Despite consistently declaring that Indonesia is Australia’s most important bilateral partner, and prime minister Tony Abbott'scommitment today "to continue the progress that has been made to resolve current issues and to strengthen the relationship further," it is clear that the Australian government will persist with a policy of turning boats back, whether Indonesia likes it or not. Debate will continue to rage over the policy, but what is certain is that we are still confused as to what our relationship with Indonesia should look like.
It may have been common in the past for the Australian embassy in Jakarta to receive notes from the president’s palace, asking “what does Australia want?”, but recent events show this way of conducting the relationship is not viable in the long term. Indonesia seems fed up or confused. They may now be inclined to ask: Why would Australia declare the Indonesian president our "best friend", and make him an honorary companion of the Order of Australia, yet tap his and his wife’s phone? Why would Australia claim Indonesia is our most important partner, yet pursue unilateral action when we’ve asked them not to?

These and many other questions are at the heart of what is now a perplexing bilateral relationship. For Australia's part, many feel that Indonesia "owes" us because we provide aid to them. It's clear why people think this way; when Australia wants Papua New Guinea or Nauru to take our asylum seekers, we come bearing aid.
Foreign aid isn't leverage to make our neighbours acquiesce to our foreign policy requests, yet this argument dominates discussion on talkback radio and in online commentary. One of Tony Abbott’s first policies as opposition leader was to advocate for reducing educational aid to Indonesia, arguing that “charity begins at home”. This view eventually subsided, after it was pointed out that policies implemented under John Howard that promoted secular education in poorer areas of Indonesia, were ultimately beneficial to Australia. But the recent take-over of AusAid by the department of foreign affairs and trade suggests this argument of "trade as leverage" is becoming more pervasive.
This leads to the dominant (but misguided) belief that Indonesia needs us more than we need them. Actually, the Australian government has to work incredibly hard in Indonesia to maintain our relevance. Aid programs help with this, as do other people-to-people links. We are going to need to increasingly work with a "rising" Indonesia on issues such as irregular migration, climate change, business and trade, and in the education sector. In short, it would be fair to say that we need Indonesia more than Indonesia needs us, and this will become more evident in the next 10 years.
Another recent concern is that Indonesian politicians will grandstand and push anti-Australian sentiment in order to gain votes. This is currently not the biggest problem in the relationship. It could indeed be the case in the future, but so far, there hasn’t been a prominent candidate in Indonesia who has pushed an overt anti-Australian platform in this year's elections.
If they did, there is (so far) no evidence at all that it would gain them any significant number of votes. The current Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), has tried to look tough on the issue of spying, but his term is coming to an end and his popularity is low. Nationalistic grandstanding will play a part in the election, but it won't be won or lost on asylum seeker policies, Australia-Indonesia relations, or indeed even on foreign policy issues.
By contrast, the Australian 2013 federal election saw our politicians bring Indonesia to the front and centre of their campaign in order to appeal to voters. Abbott’s policy to turn back the boats to Indonesia resonated strongly with many voters, despite Kevin Rudd's warning that the then-opposition leader was “trying to risk some sort of conflict with Indonesia”. When Abbott visited Indonesia as prime minister, he acknowledged the tone of the 2013 election campaign, saying "there have been times when all sides of Australian politics should have said less and done more". It is unlikely that the future president of Indonesia will need to make similar overtures come 2015. Australia, and the issue of asylum seekers coming by boat, is simply not that important in the minds of Indonesian voters this year.
In 2010, SBY stated overtly when he addressed the Australian parliament that “the most persistent problem in our relations in the persistence of age-old stereotypes”. There is certainly an argument that by taking to Twitter over the spying scandal, and withdrawing the ambassador, SBY failed to heed his own words, and encouraged those stereotypes to grow in his own country. But the current debate allows us to debunk two popular stereotypes. First, that Indonesia owes us because of our aid programs. Second, that Indonesians will use similar tactics on asylum seeker issues to gain votes, as our politicians did in last year’s election. It has been over four years since SBY made this appeal for a greater understanding of each other. Does that look likely at all in the near future?