in Papua, and support Papua’s referendum.

Early at 7 a.m. local time, the police were already on guard at Abepura, in front of Mimika Dormitory, Expo Waena, Perumnas III, and Abe Campus of Cenderawasih University.

No people showed up at Expo Waena until 7:35 a.m. Meanwhile, at Perumnas III, the mass was already giving speeches at 7 a.m.

Spokesperson for the Papuan People’s Petition (PRP) Jefri Wenda said his party would continue to express the people’s aspiration of refusing Otsus and the new autonomous regions, and their wish to hold a referendum in Papua.

“We will take to the streets and the security forces cannot be repressive towards the protesters. Because we just want to convey our aspirations to the legislative council. The police should be supporting the action,” he said.

On Thursday, Jayapura City Police chief Victor Mackbon said he had ordered thousands of police and Indonesian Military (TNI) personnel to prevent chaos from happening during the protest. The police, Mackbon said, did not want what happened at the end of August 2019 to occur again in Jayapura City. At that time, the antiracism protest in the capital city of Papua Province ended in chaos.

According to him, the police will not prohibit demonstrations as long as they comply with the rules and stay peaceful. Protesters are also not allowed to do a long march to the Papuan Legislative Council (DPRP).

“We have established communication with the person in charge. If they can meet the requirements according to the law, go on. But if not, we’re sorry to take several actions. If their purpose is telling their aspirations, we will gladly help by providing them with vehicles to go to the DPRP. We do not prohibit telling aspiration but suggest another method, not on a long march,” said Victor Mackbon on June 2. (*)

Writer: News DeskEditor: News Desk


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3) People’s aspiration rejecting Biak spaceport rejected by govt, supported by church 
Biak Spaceport - News Desk 3 June 2022

Jayapura, Jubi – The Byak’Si Community Movement has submitted to the Synod of the Evangelical Christian Church (GKI) Papua its aspiration to reject the Biak Spaceport development plan in Biak Numfor Regency on Monday, May 30, 2022. The step was taken after the Byak’Si Community failed to convey its aspirations to the Biak Numfor Regent and Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD).

Their aspiration was accepted by GKI Papua chair Rev. Andrikus Mofu. During the meeting, Mofu was accompanied by deputy chair Rev. Hizkia Rollo, head of GKI’s Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (KPKC) Rev. Dora Balubun, and other synod leaders.

The coordinator of the Byak’Si Community Movement, Michael Awom, said that the Biak Numfor Regent and the Biak Numfor DPRD did not accept the aspirations of those who rejected the Biak Spaceport plan.

“We protested but the Regent refused. We went to the Biak Numfor Regent’s Office but they closed the door. In fact, the military was there on guard. We also went to the Biak Numfor DPRD Office to no avail,” Awom told Jubi in Jayapura City on Monday.

According to Awom, the central government together with the Biak Numfor Administration continue to encourage the acceleration of the construction of the Biak Spaceport located in Saukobye Village, North Biak District, despite rejection from the indigenous people.

“The indigenous people of Warbon do not wish their land being used by the state,” he said. Awom said that the territories of indigenous peoples in Biak have been mapped according to the customary land rights of each clan on Biak Island. On top of their respective ulayat (land), each clan makes a living and maintains life.

According to Awom, the Biak community hopes that GKI as a religious forum can pay attention to the threat against customary rights faced by the Biak community, especially the Warbon indigenous people. Moreover, Biak Numfor is the largest and first GKI base in Papua.

He further said that the GKI Papua Synod is one of the pillars that has proven to be able to unite and maintain the harmony of the Biak people, as well as the Papuan people in general. “We [the Biak people] ask for attention from the GKI Papua Synod,” he said.

Head of the GKI Papua KPKC Rev. Dora Balubun said the rejection of the Biak Spaceport required the support of many parties. She said the church would take action and support Biak residents’ rejection of the government’s plan to build a spaceport in Biak. (*)

Writer: News DeskEditor: News Desk

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https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/mystery-surrounds-how-munitions-imported-indonesias-civilian-spies-were-used-2022-06-03/

4) Mystery surrounds how munitions imported for Indonesia's civilian spies were used in attacks on villages

June 3, 2022 9:00 PM GMT+10 Last Updated 12 hours ago

By Tom Allard and Stanley Widianto

JAKARTA, June 3(Reuters) - Almost 2,500 mortar shells from Serbia bought for Indonesia's spy agency last year were converted to be air-dropped, and some were used in attacks on eight villages in Papua, according to a report from an arms monitoring group and photos provided to Reuters.

The alleged procurement for the state intelligence agency, known as BIN, was not disclosed to the parliamentary oversight committee that approves its budget, three members told Reuters.

The London-based monitoring group, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), said the mortar rounds were manufactured by Serbia's state-owned arms-maker Krusik and later modified to be dropped from the air rather than fired from a mortar tube. It said the arms sent to BIN also included 3,000 electronic initiators and three timing devices typically used to detonate explosives.

The 81mm mortar rounds were used in attacks in October on villages in Papua, an Indonesian province where a decades-long campaign by armed separatists has accelerated in recent years, according to CAR, an eyewitness, and human rights investigators working on behalf of several church groups.

Reuters was not able to independently confirm certain aspects of the CAR report, including whether BIN had received the shipment. Reuters also could not establish who authorised the purchase of the munitions or who used them in Papua.

BIN and the Ministry of Defence did not respond to requests for comment about the purchase or use of the mortar shells.

The parliamentary oversight committee is holding a closed hearing next week with BIN, and the weapons purchase will be discussed, one committee member said.

Tubagus Hasanuddin, a former general who also sits on the parliamentary committee that oversees BIN, said that the intelligence agency can acquire small arms for its agents' self defence but that any military-grade weapons "must be for education or training purposes and not for combat".

"We need to conduct a hearing first with BIN and check the reason. Afterwards we will check the legality," he said.

No one was killed, although homes and several churches burned down, according to one witness and investigators working for eight human rights and church groups to document the attacks.

"It's clear cut that these mortars are offensive weapons that were used in civilian areas," said Jim Elmslie, convenor of the West Papua Project at the University of Wollongong, who submitted CAR's report to the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in April. "This is a breach of humanitarian law."

BIN is a civilian agency under the direct authority of Indonesia's president, Joko Widodo, widely known as Jokowi. The president's office did not respond to a request for comment about the purchase or use of the weapons.

A spokesman for Indonesia's military, Col. Wieng Pranoto, told Reuters its forces did not drop the munitions on the villages. He declined to say whether BIN deployed the munitions.

Indonesian law requires the military, police and other government agencies to seek permission from the Ministry of Defence to buy arms, and requires them to use materiel produced by the domestic defence industry if it is available. The country's state-owned arms-maker PT Pindad produces mortar rounds, and they are part of the armed forces' arsenal.

A defence ministry source familiar with the procurement system said the ministry never approved the purchase or any regulation that would allow BIN to acquire the munitions.

"It raises questions of why BIN would want them," this person said.

Another member of the parliamentary committee that oversees BIN said he was personally investigating the findings in CAR's report to determine whether there was any wrongdoing. He said he had approached BIN and PT Pindad for an explanation but "found a lot of giant walls".

"There must be something that is very, very sensitive about it," he told Reuters.

PT Pindad's spokesperson and chief executive's office did not answer detailed questions from Reuters about how the mortar rounds were procured or who used them.

One of the company's commissioners, Alexandra Wuhan, declined to discuss specifics of the purchase, but said: "Pindad is obliged and subjected to Indonesia's laws, rules and regulations regarding military and civilian arms procurements, likewise BIN as the end user. Pindad cannot be held responsible for the when and where the arms are used by Indonesian authorities. We do not have such control."

ARMS PURCHASE

CAR is a Europe-based arms monitor whose clients have included the European Union, the United Nations, and the U.S. and British governments.

The organisation analysed photos of ordnance used in the attacks in Papua and formally requested information on the shells from the Serbian government via the country's mission at the United Nations in New York on Nov. 26.

Serbia's UN ambassador, Nemanja Stevanovic, provided a response on Dec. 31 in a "note verbale," a formal diplomatic communique. James Bevan, CAR's executive director, said the information in that communique formed the basis of the weapons tracking group's report.

CAR declined to share Serbia's response, citing protocols. Stevanovic, and Serbia's UN Mission, did not respond to a Reuters request to share the note verbale.

THE TRANSFER

The report said Serbia confirmed Krusic made the M-72 high-explosive mortar rounds, which were sold to Serbian arms supplier Zenitprom DOO in February 2021 along with the 3,000 electronic initiators and timing devices. The munitions were then exported by Zenitprom DOO to PT Pindad for BIN, the group says.

On Oct. 6, 2020, at the beginning of the procurement process, BIN provided Serbian authorities with end-user certificate No. R-540/X/2020, confirming that they would be the exclusive users of the items in the consignment and that the munitions would not be transferred or sold to other parties without the permission of the Serbian authorities, the report said. No request to transfer the weapons was made before the Papua attack, the Serbian government told CAR, according to the report.

In its report, CAR said Serbia confirmed the lot numbers on the shells used in Papua matched those of the ones purchased by BIN.

Some details of the report that Reuters was not able to independently confirm include the mortar shells' matching lot numbers, the transfer of the munitions consignment to BIN or whether BIN complied with the end-user certificate. Reuters was unable to determine who had modified the mortar rounds or why BIN had purchased the timers and igniters.

CAR said BIN had provided the Serbian government with a "delivery verification certification," although Reuters could not independently confirm the weapons had arrived in BIN's hands.

An official at the arms-control section of Serbia's Ministry of Trade in Belgrade and the country's embassy in Jakarta did not respond to Reuters' request for comment. Krusik and Zenitprom DOO did not respond to requests for comment.

VILLAGE ATTACKS

An independence rebellion has simmered in resource-rich Papua since 1969, when a United Nations-supervised vote involving only about 1,025 people led to the former Dutch colony becoming part of Indonesia.

The security situation in Papua has "dramatically deteriorated" since April 2021, when separatists killed the head of BIN's Papua office in an ambush, according to a statement by three U.N. special rapporteurs in March. Between April and November last year, they said there were "shocking abuses" by the government. The Indonesian government rejected their statement. read more 

Starting on Oct. 10, 2021, helicopters and drones fired into and dropped munitions on eight villages in the Kiwirok district for several days, according to the eyewitness interviewed by Reuters, human rights investigators and several local church leaders.

"They dropped bombs with drones," Pastor Yahya Uopmabin told Reuters, saying he watched the assault from nearby mountains, where many residents had fled. "Places of worship, houses of residents were burning."

Eneko Bahabol, a Papuan investigator working for a consortium of eight human rights and church groups, said 32 mortar rounds were dropped, including five that didn't detonate. Reuters has seen photos of the unexploded rounds.

The photos from CAR show the mortar shells carry the markings of the Serbian state-owned arms-maker. Samuel Paunila, head of the ammunition management advisory team at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, confirmed the mortar rounds had Krusic markings.


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5) Albanese’s trip to Jakarta a chance to strengthen Australia–Indonesia ties
3 Jun 2022|David Engel

By going to Jakarta so early in his prime ministership, Anthony Albanese is practising what he preached during the election campaign about the importance he intends attaching to Indonesia. He’s right to position Indonesia in this way, even if rushing to its capital so soon after his election—something no Indonesian president is ever likely to reciprocate—tends to underscore the asymmetry in the relationship. Only the United States and China matter more to Australia’s future strategic interests.

Albanese starts with several advantages. Indonesian observers have often perceived Labor as understanding Indonesia better than the Coalition, or at least wanting to. As one Indonesian academic in international affairs recently put it: ‘Historically, Labor has had a greater regard for Indonesia’. Many recall the Hawke-Keating era as the high point in the relationship.

Albanese is no stranger to Indonesia, having visited the country both as a minister during the last Labor governments and as opposition leader in 2019. He also met Indonesian President Joko Widodo during Jokowi’s last visit to Canberra in 2020. As a result, the two leaders already know and seemingly respect each other. And few things are as important as exhibiting that respect when it comes to engaging Indonesia.

Another advantage for Albanese is the two leaders’ shared experiences of struggle from humble socio-economic origins to national leadership, journeys that left similar, though not identical, impressions on their personas. Albanese’s personal story and easygoing, unostentatious personality will likely resonate with any average Indonesian curious enough to pay attention to his visit. They will chime with the narrative that helped take Jokowi to the presidential palace.

Another is their shared passion for nation building through infrastructure, and their conviction that access to quality education advances both individuals and nations, as their own lives testify. Both subjects are bound to be high on their meeting’s agenda and the conversation will be easy and enthusiastic. A side-trip to Monash University’s pioneering campus in Indonesia, the only foreign university with such a presence, should be on Albanese’s program if it isn’t already.

Yet another advantage is their shared compassion on some aspects of social policy. Jokowi has declared a special interest in supporting people with disabilities. Albanese can share Australia’s experience with the National Disability Insurance Scheme .

In these areas, the two leaders will have grounds to build on whatever rapport they have already struck. While that’s a necessary condition for the sort of partnership the two nations need, it is far from sufficient, especially for Jokowi. Returning from his first-ever overseas trip as president in November 2014, he stressed that while befriending all countries was fine, he intended paying most attention to those that provided ‘the most benefits to the [Indonesian] people’, adding that he wasn’t interested in those that provided none.

Jokowi’s view of international affairs may have matured somewhat since then, but his transactional character has almost certainly not changed. He will value anything Albanese can offer Indonesia by way of practical support for its development priorities. The more Australia can work with like-minded partners such as the US and Japan to improve the quality and governance of Indonesia’s infrastructure development, and the more that Australia’s modestly beefed-up aid for Southeast Asia can help Indonesia address such pressing issues as food security and pandemic and climate change resilience, the more resonant Albanese’s message to Indonesia’s leadership will be.

One initiative Albanese might consider proposing is a joint research program like that which Australia already has with India, perhaps with a heavier focus on such fields as agriculture, biomedical technologies, clean energy, food and water security, and marine science. This would appeal to Jokowi, whose recent efforts to woo Tesla and SpaceX chief Elon Musk to Indonesia highlight his interest in fostering scientific cooperation and ambitions for his nation’s technological advancement.

Other economic and trade subjects will be fundamental to the visit. Global economic uncertainties and problems, and their impacts on both economies, necessitate this. And subject to the risks climate change and other factors pose to its growth trajectory, Indonesia’s rise to becoming an economic powerhouse has never been lost on Australian governments of both persuasions. The Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement reflects the aspirations for closer commercial ties that both countries have identified as a result. But IA-CEPA remains largely aspirational, principally because of the limited complementarities of the nations’ economies and Indonesia’s often unattractive investment environment. Giving too much prominence to this aspect of the relationship risks raising expectations that aren’t likely to be met soon.

For all they have in common, the two leaders diverge in important ways. Jokowi is no social democrat on economic policy. He is Indonesia’s first president from a business background, and it shows. The more his presidency has progressed, the more his agenda has aligned with the interests of business and the less with those of the common folk who voted for him. Inequality has risen markedly. Plutocrats, including in Jokowi’s cabinet, have flourished. The central plank in his economic reforms, the jobs creation law, sparked major and sustained protests from unions, environmental groups and other civil society organisations over the many provisions privileging business interests over those of labour and the environment.

Nor is Jokowi a liberal democrat. During his tenure, democratic norms and practices have regressed. Liberal values, never dominant in socially conservative Indonesian society, have waned. Critics have claimed, with some reason, that his singular focus on economic development has often come at the expense of human rights and good governance. Indonesia’s national anti-corruption body has been neutered. Minorities, notably the LGBTQ community, are coming under growing pressure from conservative religious bodies and could face worse persecution under flagged new laws. Jokowi has done little if anything to counter these developments, some of which his own vice president and ministers have pushed.

Papua threatens to become an exemplar of Jokowi’s governance shortcomings and tendency to see development as a panacea for longstanding indigenous grievance. Unrest is rising. His administration’s unpopular plans to subdivide the region into additional provinces look set only to worsen matters. Nothing in the relationship poses more risks of distrust and bilateral disharmony than how Jakarta handles this restive territory and how sections of the Australian community, including within the parliament, respond to its actions.

In these areas of Jokowi’s administration, it is hard to imagine trends less in sync with what the Albanese government promises for Australians, or less likely to appeal to a parliament set for a likely 12 Greens senators and four Greens members of the House of Representatives.

Already some Indonesian observers are expecting a Labor government to put a greater onus on human rights and social issues in discussions with Indonesia than a Coalition government would. Albanese would be on sure ground in affirming his government’s determination to support international human rights instruments (to which Indonesia itself is a signatory), especially in any discussion about the rise of authoritarianism around the world. On Papua specifically, Jokowi will expect the usual reiteration of Australia’s support for Indonesia’s sovereignty, and he’ll get it. Albanese will need to tread carefully beyond this if his message is to get traction, but he could stress that Australia shares Indonesia’s interest in the region being prosperous, peaceful and governed in accordance with the principles of its special autonomy.

Albanese will no doubt arrive well briefed on the fundamental differences between Indonesia and Australia on international affairs, including tensions in the Indo-Pacific arising from China’s increasing assertiveness. Jakarta is not blind to China’s threat. It’s seen it firsthand in its northern waters. Its concerns about Canberra’s position partly reflect the gap between Australia’s focus on military deterrence as a key element in countering China’s ambitions and Indonesia’s prioritising of dialogue and cooperation to this end. Albanese’s participation in the Quad meeting and remarks on China will have confirmed Jakarta’s view that Australia remains set on a different course to its own. No amount of rapport among leaders will alter this reality.

This year’s G20 leaders’ summit in Bali risks bringing differences on Ukraine to a head. For doctrinal and pragmatic reasons, Jakarta refuses to hold Vladimir Putin culpable for a war whose economic impacts have reached Indonesia. Determined to use the event to showcase Indonesia, Jokowi will insist on Albanese’s attendance regardless of Putin’s presence and his offences against international law that Indonesia claims to hold dear. Much could happen in the interim to engineer an acceptable compromise that would see the summit proceed, however effectively, with its full membership. Albanese’s default position should be to commit Australia’s support for finding and supporting that compromise, in conjunction with like-minded partners such as Japan.

AUKUS, specifically Australia’s plans to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines, will not have faded from Indonesian minds simply with the election of a different Australian government. For some Indonesians, the AUKUS launch revived memories of the Howard-era ‘deputy sheriff’ tag and evoked the image of a conservative Australia desperately clinging to the Anglosphere and turning its back on its region. Jakarta’s official line depicted AUKUS as a catalyst for a regional arms race, a narrative Beijing was also quick to promote.

The salient issue here is the impact of the submarines on the nuclear non-proliferation regime should their power source be weapons-grade uranium. It would be tin-eared to dismiss Indonesia’s concerns out of hand, however hyperbolic its rhetoric on this has been. Albanese can respond that Australia and the US and UK have committed to an approach to the submarines that strengthens non-proliferation benchmarks and prevents diversion of highly enriched uranium for any other purpose. He could also reassure Jokowi that Australia is in discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency to find a safeguards solution and might propose ongoing consultation to assuage Indonesia’s concerns. This would underscore a shared commitment to non-proliferation.

Albanese’s domestic agenda on gender, indigenous affairs and a strong anti-corruption watchdog will strike an attractive chord to any younger, liberal Indonesians paying attention to developments in Australia. His trip might serve as a prologue for further efforts his government could make on public diplomacy and towards enhancing Australia’s ‘soft power’ in Indonesia.

Albanese’s visit therefore offers scope for recapturing Indonesian attention invariably drawn northwards because of the economic heft of China, Japan and Korea, and the diplomatic and security imperatives linked to both ASEAN and China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. But building the sort of relationship fit for our nations’ shared strategic purposes will require sustained engagement and mutually supportive cooperation across many areas, notwithstanding our inevitable differences. By presenting himself as the personable, trustworthy leader of a significant regional power intent on always treating Indonesia as a valued partner in its own right, Albanese can reaffirm the more positive Indonesian perceptions of its southern neighbour.

AUTHOR

David Engel is the head of ASPI’s Indonesia program. He is a former Australian ambassador to Mexico and the countries of Central America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and served twice in Australia’s embassy in Jakarta. Image: Anthony Albanese/Twitter.

 

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